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 ABSTRACT 
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BERLIN 
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Marquette University, 2011 
 
 
 This paper examines John F. Kennedy’s rhetoric concerning the Berlin Crisis 
(1961-1963). Three major speeches are analyzed: Kennedy’s Radio and Television 
Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, the Address at Rudolph Wilde Platz 
and the Address at the Free University. The study interrogates the rhetorical strategies 
implemented by Kennedy in confronting Khrushchev over the explosive situation in 
Berlin. The paper attempts to answer the following research questions: What is the 
historical context that helped frame the rhetorical situation Kennedy faced? What 
rhetorical strategies and tactics did Kennedy employ in these speeches? How might 
Kennedy's speeches extend our understanding of presidential public address? What is the 
impact of Kennedy's speeches on U.S. German relations and the development of U.S. and 
German Policy? What implications might these speeches have for the study and 
execution of presidential power and international diplomacy?  
 
Using a historical-rhetorical methodology that incorporates the historical circumstances 
surrounding the crisis into the analysis, this examination of Kennedy’s rhetoric reveals 
his evolution concerning Berlin and his Cold War strategy. It is argued that Kennedy 
began with a military strategy, flexible response, which was established in his Radio and 
Television Report in July 1961 and over the next two years this strategy evolved into a 
strategy of peace embodied in a policy of détente. Kennedy moved away from 
Eisenhower’s Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy and the implied either-or 
choice of holocaust or humiliation toward a more flexible policy that gave the president 
many more options. By including a historical account of U.S.-German relations from 
World War II to Kennedy’s ascension in 1961 to his untimely death in 1963, this study 
also connects Kennedy’s rhetoric to important developments in U.S.-German relations 
and highlight’s the president’s crucial role in shaping this process.   
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of presidential rhetoric as a scholarly pursuit has evolved over the years, 
and is now seen as an interdisciplinary field with many different contributors and as a 
force in the academic world (Medhurst, 2008). Presidential rhetorical articles have 
increased in two key journals, Presidential Studies Quarterly and Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs. Since 2005, Presidential Studies Quarterly has published 19 articles or reviews 
of books on presidential rhetoric. Rhetoric & Public Affairs has published approximately 
40 articles concerning presidential rhetoric. The variety of articles being published in 
both journals demonstrates an increasing interest among scholars in presidential rhetoric. 
While these studies are filling in the scholarly knowledge Windt (1986) recognized there 
are still many topics and presidents that have not been examined by rhetorical scholars. 
Background and Previous Studies 
Existing scholarship on Kennedy addresses various aspects of his foreign policy 
addresses, but no existing rhetorical scholarship has focused on his three major speeches 
on U.S.-German relations and their role in U.S. policy toward Germany. Berlin was 
central to Kennedy’s foreign policy, and while scholars have focused on either his Report 
to the American People on the Berlin Crisis or his address at Rudolph Wilde Platz, no 
rhetorical scholar has analyzed both speeches together. In addition, there has been no 
scholarly rhetorical study of Kennedy’s address at the Free University of Berlin, which 
provided Willy Brandt with the impetus to implement his Ostpolitik policy with East 
Berlin. The lion’s share of literature on Kennedy and the Berlin Crisis comes in the form 
of historical research. Although much of this research is richly detailed and provides the 
context for the Berlin Crisis, it does not apply the techniques of rhetorical analysis. 
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Further, historians most often refer to the important lines and phrases from Kennedy’s 
speeches and note the historical consequences of Kennedy’s actions on the Cold War 
landscape.  
Even Kennedy’s speech writer, Theodore Sorensen (1965), provides an exclusive 
look inside the Kennedy administration, but his analysis of Kennedy is more historical 
than rhetorical. Theodore Windt Jr.’s (2003) study on Kennedy’s speech writing process 
used all three German speeches as examples of the multifaceted atmosphere in which 
Kennedy’s speeches were drafted, but Windt fails to critique any German address in 
depth. Rather, Windt examines the collaboration between Sorensen and Kennedy, and the 
evolution of Kennedy’s rhetorical style over his political career. Other rhetorical studies 
include Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos (1995b), Goldzwig and Bostdorff (1994), and 
Meagher (1997) focus on Kennedy’s personal characteristics or the pragmatic idealism 
present in his foreign policy speeches. These studies draw upon Kennedy’s background 
and presidential campaign to show the formation and transformation of Kennedy’s 
thought. These studies are essential to understanding Kennedy’s actions and rhetoric in 
Berlin. Where Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos (1995a) examine Kennedy’s Report to the 
Nation on Berlin, they give no substantial attention to the other two speeches in the 
context of the German question. In fact, Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos’ (1995b.) previous 
study demonstrated the full dimensions of Kennedy’s attempts at strategic balancing of 
idealism and pragmatism. My study will undertake this task by focusing on the German 
speeches. Kennedy’s Berlin speeches are in fact a rich resource of presidential idealist-
pragmatist appeals. 
3 
 
Daum (2008) offers a historian’s book length account of Kennedy’s 1963 European 
tour, and his visit to Berlin. Daum understands the importance of rhetoric and its 
importance in history. He understood Kennedy’s trip to Europe as part of a larger drama 
that was unfolding in Europe, and Kennedy’s trip to Berlin as the main act in the drama. 
Daum is one of the few scholars to discuss Kennedy’s Free University address. Daum’s 
early chapters provide the context for Kennedy’s European trip. Daum understands the 
past relations between the U.S. and Germany, and is fully aware of how Kennedy’s 
rhetoric factors into the relationship. His look at the impact of Kennedy’s speech is 
helpful in understanding its significance and place in the history, but Daum’s work is 
historical and not rhetorical.  
Other studies by Pucci (1994), Dean (1991), and Meagher (2006) add to the 
scholarship on Kennedy, but they focus on a single Kennedy speech and do not examine 
Kennedy’s policy on Germany from 1961 to 1963 as a coherent whole. Pucci’s (1994) 
examination of the Berlin Crisis of 1961 ends with the erection of the Berlin Wall and 
there is little attention paid to the consequences of the Wall on Kennedy’s foreign policy. 
Pucci’s rhetorical scholarship provides insight into Kennedy’s Report to the American 
People on the Berlin Crisis, but he fails to link the original rhetoric on Berlin with the 
rising tension in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-German relations or the evolution and 
implementation of Kennedy’s German policy with the culminating act being Kennedy’s 
trip to Berlin. Dean (1991) focuses only on Kennedy’s 1961 speech, arguing that 
Kennedy was using the speech to bolster his presidential image and standing in the world 
community. Dean’s appraisal of Kennedy is that he used transcendent language and an 
accusatorial strategy to unify a divided audience and achieve global influence. Meagher’s 
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(2006) study explores how Kennedy built on his success in the 1961 Berlin Crisis to 
deliver his 1963 address at Rudolph Wilde Platz. But, Meagher does not apply any 
appreciable theory to explore Kennedy’s rhetorical discourse. In trying to draw historical 
comparisons between Kennedy and Reagan’s Berlin speeches, Meagher minimizes the 
importance of Kennedy’s address as it relates to previous Kennedy speeches. In not 
analyzing multiple Kennedy speeches on German unification, we miss a crucial 
opportunity to understand how Kennedy’s policies were created and how they evolved. It 
is also quite useful to track how Kennedy had his advisers review previous speeches in an 
attempt to maintain continuity in his policies (Windt, 2003). 
The two most comprehensive studies of Kennedy’s foreign policy rhetoric were those 
by Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos (1995a) and Silvestri (2000). Goldzwig and 
Dionisopoulos analyze Kennedy’s major Cold War addresses, most notably his Report to 
the American People on the Berlin Crisis, his Cuban Missile Crisis address, and the 
American University speech. Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos’s major focus is on speeches 
that responded to a crisis, implemented a new policy or both.  But, their scholarship does 
not include Kennedy’s two major addresses in Berlin or how they transformed U.S.-
German relations, U.S. policy in Germany, and German policy. Silvestri’s (2000) work 
on Kennedy’s foreign policy includes his Report to the American People on the Berlin 
Crisis in 1961 and his speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in Berlin in 1963. Silvestri’s 
critique of his Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis looks at how Kennedy 
used the Berlin Crisis as a pretext for his new flexible response strategy. Silvestri’s 
treatment of the 1963 Berlin speech, however, focuses more on the two errors Kennedy 
made rather than any rhetorical devices used. Silvestri overlooks key elements of 
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Kennedy’s rhetorical style and the implications of that speech. Silvestri focused on 
Kennedy’s off-the-cuff remarks about challenging the Soviets in Berlin, which 
contradicted his peaceful overtures for détente a few weeks earlier, and he critiqued 
Kennedy’s syntax error of the German phrase “Ich Bin Ein Berliner.” Silvestri does little 
to connect the two speeches or examine them together rhetorically. 
 James Pratt (1970) examined three crisis speeches, delivered by Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson. Pratt noticed that Eisenhower and Johnson’s speeches shared 
similarities, but Kennedy’s crisis rhetoric was unique. Kennedy’s speech was aimed at an 
international audience and sought to elicit their support, and he used the first person, 
which Pratt says was unusual in presidential rhetoric during crises. However, Pratt 
compares presidential crisis rhetoric and does not take a historical look at a particular 
president or issue. 
The very nature of this study is different because my historical treatment seeks to 
account for the status of Berlin and U.S. commitments to Berlin and Germany beginning 
after the Second World War. My study also differs from previous research because I will 
focus on the coherence of Kennedy’s German policy. In the previous research on 
Kennedy, scholars have examined multiple Kennedy speeches together, but no scholar 
has looked at multiple foreign policy speeches on one particular policy or country. As 
indicated earlier, Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos (1995a) present the closest example of 
studying consistency and coherency in Kennedy’s public addresses, but their work spans 
Kennedy’s entire career and focuses on his entire foreign policy, not one specific policy 
or the concerns about one specific subject, Berlin. 
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Rationale and Purpose  
With the change in the American media landscape, from a print oriented world to an 
electronic environment, the casual and interpersonal politician was rewarded with 
electoral success. The ability to persuade is important for any politician, but it is crucial 
for to the president. Rhetorical presidents are adept orators who elevate their narratives to 
form effective arguments for audience consumption in a mass mediated message 
environment (Henry, Abbott, Houck, Laracey, Lucas, & Parry-Giles, 2008). Rhetorical 
presidents are able to set the terms of the debate about public policy, to set the agenda of 
the nation, and as David Zarefsky asserted, “[T]he power to set the terms of the debate is 
often accompanied by an advantage to win the debate” (Henry et. al, p. 342). Presidents 
use words to shape the worldview of the country, and to direct the citizenry toward the 
issues that are important in society (Bostdorff, 1994). The president’s power rests in his 
ability to persuade the American public to support his initiatives (Tatalovich & Daynes, 
1979). There are times when tough words or actions are needed from a president to 
reinforce the will of the nation. Thus, a  president “must be willing to show iron from 
time to time, to make an example by what happens to resisters and trouble-makers” 
(Nieburg & Nieburg, 1991, p. 291). The ability to show strength in the world through 
tough action and oratorical prowess increases the president’s credibility, especially when 
a president deals with a crisis. Indeed, for a president, words are interpreted as deeds. 
 The president has a variety of roles as the nation’s Chief Executive and 
Commander-in-Chief. While the president has authority and responsibility in both 
domestic and foreign affairs, the two spheres differ dramatically. As Ted Sorensen notes: 
In domestic affairs, a presidential decision is usually the beginning of 
public debate. In foreign affairs, the issues are frequently so complex, the 
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facts so obscure, and the period for decision so short, that the American 
people have from the beginning-and even more so in this century 
delegated to the President more discretion in this vital area; and they are 
usually willing to support any reasonable decision he makes (Windt Jr., 
2003, 93). 
 
In foreign affairs, the president becomes the embodiment of the nation. The nation is 
personified through the president’s words and actions (Wander, 1984). In this study, I 
will treat Kennedy’s three speeches in Berlin as a study in foreign affairs that will 
highlight how a president employs rhetoric in an effort to frame, interpret, and advance 
foreign policy for a variety of audiences. The study will employ both history and 
rhetorical scholarship in an effort to argue that Kennedy’s rhetoric reveals his evolution 
concerning Berlin and his Cold War strategy. I argue that Kennedy began with a military 
strategy, flexible response, which was established in his Radio and Television Report in 
July 1961 and over the next two years this strategy evolved into a strategy of peace 
embodied in a policy of détente accentuated at his Free University address. Within these 
speeches, both history and Kennedy’s personal characteristics and style influenced his 
rhetoric. To fulfill this purpose I will answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the historical context that helped frame the rhetorical situation 
Kennedy faced? 
2. What rhetorical strategies and tactics did Kennedy employ in these 
speeches? 
3. How might Kennedy's speeches extend our understanding of 
presidential public address? 
4. What is the impact of Kennedy's speeches on U.S. German relations and 
the development of U.S. and German Policy? 
5. What implications might these speeches have for the study and 
execution of presidential power and international diplomacy? 
 
In an effort to fulfill my purpose and describe the foundational assumptions I bring to the 
formulation of these research questions, I will discuss: (1) my position on rhetorical 
theory as a rationale for this study; (2) the role of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism; and (3) 
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the relationship between rhetoric and history and, and (4) the importance of studying 
rhetorical history. These topics will serve a basis for grounding  my study before turning 
to two major goals for this study:  (I.). an admittedly lengthy but necessary  historical  
account of the post-World War II/Cold War era in Chapter II: Historical Context  and  
(II.) using that pivotal history to inform my  critical analysis of Kennedy’s Berlin 
speeches in Chapter III: Rhetorical Analysis. 
 Rhetorical Theory  
David Zarefsky (2008) argues that many rhetorical theories are grand, 
nonfalsifiable propositions, which often apply a category system to a particular case. 
According to Zarefsky (2008), the creation of categories which can result in grand theory 
may provide “heuristically a rich exercise, but the application of categories to cases is 
often quite mundane. The critic usually will find that the category system applies to the 
case and will conclude the theory…helps explain the case” (p. 636).    Such a “cookie 
cutter” approach to theory can result in a disservice to rhetorical scholarly work. The 
critic who uses a theory and applies it to the case believing they found insight has “not 
really illuminated the case; he or she has shown the category system is versatile” 
(Zarefsky, 2008, p. 636).  
 Zarefsky (1998) observes that the division and distinctions are common practice 
in theory and in academic work and it is for this reason that rhetorical historians are often 
on the defensive because true discovery of knowledge in rhetorical studies counsels 
against these distinctions and divisions. Furthermore, Zarefsky (1998) argues that the 
distinctions between history, criticism and theory in rhetorical studies are “unnecessary 
and without foundation” (p. 20). Terrill (2003) states “All rhetorical study necessarily is 
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historical, after all, if only because thoughtful interpretations and interventions take time” 
(p. 298). An even stronger argument comes from E. Culpepper Clark and Raymie E. 
McKerrow who maintain “that rhetoric is a force in history and that rhetoric is a force in 
writing of history” (Terrill, 2003, p. 298). Clark and McKerrow (1998) contend that 
rhetorical history “is the conception of discourse as an instrument of power—a 
conception that makes possible an investigation of the ways in which language, used in 
the service of power, forms human subjectivity…The historian is always called upon to 
discern how rhetoric shaped or was shaped by concrete sociopolitical relations and, 
thereby to determine rhetoric’s complicity with dominating groups” (p. 45). Having 
provided a rationale for the rhetorical historian as someone who may proceed 
productively sans a heavy theoretical orientation, I now turn to the role of the critic. 
Rhetorical Criticism  
This study will rely upon rhetorical criticism as a method of analyzing 
presidential discourse.  For purposes of this discussion the term “rhetoric” refers to 
human attempts at persuasion. Rhetorical critics assume that discourse in not transparent 
in meaning, implication or significance (Zarefsky, 2008). Rhetorical critics seek to 
answer two questions: 1. What is going on here? 2.  So what? Zarefsky concludes that 
answering the first question requires understanding the underlying dynamics of the 
work—its influence on people. Here one seeks to understand the “actual response of a 
specific audience and the degree to which that response can be attributed to the rhetorical 
work” (Zarefsky, 2008, p. 633). Bostdorff (1994) suggests that attempts to understand 
audience response to presidential public address are best mounted by interrogating 
identificational appeals used by the president to elicit response. Theodore Windt Jr.’s 
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(1986) research on presidential rhetoric shows that the “audience” for a speech goes 
beyond those who attend and extends to multiple constituents and constituencies who are 
exposed to the speech through the media. Often exposure means tuning into a nationally 
televised address or catching a mere snippet of coverage of the address when it is 
discussed in the print and electronic media. Rhetorical scholars are charged with the task 
of explaining the speech text and its meaning to the audience. Rhetorical criticism has 
highlighted the polysemy of language and its ability to have multiple voices at once to 
multiple audiences (Zarefsky, 2008). Audience analysis has identified this phenomenon 
of polysemy, and it is up to the rhetorical scholar to explain it. 
 The rhetorical critic is more of an artist, than a scientist, and regards the outcome 
of a rhetorical text as open, not inevitable. The accessibility of rhetorical criticism opens 
up the rhetorical text for debate over “why the rhetor made the choices that he or she 
did…what reprisals were invited by those choices, to theorize about the functions and 
consequences of the choices…[and] to evaluate the choices in the given case” (Zarefsky, 
2008, p. 634). The openness of the rhetorical text allows the critic to evaluate the style of 
the text, which is often influenced by the rhetor. The style of the speech refers to how a 
rhetor typically speaks. As Burke notes, “style is the way in which rhetors adhere to 
personal values in their discourse” (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 19). James Barber and Hugh Blair 
researched presidential character, and made a connection between style and presidential 
character or the way the president “orients himself toward life” (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 21). 
 More importantly, rhetorical criticism allows the scholar to assess the 
effectiveness of the discourse’s two principal functions: building community and 
inspiring people to achieve goals (Zarefsky, 2008).  A presidential rhetor builds 
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community when he or she identifies with the audience and establishes a common bond 
with the people; thereby integrating isolated individuals into a public (Zarefsky, 2008). 
Inspiring people to achieve common goals is performed when the rhetor “articulates a 
vision or goal and motivates an audience to seek to pursue it” (Zarefsky, 2008, p. 638). 
While, historical-critical research has often been employed in rhetorical studies (e.g., 
Bostdorff, 2008; Kiewe 1994; Medhurst & Scott, 1990), I need to advance a more 
specific discussion of the relationship between rhetoric and history as a rationale for the 
considerable explication of history that is considered crucial to this study.  Indeed, some 
readers may note upon finishing this study that its contents seem seems to have more to 
do with history than rhetoric. These readers’ suspicions are well-grounded. I consider this 
study an enactment of rhetorical history.  
Rhetoric & History 
Martin J. Medhurst has argued that “rhetoric and history must be studied together, 
because both are complicated matters that directly impinge upon one another” (Bostdorff 
etc. al, 2008, pg. 358). A rhetorical perspective helps retain the human focus in historical 
research, and history helps place the rhetoric in context (Ball, 1998). Thus, “doing 
rhetorical history” allows the academic to consider “what persuasive discourse means 
within its historical context” (Ball, 1998, p. 63). Rhetorical historians can make informed 
judgments about the communication of the past, interweaving rhetoric, history, and 
criticism into probative narrative explanations.  Kathleen Turner et al (1998) argue for a 
larger role for rhetorical history because it offers: “an understanding of rhetoric as a 
process rather than as simply a product; it creates and appreciation of both the 
commonalities among and the distinctiveness of rhetorical situations and responses; it 
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tests theory and complements criticism while standing as a distinct and valid approach in 
and of itself” (Turner, 1998, p. 2). 
As indicated earlier, rhetorical criticism seeks to understand the message text in 
context, but rhetorical history “seeks to understand the context through messages that 
reflect and construct that context” (Turner, 1998, p. 2). Or, as Zarefsky notes, the 
rhetorical historian will look at “how messages are created and used by people to 
influence and relate to one another” (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 30). So while the speech texts 
remain important, using a historical approach enables me to connect Kennedy’s rhetoric 
with the ongoing context of the Berlin Crisis, and draw commonalities and distinctions 
not only between the three Berlin speeches, but possibly other presidential crisis speeches 
or other president’s remarks concerning the Berlin’s unique position of being divided 
between East and West, which occurred from 1945 to 1989. 
Rhetorical History  
 Zarefsky (1998) answers one of the most important questions concerning the 
overall goal of my study, which is to use history as a lens for interpreting presidential 
rhetorical practice. The study of history is important because it aids in the understanding 
the past, history counters any notion of what happened had to happen by offering the 
roads not taken, and history helps broaden the human experience by bringing people out 
of their own boundaries and showing them the larger human experience (Zarefsky, 1998). 
History provides a connection between past and present, a parallel case used for 
evaluating existing conditions and charting a course for the future. History is used as a 
part of argument, a selective remembering to validate an action or course (Zarefsky, 
1998). E. Culpepper Clark and Raymie E. McKerrow (1998) argue that history does not 
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need to function separate from the argument it contains. The rhetor “cannot argue in the 
present without a sense of history being implicated in the meaning of the argument” 
(Clark & McKerrow, 1998, p. 42). John Kennedy used historical allusions, metaphors 
and examples in all three of his German speeches and understanding how Kennedy used 
and was affected by history is an important factor when examining his discourse. 
 Communication scholars should undertake the study of rhetorical history because 
their efforts will help to define the rhetorical climate of an age. In defining the rhetorical 
climate of an age, communication scholars can help answer and examine “how people 
defined the situation, what led them to seek to justify themselves or to persuade others, 
what storehouse of social knowledge they drew upon for their premises, what themes and 
styles they produced in their messages, how their processes of identification and 
confrontation succeeded or failed” (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 31-32). 
 To fully understand what exigencies Kennedy was reacting to and acting on, an 
understanding of the history of Berlin since 1945 is needed. An explanation of the 
relationship between the U.S. and the Western Allies, and the U.S. and the Soviets is 
crucial. This background will inform Kennedy’s Berlin addresses.  The historical 
literature on the Berlin Crisis, in particular, is extensive and my study includes a lengthy 
description of the historical background leading to Kennedy’s first address in July 1961. 
In addition, to fully understand the impact and consequences of Kennedy’s rhetoric, one 
must understand the political and historical pressures Kennedy was under in 1961 and 
1963. 
In my analysis of Kennedy’s three German speeches, I will trace the evolution of 
Kennedy’s Berlin rhetoric, from his first speech in 1961 which proposed a military 
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strategy to his last speech in 1963 that called for a policy of peace. In the process, I will 
demonstrate how Kennedy created community among the multiple audiences through the 
use of idealistic language and goals. By setting these goals, he inspired his audiences to 
sacrifice and to meet the challenges he laid out in his speeches. Also, by using a 
rhetorical historical framework, I will be able to trace the evolution of Kennedy’s 
rhetoric, from his first speech which proposed a military strategy to his last speech that 
called for a policy of peace. This examination of his rhetoric will trace how the historical 
events influenced Kennedy and how Kennedy’s rhetoric influenced history. Finally, I will 
answer Zarefsky’s question: So what? Why do Kennedy’s speeches matter? 
 In sum, both texts and contexts matter. Analysis of presidential speech texts do 
not occur in a vacuum. One must view them within a specified context.  Key to the 
speech context is the historical situation faced by the president when delivering his 
speech. The speech is shaped by the historical context and the historical context helps 
shape the rhetorical options available when a president presents his identificational 
appeals.  
In the next chapter I will provide a diplomatic history of U.S.-German and the 
Cold War landscape from the end of World War II to 1961. Without an examination of 
U.S.-German relations beginning in final days of World War II and continuing through 
the early stages of the Cold War, it is hard to appreciate how Kennedy’s rhetoric 
revolutionized U.S.-Germans relations. The historical background leading up to the 1961 
Berlin Crisis will provide a basic understanding of U.S. Cold War policy, and will set the 
scene for the pivotal showdown over Berlin. 
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CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1945-50: Postwar Settlement: A Cold Peace? 
 At the close of World War II, the announcement of unconditional surrender by 
Germany created the symbolic “other” in the minds of both Americans and Germans. 
Preconceived German notions of America dated back to 1776 (Ickstadt, 2004). Germans 
saw America as a “prison house of freedom where a disgusting mob exerts its uncouth 
dominance” (Ickstadt, 2004, p. 163).  Americans lacked culture, according to the 
Germans. American culture was considered despicable, “Kramergeist,” because 
American values were mainly perceived in terms of money and commerce (Ickstadt, 
2004).  Germany felt it was fighting to preserve its culture against the invading 
uncultured American hordes and their capitalist greed. 
 The American portrayal of Germans was no kinder. The American image of the 
Germans was shaped by the Pocket Guide to Germany, which warned Americans about 
the duplicity of the German people, feeding into the stereotype that all Germans were 
fanatical Nazi supporters (Goedde, 1999). Americans entering Germany in 1945 feared 
an indoctrinated citizenry bent on fighting the invaders to the death. Americans were 
warned that “during the war, Germany kept 500,000 trained killers at home, the black 
uniformed SS Guards” (Goedde, 1999, p.4), who would discard their uniforms, and 
attack American soldiers in the dark as civilians. Germany was portrayed as a hyper—
masculine country dominated by men and the imagery of the indoctrinated Nazi 
stormtrooper or SS Guard still haunted the imagination of the American soldier (Goedde, 
1999). The American discovery of Nazi concentration camps confirmed the expectations 
of U.S. army commanders’ warnings about the barbaric nature of Germans. 
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The precarious position of a divided Berlin began in the waning months of World 
War II. The winter of 1945 was ending and the spring thaw was coming early throughout 
Europe. The Soviets were within an hour’s drive of Berlin, with the Western Allies over 
three hundred miles away and recovering from the Battle of the Bulge, but the end of the 
war was in reach. Hitler’s reckless advance on the Western Front had failed and the 
Soviets were preparing for their final offensive into the heartland of Germany: Berlin. 
Winston Churchill began looking for an end game in Western Europe and for a peace 
settlement. Churchill surmised that whoever held Berlin would hold a trump card in the 
peace negotiations (Gelb, 1986). The ‘Big Three’ were to meet at Yalta in February 1945 
to discuss the postwar settlement of Europe. It would be the last time that Roosevelt, 
Stalin and Churchill were to meet in person. Churchill had misgivings about Soviet 
reliability and trustworthiness as the war began to wind down, but Roosevelt and 
Eisenhower believed the Soviets shared their aims of making sure Germany never 
threatened world peace again. Indeed, though Stalin led a totalitarian regime he was 
viewed as a reasonable man (Gelb, 1986).  
As the Big Three prepared for the summit at Yalta, the role of the Soviets in the 
postwar global community was of some concern. By the end of the war, the Soviet Union 
had suffered 27 million casualties, both military and civilian, 90 times the number of 
Americans who died in the war. Stalin believed the expenditures in blood and treasure by 
each country should determine who gained what, and by Stalin’s account the Soviets 
were due more than any other country. Stalin wanted to retain the territories he gained in 
the 1939 non-aggression pact with Hitler and for the countries on his borders to remain 
within the Soviet sphere of influence (Gaddis, 2005a). Stalin did not want a repetition of 
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the small power blocs that dominated Central and Eastern Europe in the 1930s. Stalin felt 
the Soviet Union should be the dominant military power in this region, as well as all of 
Europe (MacDonogh, 2007). Regarding the German issue, Stalin was open to various 
plans as evidenced by his support for the Morgenthau Plan, his advocacy for a divided 
Germany in Teheran, a united Germany with Allied zones of occupation at Yalta, and a 
single economic unit at Potsdam. While these positions may be characterized as mixed 
messages, he would not budge on giving Poles German land (MacDonogh, 2007). Stalin 
was quite clear that he would cede German land to Poland. 
The major issue for the Soviets in 1945 and throughout Soviet history has been 
security. For Stalin, security meant personal security for himself and his regime, but also 
security from outside invasion and security for his ideology. Soviet security could be 
partially secured through courting spheres of influence, but because of heavy Soviet 
losses the only way for Stalin to ensure his gains was to take measures to maintain the 
peace throughout Europe (Gaddis, 2005a). At both Yalta and Potsdam, Stalin would 
insist on a glacis to its west, a large swath of land that any enemy coming from the west 
would have to pass through were they to attack Russia. If these lands were not to be 
absorbed into Russia, they should at the very least be pro-Soviet regimes eschewing any 
fascist or reactionary elements (Judt, 2005). World War II left the Soviet Union in a 
position of power globally, but greatly damaged economically by human loss and 
damaged land. Stalin’s lasting dream for Europe was its domination by the Soviets, but 
he would settle for Soviet domination as far as the Rhine, with the British leading the rest 
of Western Europe (Gaddis, 2005a). Soviet hopes for domination of Europe hinged on 
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the communist ideology and its spread through Germany and into France, along with 
American withdrawal from the continent. 
The allies gained by America would be crucial in shaping the postwar settlement. 
Roosevelt believed that without allied cooperation the world stood little chance of 
maintaining the peace. The postwar settlement the U.S. was banking on would be one 
where a new collective security organization would be created to prevent future wars by 
deterring and if necessary, punishing aggressor nations. A key corollary to the postwar 
settlement was renewed economic success that could be secured and protected by the 
collective organization of nations. Finally, Roosevelt knew the settlement had to be 
acceptable to the American people, unlike the Wilsonian settlement after World War I 
(Gaddis, 2005a). Concerning Germany, Roosevelt initially favored the Morgenthau Plan, 
but quickly retreated. By the time he reached Yalta, he favored a federal system with as 
many as five zones or as few as two zones (MacDonogh, 2007). Roosevelt’s tried to 
implement his postwar vision at Yalta, but he found himself more in the role of mediator 
between the Soviets and British. While some of his vision lived on after his death, his 
untimely demise left the U.S. in a precarious position heading into the final postwar 
discussions at Potsdam.  
The final stage of the war and the first stages of post-war Europe were set in 
February 1945. The Yalta Conference was the last time the Big Three leaders met to 
discuss post-war plans. Yalta opened with Stalin discussing the dismemberment of 
Germany and the establishment of a new government. Stalin had plans of dismembering 
Germany as early as 1941, when the war was bleakest for the Allies, and these plans had 
been passed to English foreign secretary Anthony Eden (Plokhy, 2010). Eden’s 
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assessment of Stalin’s plans in 1941 was “that dismemberment would be sustainable only 
if achieved by separatist movements on the ground” (Plokhy, 2010, p. 95). At Teheran in 
late 1943, Stalin still agreed with Roosevelt that Germany should be dismantled. At 
Yalta, Stalin pushed for a dismemberment plan to be drawn up by a commission of the 
Foreign Ministers, but like the Americans and the British, the Russians did not yet have a 
clear vision for a dismembered postwar Germany (Bessel, 2009). At Yalta, the Allied 
powers decided that Germany would be separated into occupation zones. The purpose of 
Allied occupations was to “destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure 
Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world” (Report of Yalta, 
1945). The Allied leaders agreed that: 
Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a 
separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has 
been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission 
consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with 
headquarters in Berlin (Report of Yalta, 1945). 
 
Stalin initially objected to French inclusion because he abhorred France’s collapse in 
1940, which he blamed for Hitler’s attack on Russia in 1940 (MacDonogh, 2007). 
Roosevelt persuaded Stalin by admitting the Americans would not be able to leave troops 
in Europe indefinitely to patrol Germany, and that without U.S. ground forces the British 
needed help patrolling and keeping peace in Germany (Plokhy, 2010).  The last point 
may have tipped Stalin in favor of French inclusion, but nonetheless the French were 
given a zone of occupation out of the Western Allies zone and participation rights in the 
Control Commission in Berlin. 
 The borders of the occupation zones were a British creation that Stalin rushed to 
accept because the British plan gave the Soviets more territory than the Soviets’ original 
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proposal. The British proposal placed the Soviet zone boundary further west, a line that 
came to separate the GDR and the FRG (Plokhy, 2010). The Americans made little 
objection because they were wholly unprepared when the British proposed their plan in 
January 1944. The Americans believed that by the end of the war the Soviets and 
Americans would meet at the Rhine River, not the middle of Germany. Stalin also 
accepted the idea of a quadripartite government in the city of Berlin, raising the question 
of why the Soviets would allow Western Allied soldiers to be in Berlin, which was part 
of the Soviet zone. Stalin and the Soviets accepted this arrangement because he believed 
the Marxist-Leninist government installed in the Soviet zone would be a magnet for 
Germans to elect leaders who would unify Germany under Soviet control (Gaddis, 
2005a). Prior to the development of the atomic bomb, the Americans still wished for 
Soviet intervention in the Pacific theatre against the Japanese. Roosevelt had been 
pushing Stalin to pledge his support for Russian intervention against Japan once the war 
was over in Europe. At Yalta, Stalin pledged his support to intervene against the Japanese 
in exchange for what would become a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe 
(Stone, 2010). After the Soviet atrocities in Eastern Germany and the repression of 
freedom in Eastern Europe, Yalta became a “code-word for the willingness of the 
Western Allies to consign half of Europe to Stalin” (Stone, 2010, p. 21). Soviet 
intervention late in the Pacific theatre also gave Stalin a railway and two main ports in 
Manchuria (Stone, 2010). Roosevelt’s desire for Soviet support against Japan impaired 
Western influence in Eastern Europe and also strengthened communist support in China 
that led to a Sino-Soviet alliance. Truman’s bargaining with Stalin over Soviet support at 
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Potsdam was very different than Roosevelt’s dealings at Yalta, but by then it was too late 
to change Soviet momentum in Eastern Europe. 
Stalin had one more idea at Yalta concerning the zones of occupation, exclusive 
zonal responsibility. The British plan called for primary zones of occupation that allowed 
troops from any of the four occupying powers to cross and patrol in each other’s zones. 
Stalin wanted exclusive zones, which meant American, British and French troops could 
not patrol or be stationed in the Soviet zone (Plokhy, 2010). At the time, none of the 
Western Powers objected to the idea of exclusive zones, but as the joy of victory faded 
and an icy atmosphere settled over Germany the impact of exclusive zonal control played 
a major role in the fate of Berlin and the history of the Cold War. 
The vision of the wartime allies at Yalta focused upon the negative. Yalta largely 
defined what Germany would not be in the future. There was little discussion of how to 
rebuild Germany (Bessel, 2009); mainly because none of the major Allies, except a minor 
American bloc, that would be called the Berlin mafia, wanted to see a united and strong 
Germany. In addition, agreement at Yalta occurred in February 1945, when the 
Americans and British were recovering from the Battle of the Bulge and few American 
leaders believed the Western Allies could reach Berlin before the Soviets.  
By April 1945, the Western Allies were having different thoughts on the postwar 
settlement, as the situation on the ground had changed. The Americans had driven deep 
into Saxony which was promised to be under Soviet control, and the British held a chunk 
of Mecklenburg (MacDonogh, 2007). The remaining leadership of the Third Reich, 
Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler hoped the Americans would reach Berlin and turn on the 
Soviets. Churchill wanted western control of Berlin as a counter balance for Soviet 
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assurances on their territorial acquisitions (MacDonogh, 2007). The British urged 
Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, to use a narrow thrust attack to roll 
across the plains of Central Germany and for the Western Allies to strike at and capture 
Berlin. Eisenhower and the Americans disagreed with their ally’s plan and their post-war 
assessment of the situation. Eisenhower preferred a broad attack that was less risky, but 
more significantly Roosevelt and the Americans did not see the Soviets as a threat. The 
Americans saw the Soviets as gallant allies that desired to end this ugly war as soon as 
possible and Roosevelt believed Stalin was a reasonable man that he could handle. Any 
sort of race across Europe to get to Berlin first would be pointless and shabby politicking 
on part of the Americans, the chief effect being antagonizing the Soviets (Gelb, 1986). 
Roosevelt would not get a chance to handle Stalin because in April he died from his long 
standing health issues. The Americans turned to Vice President Harry Truman to finalize 
a postwar settlement at Potsdam. 
A mere five to six months after the “Big Three” met at Yalta the leadership of the 
Allies met again at Potsdam. Franklin D. Roosevelt had died and was replaced by Vice 
President Harry S Truman. Midway through the meeting Winston Churchill was removed 
from office when he lost the election in England. Only Stalin remained, leaving the 
Soviet Union with a major advantage as having the only leader fully briefed and present 
at all other Allied postwar discussions. Potsdam offered nothing new. There were no new 
decisions and virtually nothing was added to prior agreements. None of the problems or 
disagreements between the Allies were solved. What Potsdam does offer is a view of 
Europe two months after Germany’s defeat (Dallas, 2005). What did change at Potsdam 
was how the Allies viewed each other. Truman was not swayed by Churchill’s flattery 
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and a skeptical Truman felt that Churchill tried to “soft soap him” at Potsdam (Dallas, 
2005, p. 548). Nevertheless, Truman did eventually see that Churchill occasionally 
dropped a pearl of wisdom amongst his ramblings. More important to the postwar 
settlement and increasing tension in the Anglo-American alliance was the recognition by 
Truman and the U.S. that the British economy was in disarray (Dallas, 2005). After the 
war had ended, Britain was entering into a postwar currency crisis that threatened to 
cripple the country. The price of the British Empire had sky rocketed since 1939 and all 
of the diplomatic and military expenditures on its empire were depleting an already thin 
British treasury. The only way Britain could survive was to impose voluntary conditions 
of restraint, which left the country poorer and bleaker than the defeated nations of World 
War II (Judt, 2005).  Compared to the United States, the British were working with worn 
out and outdated machinery used by a worn out and war weary population. If the West 
was to maintain a foothold in Europe, the U.S. would have to play a new role that 
required a reversal of policy that Roosevelt had outlined. 
The major push by Stalin at Potsdam was the recognition of the Polish-German 
border and the relocation of Germans that were in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
At Potsdam, a formal agreement was reached about the eastern border of Germany, 
which was to run along the Oder and western Neisse rivers. Only Churchill believed the 
changing of the German border and the displacement of millions of Germans was a major 
issue. Truman believed the issue could be put off and finalized at a peace conference 
(Dallas, 2005). Churchill’s recommendations and discussions of Germany’s borders 
included the annihilation of the state of Prussia, the introduction of Stalin’s democracy 
into the heart of Europe, the entrenchment of Poles in the new “western Poland,” and the 
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cost of incorporating millions of Germans from these territories into an already decimated 
Germany (Dallas, 2005). Stalin’s idea of democracy was not the same as the western 
notion of democracy. In the ‘Declaration on Liberated Europe,’ the term democracy was 
deliberately vague and the Allies fretted over the fate of Poland (Dallas, 2005). When 
Churchill left on the morning of 25 July, Stalin described democracy as being non-fascist 
states. He characterized the former German satellites of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary 
as democratic nations and questioned why they had not been admitted to the United 
Nations (Dallas, 2005). Stalin’s effort to define the new Soviet ‘satellite’ countries as 
democratic and gain their acceptance into the United Nations was his attempt to 
legitimize Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. These early actions would be precursors to 
the actions taken by the Soviets in Poland, Eastern Germany and other ‘democratic’ 
nations in Eastern Europe. 
Akin with the change in the German border, Article XIII of Potsdam accords also 
called for the “transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, 
remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary” (Bessel, 2009, p. 214). The transfer 
of Germans back into Germany and the Soviet zone was supposed to be “effected in an 
orderly and humane manner,” but orderly and humane were distinct exaggerations of 
what actually occurred (Bessel, 2009, p. 214). From the end of June 1945 and through 
August 1945, millions of Germans were forced out of these territories and back into 
Germany. Germans in Western Poland awakened in the middle of the night and had only 
minutes to take some personal belongings with them before they were marched 
sometimes at gunpoint to the nearest border crossing and left on the other side at the 
whim of Soviet troops (MacDonogh, 2007; Bessel, 2009). Evacuation was filled with 
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dangers including robbery by Polish militia units. If evacuees had any possessions 
remaining with them after crossing into the Soviet zone, they were easy prey for Soviet 
troops likely to take any remaining valuables. Expulsion also included forms of physical 
and sexual violence. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, Germans were beaten, raped, forced 
to perform humiliating tasks and subjected to sadistic violence in labor camps 
(MacDonogh, 2007; Bessel, 2009). The physical strain on the German population was 
only part of the toll the Allies, especially the Russians, levied against Germany. The 
economic reparations and other new policies placed a heavy burden on Germany. The 
economic fate of Germany, while discussed at Yalta, was finalized at Potsdam.  
Germany was to pay $20 billion in reparations, with half the sum due to the 
Soviet Union (Dallas, 2005). The other major aspect of the Potsdam Accords included the 
Allies agreement that “during the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a 
single economic unit” (Bessel, 2009, p. 375). The Allies were to impose and regulate 
common economic policies regarding currency, banking, central taxation and customs 
(Bessel, 2009). The Allied Control Council was to set up administration departments in 
the fields of finance, transport, communication, foreign trade and industry. The common 
economic policy was supposed to help maintain the cohesiveness of Germany with the 
eventuality of Germany becoming one nation again after Allied occupation and treaty 
agreements at a Peace Conference (Cecil, 1970). Controlling foreign trade was the key to 
overall economic treatment of Germany. If the Allies managed foreign trade on a zone by 
zone basis, instead of an all-German basis, then what started as a temporary division of 
Germany could become a permanent division. The two Germanys would have to deal 
with each other as separate companies engaged in economic trade rather than one unified 
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country with intrastate trade. Secretary of State James Byrnes did not believe that the 
reparations taken from Germany would be run on a unitary basis implying the U.S. knew 
there was going to be two Germanys (Trachtenberg, 2001). The French, who were not 
invited to Yalta or Potsdam, objected to the uniformity of a single economic unit in 
Germany. The French had the ability to veto any action taken by the Allied Control 
Council to implement a uniformity of policy (Cecil, 1970). French objections were 
twofold. First, occupation offered the French an opportunity to extract coal and steel from 
the Saar region without having to report this to a common economic council. Second, the 
French feared a united Germany. It threatened French security especially if Germany 
allied itself with the Russians and attacked France (Bessel, 2009). French objection 
carried little weight in the actions of the ‘Big Three.’ However, even before the 
agreement was finalized, each occupation zone was operating economically in its own 
way ignoring single economic unity clause stipulated at Potsdam. 
The Potsdam Accords had a lasting impact in world relations, as objections and 
problems arose throughout the Cold War were attributable to the division of Germany. 
The intent of the Allies was to punish Germany after the war. Security was a goal of the 
Potsdam accords along with convincing the German people they had suffered a total 
military defeat and could not escape responsibility for the war (Hermens, 1947). The 
Accords placed collective guilt for the war on the German people and opened the door for 
collective punishment. As the Americans soon realized, the proclamation of collective 
guilt and the need for punishment would be detrimental to U.S. European policy. Many 
of the German people did not have a chance to defend themselves in a court. Moreover, 
people born after Hitler could be condemned to a life of economic injustice with the only 
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rationale being their German birth (Hermens, 1947). Even at Potsdam, a rift between the 
Allies was beginning to occur over occupation rights and democracy in Eastern Europe. 
Truman, who still believed all these issues could be solved at the Peace Conference, was 
slowly warming to Churchill’s views of Stalin and Soviet intentions. Truman called out 
Stalin on the democratic legitimacy of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary and pointed out 
that the Soviet commission never saw both the U.S. and British representatives at the 
same time to work out issues of German uniformity (Dallas, 2005). The Western Allies 
allowed the Soviets to move freely in Italy and other Western European nations, but the 
West was constantly under surveillance by Soviet intelligence in Eastern European 
countries (Dallas, 2005).  
Lucius Clay credits French vetoes as saving Germany from falling under Soviet 
communist control. Anthony Eden gained support for the Bonn Conventions and the new 
Federal Republic of Germany by claiming the Russians never upheld the Potsdam 
Accords based on their actions in the Eastern zone of Germany (Cecil, 1970). Truman for 
his part made one last attempt at Potsdam to get European waterways open to 
international traffic to which Stalin quickly replied ‘Nyet!’ and added in English “No, I 
say no!” (Dallas, 2005, p. 567). Truman wrote to his mother calling the Stalinist regime a 
“police government pure and simple: a few top hands just take clubs, pistols and 
concentration camps and rule the people on the lower levels” (Dallas, 2005, p. 567). The 
era of good feeling between the U.S. and Russia was over, Truman’s view of Russia was 
now solidified and the Cold War was set to begin, but first Western Germany needed to 
be saved from U.S. occupation policies. 
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While the French and Russians were intent on taking reparations from their 
occupation zones, the U.S. was intent on bringing New Deal-style democracy to the 
Germans (Rolleston, 1999). Unfortunately, the beginning of occupation in the American 
zone began harshly. The April 1945 Directive to the Commander and Chief of U.S. 
occupation forces, JCS 1067, outlined the U.S. policy for its occupation of Germany and 
stated that “Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated 
enemy nation” (Report of Yalta, 1945). On May 8, 1945 the war in Europe ended with 
the unconditional surrender of the German Armed forces by Admiral Donitz (Herring, 
2008). The surrender included a declaration of German guilt for the war, and dissolution 
of all powers possessed by the German government (Hansen, 1995). Germany was to 
blame for the war and was no longer a sovereign nation. Germans were to bear the brunt 
of Allied abuse, guilt and blame for Hitler’s war. 
 American occupation began ruthlessly. America’s leading General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower later stated that America ruled Germany as “conquerors, not as liberators” 
(Snow, 2008, p. 203). Germany was shattered.  “There was no such thing as habeas 
corpus and there was no forum to which one could apply for a hearing” (Snow, 2008, p. 
203). Germany was to be run under military law with the intent of bringing “home to the 
Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have 
destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the 
Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves” 
(Directive to Commander and Chief, 1945). Germans had no rights, and American 
commanders believed the stereotype of the untrustworthy German. American actions 
provided no comfort to the war weary German populace. American policy toward the 
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Germans was to make them pay for the war, but U.S. policy was leaving Germany in 
shambles (Rolleston, 1999). The U.S. instituted a no fraternization policy, which 
prohibited “any informal interactions between American soldiers and German nationals” 
(Goedde, 1999, p. 2). U.S. policy was to crush hopes and reinforce collective guilt for the 
war into the German psyche (Goedde, 1999). The basic social norms and institutions 
were absent, along with any semblance of German self-government. The absence of a 
social structure was worsened by German guilt for the war (Rolleston, 1999). German 
ineptness and weakness allowed America to dominate, but American domination was 
undercutting any support by the German occupation for U.S. rebuilding plans. American 
officials worried that rebuilding German industry would be criticized for restoring 
German war potential (Dulles, 2003). The ambiguities and harshness of U.S. policy left 
Germany in a disordered state. There was no U.S.-German relationship in 1945. If the 
U.S. did not help rebuild Germany, chaos would ensue or worse communism might 
overtake Germany. 
The problems facing ordinary Germans civilians were compounded by the lack of 
a steady U.S.-German relationship. Without any American support, Germans were left 
helpless. Germans in the American zone of occupation were supposed to receive 1,500 
calories a day, but that total was far from being met (Dulles, 2003). At high times during 
U.S. occupation, Germans received 1,275 calories of food a day, but at points during the 
occupation intake could run as low as 860 per day (MacDonogh, 2007). Threats to 
German POWs included prisoner abuse and death, and rape was a constant threat to 
German women. German POWs died from starvation, execution, and physical abuses. In 
approximate numbers, there were anywhere from 32,000 to 40,000 German POW deaths. 
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Rape charges in March and April 1945 were 402 and 501 respectively (MacDonogh, 
2007).  While a report in March 1945 by Ninth Army Courier Leiser indicated rape might 
be a frequent occurrence, there was difficulty calculating the numbers because it was 
assumed that some German women might prostitute themselves for food (Goedde, 1999). 
All told, rape and prisoner abuse was less in the American zone, than the Soviet zone, but 
the mistakes in early U.S. policy strained the tenuous relationship between Germany and 
America that was beginning to form. 
 U.S. policy toward the defeated German state followed the guidelines outlined at 
Yalta and U.S. directive JCS 1067. Under JCS 1067, Germany was to undergo a 
complete denazification, demilitarization and reeducation. Denazification included the 
removal and prohibition from public or private enterprises of any person who had been 
more than a nominal participant in Nazi activities, all active supporters of Nazism or 
militarism, and all persons hostile to Allied persons (Directive to Commander and Chief, 
1945). All political activity inside Germany was to be prohibited. Germany had lost its 
Army and political sovereignty. The German state was divided between the Three 
wartime Allies and France. The loss of national sovereignty meant the rebuilding of 
Germany was left to the victorious wartime powers. German law was to be remodeled 
and reconstituted by the Americans. Any new German law, either national or local, 
needed approval by members of the occupation military government, and many of the 
new German laws were implemented by the military governments (Schraut, 2000). The 
rebuilding of the German state began as an Allied Power occupation project, but ended as 
project completed by the people of West Germany. 
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American soldiers began to go out among the German people, and found the 
Germans were not the indoctrinated Nazi fundamentalists depicted in the Pocket Guide to 
Germany. In particular, U.S. soldiers had a difficult time conceiving of women and 
children as the enemy. Germany changed from a masculine militant country to a feminine 
country in the minds of American soldiers. U.S. soldiers began to see themselves as 
providers and protectors for the defenseless population (Goedde, 1999). Children ran up 
to American soldiers asking for “cheving gum” or “choclat,” women would grin, and old 
men and women would talk to pass the time of day (Goedde, 1999). The diminished role 
of Germen men in society removed the threat of German males portrayed in the Pocket 
Guide to Germany. The threat of a fanatical Nazi male or defense of the German 
homeland by SS men in civilian garb was removed from the American psyche (Goedde, 
1999). A strong relationship between American soldier and German civilian was built, 
but the context was one of dependent-provider with the soldier being the provider to the 
civilian dependent. 
Denazification was vilified by the Germans, but was a cornerstone of American 
policy in postwar Germany. A majority of Germans saw denazification as “too strict” and 
as “logical nonsense, judicial perversity and moral perfidy because it rested on the 
assumption of collective guilt” (Jarausch, 2006, pp. 52).  Questionnaires issued by the 
Allies inflicted wounds on the self-worth of Germans, but Germans needed to fill out the 
questionnaires to get a certificate from the Allied government to get a decent paying job 
in Germany. The policy restricted the number of people available to fill important vacant 
positions in Germany, which caused a disruption in the rebuilding of Germany (Jarausch, 
2006). With the slow change in American-German relations, denazification was called 
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off by 1948. Though denazification was a difficult and bureaucratic process, there were 
some positives. First, the Nazi Party was outlawed making sure there was no possible 
revivalism of Nazism in Germany. Second, major Nazi leaders were captured and 
eliminated from public life. Finally, Nazism as an ideology was discredited (Jarausch, 
2006). With Nazism discredited and Allied occupation in place, there was an opportunity 
for a new political movement to take place in Germany. 
 Americans began to see a difference between Nazi Germany and post-war 
Germany. Not all Germans were guilty of waging war and antagonizing U.S. forces. At 
the same time the thaw between Germany and America was taking place, a hardening of 
lines between America and the U.S.S.R. was beginning. The new threat to America and 
the West was communism, not Nazism, and consumerism became the weapon of choice 
to fight communism. The best ambassadors of American culture were already in Europe 
as U.S. soldiers. American soldiers spread American consumer culture to Germans 
through their interactions with German children, women, and other civilians (Goedde, 
1999). Over time the Germans became less of a threat, and more of an ally against 
Russia. Cultural exchanges and German societal changes prompted General Eisenhower 
to note the “rapid progress which has been made in the denazification and removal of all 
prominent Nazis from any part of German life” (Goedde, 1999, p. 15). Eisenhower’s 
declamation signaled a shift in U.S. military policy toward Germany and triggered a 
distinction by U.S. occupation forces between guilty and innocent Germans. The Truman 
Doctrine which was based in containment was outlined in 1947 by President Harry 
Truman officially shifted how Germany was treated, and created the foundation for a 
democratic Germany. 
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 Yalta and Potsdam symbolized a return to prominence for the Soviet Union in 
Europe. Stalin was insistent on territorial aggrandizement at both conferences. The 
Western Powers were not willing at the time to offer much resistance to Stalin’s wishes. 
The realization of a new Eurasian bloc represented a rise in Soviet world status. The land 
also provided Stalin and Russia with security, which was the most important issue for the 
Russians. If a future enemy wished to attack Russia, especially the Germans, they would 
have to cross a large swath of land (Judt, 2005). Two developments are important to the 
discussion and evolution of the Cold War. The countries lying between the Soviet zone of 
occupation and Russia were to be regimes friendly to the USSR, “free of fascist and 
reactionary elements” (Judt, 2005, p. 118), if they were not wholly absorbed into the 
Soviet Union. The other major development was the security Russia gained which came 
at the cost of German unity, with Russia attempting to ensure Germany never threatened 
Europe or Russia again. 
 Potsdam concluded with Russia gaining the right to extract and remove goods, 
services and financial assets from its German zone, but Russia also pursued the policy of 
removing factories and equipment from Western zones, with or without the approval of 
their fellow occupiers (Judt, 2005). It was here in Germany that the policies of the “Big 
Three” began to diverge and set up the Cold War. Stalin was intent on dominating 
Europe, but instead of fascism, Europe would be dominated by Soviet communism. The 
Soviet zone in Germany would attract Germans of the western three zones who would 
eventually vote to create a united Germany under a communist regime (Gaddis, 2005a). 
Russian security would be ensured by Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Soviet action in Germany, however, spurned Stalin’s dreams and led to a showdown 
between Western Allies and the Soviets. 
The “magnet” regime that Stalin hoped to set up in the Soviet zone never 
materialized. Germans living in the Soviet zone did not readily accept Soviet collectivist 
doctrines. The Nazis had run a capitalistic economy. Germans in the Soviet zone were 
unwilling to nationalize their banks or implement a new system of land tenure. Soviet 
soldiers also looted far more than any other country’s soldiers and wiped out all liquid 
assets (Dulles, 2003). Stalin’s tactics in Germany did little to impress upon the German 
population that he intended to follow the Potsdam Accords and maintain the unity of 
Germany or help the German people. The de facto Communist led government quickly 
began extracting and dismantling all that fell into their grasp, including many German 
factories and industrial equipment leaving the Soviet zone impoverished. However 
unpopular the Americans, British or French were in the German’s eyes, the Soviet regime 
was far worse (Judt, 2005). The Russian standing among the German people was low. 
Russian soldiers went about Berlin looting worker’s houses. The section of Germany 
being turned over to Poland saw a good deal of buck passing and a great deal of 
confusion over what was actually occurring (Dulles, 2003). The Russians impressed the 
Germans as thugs. Ordinary citizens were not given food cards and travel was often on 
foot (Dulles, 2003). While the U.S. struggled to gain the full acceptance of the Germans, 
unlike the Russians, the U.S. never created an atmosphere of disharmony, animosity, and 
chaos. Initial Soviet actions proved to be disastrous in the future as the East German 
government, the GDR, never gained legitimacy. Soviet soldier’s early action toward 
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German civilians, including numerous sexual assaults and pillaging, sowed the early 
seeds of discord between the occupiers and the defeated. 
Reports of rape and abuse in the Western zones were disturbing, but paled in 
comparison to the actions of the Soviets. Women suffered the most at the hands of their 
new Russian occupiers. Russian commanders typically turned a blind eye to rape and 
pillaging in Germany.1 Because of German actions in Russia in 1941 the Russians now 
found rape the perfect vengeance against these “racially superior German women” and an 
ideal way to humiliate German males (MacDonogh, 2007). Rape was condoned 
throughout the entire Soviet Army. Its top military and political figures sanctioned rape. 
Stalin told Yugoslav leader Milovan Djilas that it was necessary to understand that “ if a 
soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fire and death has fun 
with a woman or takes some trifle” so be it (MacDonogh, 2007, p. 26). There was no one 
left to protect the German women. Most of the men in Germany were forced into military 
service and were either killed or in POW camps, and if any that remained tried to protect 
the women Russian soldiers would shoot them immediately (MacDonogh, 2007).  
To German women, American men were attractive because few had suffered the 
deprivations of war the way the Russians had and American men were not crippled, but 
usually taller and more athletic (MacDonogh, 2007). German female attraction towards 
American GIs stemmed from a dependence on the GI for food and favors in return for 
companionship and sex, but also from the lack of German men (Goedde, 1999). The lack 
                                                 
1
 In Vienna, it is estimated that 87,000 women were raped with a slightly higher number in Berlin with the 
onset of Soviet troop arrivals (Judt, 2005). Between 1945-1947 approximately 2 million women were raped 
by Russian soldiers (Gaddis, 2005a). These numbers are probably lower than the actual number of rapes 
because they account for reports of women in the cities, not the outlying towns and only account for 
reported incidents of rape (Judt, 2005). Neither age nor social status mattered to the Russians, with reports 
that women as young as twelve and as old as eighty were raped, and the higher the social status the worse 
off a German was because the Russians abhorred the German’s wealth. 
36 
 
of German men removed one of the biggest threats in the minds of American GIs, the 
German male as a fanatical Nazi seeking revenge. With the devastation of an entire male 
generation, German women came to depend on American servicemen. In return, 
American views of Germans changed. U.S. servicemen did not hold the German women 
responsible for the atrocities perpetrated across Europe (Goedde, 1999). The rare German 
youth did resent the presence and dominance of American GIs with German women, with 
the occasional fight between a German male who felt emasculated and an American GI 
(Goedde, 1999 and MacDonogh, 2007). The anger of many Germans towards Americans 
subsided with the reminder that in the Russian zone they would be shot, they were worse 
fed in the British and faced corruption in the French zone (MacDonogh, 2007).  
American treatment of German women had a ripple effect in U.S. policy. The 
approximately 14,000 GI brides and 94,000 occupation children signaled an end to the 
U.S. no-fraternization policy (MacDonogh, 2007). U.S. action in Germany, while 
resented by some sects in Germany, provided many Germans with a better standard of 
living than the constant threat of rape and pillage present in the Russian zone. How 
American GIs treated women compared to their Russian counterparts helped forge the 
two different paths the U.S. and Soviets would take in the Cold War in Germany. The 
U.S. continued its role as protector and caretaker, while the Soviets became the face of 
brutalization and repression. The U.S. tried to make the Allied Control Council a 
legitimate government for all of Germany, but the Soviets merely kept the Council alive 
to exploit East Germany to bolster the Russian economy while simultaneously turning 
East Germany into a police state (Clay, 1962). The actions of the Soviets alienated the 
German population and delegitimized the actions of the Soviets in Germany. The Soviet 
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installed regime in East Germany that was to become the GDR lacked the legitimacy the 
Western created FRG gained immediately (Gaddis, 2005a). The West realized that if the 
Germans remained downtrodden and impoverished, Germany may become a communist 
state. America set about reconstructing Germany, which began with the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan. 
 The state of the German economy was still relatively weak in 1946-47, and 
hunger still loomed. A small effort was being made by American charitable organizations 
in 1946 to feed the starving German population. The previous American perspective on 
Germany prevented American relief agencies from sending food stuffs and CARE 
packages to German citizens. But, General Luscious Clay, military governor of Germany, 
realized the problem of trying to “develop democracy on a starvation diet” (Goedde, 
1999, pp. 18). The warming of U.S.-German relations saw an increase in CARE 
(Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) packages and food stuffs arriving in 
Germany, but a larger policy was needed to rebuild Germany. A new American policy 
outlined in 1947 by President Harry Truman officially shifted how Germany was treated. 
The run up to the Truman Doctrine began in 1946 with George Kennan’s ‘Long 
Telegram’. 
 George Kennan was the charge d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in 1946 
when he received a request to analyze a recent speech given by Stalin at the Bolshoi 
Theatre. In his speech, Stalin announced the Soviets would return to their pre-war 
emphasis on industrialization, war-preparedness, and the inevitability of conflict between 
capitalism and Communism; he explicitly told the West the Soviets would only deal with 
the West when it suited them (Judt, 2005). Resulting from Stalin’s speech was an eight 
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thousand word telegram from Kennan to the Truman administration. The message 
explained Soviet behavior in terms of Russian nationalism and security fears, but Kennan 
also added a section on Soviet ideology. According to Kennan, “international Marxism, 
with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war-torn outside world” made Russian 
nationalism “more dangerous and insidious than ever before” (Bostdorff, 2008, p. 20). He 
explained that the Soviets were going to strengthen their military and industrial capacities 
to expand their global influence by supporting or establishing communist regimes around 
the globe (Bostdorff, 2008). Kennan maintained that there was nothing the West had 
done to incite the Soviets. Instead the Soviet ideology stemmed from the Stalinist regime. 
The Soviets’ regime had to treat the outside world as hostile because there was really no 
other reason for the Soviets to have a dictatorship. Without that dictatorship, the regime 
did not know how to rule and demand the cruelties and sacrifices that would be required 
(Gaddis, 2005a). Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ was one of the first instances of the 
insertion of ideology into the oncoming Cold War conflict.  
 Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ informed the Truman administration of the problem, 
but did not offer any concrete solutions. The answer to the problem was to come from 
George Marshall, Kennan and others inside the Truman administration. Clark Clifford, 
special counsel to Truman, and George Elsey, assistant to Clifford, prepared and 
delivered a report to Truman in September 1946 that greatly influenced Truman’s policy 
toward the Soviet Union. The Clifford-Elsey report drew on Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram,’ 
but unlike Kennan who discussed the Soviet Union’s historical security concerns and its 
current government’s ideology, Clifford and Elsey disregarded the Russians historical 
security concerns. Clifford and Elsey explained Soviet behavior on the fundamental 
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tenets of communist philosophy and described how communism and capitalism cannot 
coexist and that there was going to be an upcoming struggle between the two (Bostdorff, 
2005). What Clifford, Elsey and to a certain extent Kennan missed about Stalin’s 
February 1946 speech and Soviet action over the remainder of the year was that there was 
nothing really new to Soviet policy (Judt, 2005). 
 Stalin’s rhetorical motivations reflected a return to the Bolshevik “hard” line 
before 1921 and between 1927 and the onset of the Popular Fronts (Judt, 2005). The 
Russians had a long standing fear of surprise attacks coming from the west. Hitler and 
Napoleon had both brought massive destruction and death using surprise attacks from the 
West. Stalin, like all dictators, feared internal and external threats to his power, since his 
regime was based on a minority coup that ruthlessly imposed a dictatorship. Stalin and 
the Russians would continue to perpetuate the fear that Germany remained the main 
threat to Russian security (Judt, 2005). The Truman administration missed these basic 
realities as well as the reduction of the Red Army from 11,365,000 to 2,874,000 soldiers 
in 1946. Stalin was risk averse, and believed that Western protest over Soviet action in 
the East was a mere formality for Western acceptance of Soviet intentions (Judt, 2005). 
Stalin planned on taking advantage of his assets in the upcoming cooling of relations with 
the West, but more focused plans were unclear. As Norman Naimark, historian of Soviet 
occupation of post-war Eastern Germany, concludes, “The Soviets were driven by 
concrete events in the zone, rather than preconceived plans or ideological imperatives” 
(Judt, 2005, p. 120). The West read everything the Soviets did in ideological terms, but 
completely missed the how much the Soviets were realist and pragmatists. Stalin wanted 
freedom to act in Eastern Europe and security from future attack, but he was not willing 
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to risk war to gain it. The Truman administration did not understand this and soon slowly 
ratcheted up tensions. 
 Initially the U.S. response to the Soviet Union was one of “patience and firmness” 
according to the Joint Chief of Staff (Gaddis, 2005b, p. 21). This differed from past U.S. 
strategy with the Soviets since the U.S. no longer felt the need to conceal disagreements 
with the Soviets. The U.S., in essence, began a policy of containment. The U.S. would 
draw a line and defend against future Soviet encroachment, strengthen U.S. military 
capacities, and continue negotiations with the Soviets for the purpose of persuading 
Moscow to accept U.S. positions (Gaddis, 2005b). This new policy would be the 
lynchpin of international relations. In Japan, the U.S. resisted any substantial role for 
Russian occupation of the defeated nation. In Germany, America cut off reparation 
shipments to Russia and began consolidating their zone with the British and French. The 
U.S. also offered the Russians a four-power treaty guaranteeing the disarmament of 
Germany for twenty-five years, a treaty Russia did not accept (Gaddis, 2005b). The new 
policy of patience and firmness become most manifest in the Truman Doctrine which was 
announced in March 1947. 
 A week before Truman went before Congress and annunciated the Truman 
Doctrine, he delivered a speech in Waco, Texas that presented some major ideas on free 
enterprise. The principles Truman advanced would guide U.S. support in Greece, Turkey 
and Western Europe. Truman called for the establishment of the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) under U.N. auspices to prevent economic warfare. He sought 
bipartisan support and tried to calm fears about an external governing body interfering in 
U.S. free trade. Truman also stressed how economics and politics were inextricable 
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partners with U.S. free trade and enterprise in the world. His speech was well received for 
its emphasis on bipartisanship, American world leadership and free enterprise (Bostdorff, 
2008). Truman’s intentions were clear; he was establishing a basis for U.S. economic aid 
to Greece and Turkey. 
President Harry S Truman went before the United States Congress on March 12, 
1947, to ask the Congress to send aid to Greece and Turkey, but the ramifications of his 
speech changed the American-German relationship. After outlining why Congress needed 
to send aid, Truman turned his attention to the spread of communism around the globe. 
Truman told Congress “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United 
States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will able to work out a 
way of life free from coercion” (Truman, 1947). Truman protested the totalitarian 
regimes in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria and declared, “that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or outside pressure” (Truman, 1947). Truman implied communism must be 
resisted not only in Greece and Turkey, but in all areas across the globe. Communist 
gains in other countries were legitimate threats to the security of the United States, and 
needed to be blunted (Edwards, 1989). One of the major areas of contention was 
Germany, which remained a strategic location in Central Europe, a fulcrum between 
Eastern and Western Europe. Germany had an enormous resource base and was filled 
with industrious people. Walter Judd (R-Minn.) pointed out the implications of the Cold 
War in Germany “that as Germany goes, so will go Europe” (Edwards, 1989, p. 140).  
Truman resolved that a communist Germany and a communist Europe would be a 
disaster. With the Truman Doctrine and the political significance of Berlin, American 
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prestige and loyalty was now tied to the fate of the free city located directly inside the 
heart of communism. 
The speech received a standing ovation from both Democrats and Republicans, 
but as Dean Acheson recognized “this was a tribute to a brave man rather than unanimous 
acceptance of his policy” (Edwards, 1989, p. 131). The main criticisms of the policy were 
the amount of money needed to implement the policy globally, the wisdom of bypassing 
the U.N., and the bellicose nature of the proposal (Edwards, 1989). Congressional 
criticism of the address echoed some of the same sentiments that were being debated 
inside the Truman administration itself. Critics decried Truman’s universalist rhetoric, 
and especially the more aggressive sections added by Clark and Elsey. Kennan, who now 
headed the new Policy Planning Staff, privately believed the Truman Doctrine should be 
forgotten because he believed the U.S. could not defend free people everywhere (Gaddis, 
1974). After the speech, administration officials spoke at Congressional hearings to 
emphasize that future requests for aid would be evaluated on an individual basis, and the 
likelihood of extending aid would be based on effectiveness. By September 1947, 
Truman argued that foreign aid dollars should be applied “where they can serve the most 
effectively to bring production, freedom, and confidence back to the world” (Gaddis, 
2005b, p. 58). By 1948, Under-Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, more forcefully 
addressed the issue of constraints, maintaining that the U.S. could not underwrite the 
security of the world and had to make sure it did not overextend itself (Gaddis, 2005b).  
The Soviets did not take offense to Truman’s grandstanding and speech (Judt, 
2005). Stalin saw the speech as a direct response by the U.S. to the British inability to 
continue aid to Greece and Turkey. There was no fear in the Soviet Union regarding U.S. 
43 
 
intervention in Eastern Europe (Judt, 2005). The fear of war and worry over the warlike 
nature of the speech was a debate held in Congress, not Moscow. One of the reasons for 
this may have been the lack of a direct challenge to the Soviet Union. The speech used 
the word “totalitarian and other words to describe the enemy, Russia, but the words 
seemed targeted to domestic and international audiences who already knew who this 
terrifying enemy was. The replacement of communism with “totalitarian” also gave the 
administration plausible deniability with the Soviets. In addition, this alternative 
appellation demonstrated that the administration had something positive to offer, not just 
anti-communism (Bostdorff, 2008 and Gaddis, 2005b). The Truman Doctrine speech had 
raised the stakes in U.S. foreign policy. The problem looming for the Truman 
administration was how to contain the Truman Doctrine and keep it from becoming a 
blanket policy that would turn the U.S. into the world’s peacekeeper. 
Initially, the administration applied the Truman Doctrine on a case by case basis 
successfully. It seemingly had abandoned universalism and employed economic and 
technological means selectively and asymmetrically in those centers of industrial-military 
power not controlled by the Soviet Union (Gaddis, 2005b). The administration also 
distinguished between the different types of communism, Maoism and Titoism, and had 
hopes these different manifestations would help roll back Soviet style communism. There 
was also the reassuring recognition that the Soviets were not fit for empire and imperial 
management (Gaddis, 2005b). As late as early 1950, the administration was stressing the 
difference between U.S. vital and peripheral interests in hopes of stemming the idea of 
resisting communism everywhere across the globe. The administration tried through the 
China White Paper, Acheson’s National Press Club speech, and several other statements 
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to retain flexibility in its policy (Gaddis, 1974). The onset of the Korean War and some of 
the administration’s other actions caused the containment policy to become universal. 
The Truman administration continued to speak in universalistic terms for limited 
problems because they believed a greater impression would be made on an isolationist 
Congress and on the Soviets if things were stated in unlimited terms. Unfortunately, after 
painting a picture of Soviet world domination with puppet regimes all around the world, 
the administration was having a difficult time explaining why the U.S. should not oppose 
communism everywhere around the world (Gaddis, 1974). The continued use of 
universalistic rhetoric, along with the 1948 Berlin Crisis and Mao’s victory in 1949 began 
to change the perceptions of the administration and the public, and communism was 
increasingly seen as a monolithic enemy (Bostdorff, 2008). The onset of the Korean War, 
the strengthening of the Sino-Soviet relationship and the Chinese entry into the Korean 
War all led to the universal implementation of the Truman Doctrine, but there was a 
successful economic package outlined by Secretary of State George Marshall that had a 
major impact in Europe and Germany. 
 The Marshall Plan was conceived to prevent the spread of communism in Western 
Europe. America now planned to rebuild Western Europe, and make Germany a bulwark 
against communism. The United States feared that an impoverished Germany and Europe 
would be more susceptible to Soviet influence. To combat communism in Germany, the 
U.S. was intent on showing the Germans the benefits of capitalism (Boehling, 1999). On 
June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall announced the Marshall Plan at 
Harvard’s commencement ceremony. Marshall outlined the complete breakdown of 
European economies, and Europe’s sluggish recovery for lack of a peace settlement in 
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Germany or Austria. The danger in letting the sluggish economic growth and output 
continue was in the demoralizing effects on countries, and the possibility of war and 
conflict. Marshall argued that the U.S. must rebuild Europe and return it to normal 
economic health to ensure political stability and lasting peace (Marshall, 1999). The 
Marshall Plan marked a new beginning for the United States in foreign policy toward 
Europe.  
The Marshall Plan was ingenious as it would help put Europe back on its feet and 
ease the pain of the many standing in bread queues. Europe’s hungry and downtrodden 
were Marshall’s greatest concern since they were the most likely to turn to communism 
(Stone, 2010). The Marshall Plan was a clean break with past proposals on rebuilding 
Europe. European countries could choose to accept or decline U.S. aid. If accepted, it was 
up to the individual country as to how to spend the money. Because the distribution of aid 
was also spread over a number of years, it was more of a structured strategic recovery 
program, rather than a disaster recovery fund. The sums of money given to Europe were 
very large, totaling $13 billion at the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952 (Judt, 2005). The 
plan also focused on integrating Western European economies, which included the West 
German zones under Allied Control. Russia and Eastern Europe did not accept the 
Marshall Plan fearing that U.S. capitalism and democracy would infiltrate and dominate 
their countries. 
No longer mired in isolationism, the Marshall Plan placed the U.S. at the center of 
world affairs, and the U.S. targeted Germany to be a major beneficiary of its aid. The 
Marshall Plan strengthened the ties between the U.S. and Europe, which was further 
strengthened by the creation of NATO in 1949. European integration was another prong 
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of the Marshall Plan. Integration tied the Western European economies together, and 
strengthened the bond between the West and Germany (Stern, 2006). The point of the 
Marshall Plan was to rebuild and integrate Germany, not make Germany a dependent 
pariah. The Plan sought to preclude the economic and political impetus that led to the rise 
of Hitler (Judt, 2005). There were many in Europe who blamed the Americans for the 
sluggish European economy since the U.S. failed to deliver on the German reparations. 
America wanted to revitalize and integrate Germany into the European economy, but 
many Europeans feared the worst given Germany’s recent past (Stone, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Germany was the lynchpin in saving the rest of Europe because of its 
central location and its vast resource and industrial capacity. Without a revitalized 
Germany, France would lack the coal needed to build new steel mills, Britain could not 
sustain their zone in Germany unless it recovered and the Lowland countries and 
Denmark would remain moribund if Germany could not buy their produce (Judt, 2005). 
Marshall sought to integrate Germany into the European Recovery Act. 
In the summer of 1947, Marshall introduced the idea of melding the British and 
American zones into ‘Bizonia,’ and fifty-two representatives met in Frankfurt to discuss 
the west German economy. Reparations were scaled down to permit 10.7 tons of steel to 
be produced in the western zones. ‘Bizonia’ was officially included in the European 
Recovery Program (ERP), the official title of the Marshall Plan, and sixteen participating 
nations met to submit a project for increased output and exports, for financial stability 
and cross-border co-operation of all countries participating in the ERP (Stone, 2010). By 
February 1948, there were 104 deputies of the Marshall Plan working in Germany, and 
by June there was the ‘Bank of German Lands,’ which did not include East Germany. 
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The French had squabbled over the Saarland’s coal, but by the summer of 1948, they 
joined their zone with ‘Bizonia’ and ‘Trizonia’ emerged, along with the basis for a new 
Germany (Stone, 2010). The Marshall Plan was a success in reestablishing German 
confidence and had the potential to build a new German nation.  
The Plan saved Western Europe from what could have been devastating food and 
fuel shortages that could have given communists the needed boost and votes to come to 
power. The Europeans also sat down at a table for the first time in many years to discuss 
and co-ordinate their responses to Marshall’s offer in 1947. The biggest boost, however, 
was to the European psyche. Europe broke with its legacy of chauvinism, depression and 
authoritarian solutions, and made a coordinated economic policy seem the norm rather 
than the exception (Judt, 2005). The key here was that Marshall allowed the European 
governments to spend the money as they saw fit. He signaled that he was not bringing 
Americanization and U.S. dominance, but rather helping Europe find its own footing. 
 The long term impact of the Marshall Plan in Germany was the creation of 
democratic enfranchisement among the Germans. Marshall saw enfranchisement as a 
path toward a consumer culture, privatization, and democracy (Castillo, 2005). By the 
early 1950s the world began to marvel at West Germany’s economic turnaround, which 
was attributed to the Marshall Plan and influx of cheap labor from Eastern Germany 
(Stern, 2006). In the early 1950s, the United States set up the Amerika zu Hause (America 
at Home) in Berlin, an elaborate display intended to show Germans the typical American 
lifestyle. Amerika zu Hause was part of the Marshall Plan, and was described as a 
“gratifying demonstration of what can be accomplished in selling the American 
democratic way of life from the Berlin showcase” (Castillo, 2005, p. 270). The display’s 
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opening in 1950 drew 15 percent of West Germany’s population, and helped solidify 
West German-American relations. Drawing on the German legacy of Bauhaus design, the 
Amerika zu Hause display won rave reviews by Germans, and helped “draw the Weimar 
Republic and the [postwar] Federal Republic into the same elective lineage” (Castillo, 
2005, 272). Amerika zu Hause was not merely a way of demonstrating model U.S. 
housing, but about creating a new German citizen rooted in democratic principles.  
Marshall Plan funds were also used to subsidize the construction of single-family 
homes to promote the concept of private property. The concept of owning a home or 
living space had already helped shape the 1949 housing construction program of the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of Konrad Adenauer (Boehling, 1999). The release 
of funds from the Marshall Plan to subsidize the construction of homes in Germany also 
favorably influenced the German culture and economy towards capitalism (Boehling, 
1999). By connecting the Weimar Republic and the FRG, America attempted to persuade 
the Germans that Germany was always democratic at heart. Other institutions were also 
used to connect postwar Germany with its democratic past. 
 The Amerika zu Hause exhibits and the introduction of American sponsored 
libraries and information centers were successful in the U.S. goal of spreading the 
democratic ideal, but they did have their critics. Some Germans saw the American 
reeducation plan as arrogant and the long parade of guest visitors from America speaking 
to the Germans about democracy caused some Germans to question whether the 
“Americans were suffering from an obsession endlessly to talk about that verbal fetish, 
democracy” (Snow, 2003, 203). Many Germans believed denazification stabilized the 
country after Hitler, but the continued use of denazification programs and unrelenting 
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attempts to force a U.S. style democracy made the Germans feel marginalized. Germans 
believed that American style democracy was not necessarily the best option for a new 
Germany, only a German form of democracy would work best in a new Germany (Snow, 
2003). U.S. reeducation and reorientation programs in Germany were successful in 
helping the Germans create a new democratic identity and the roots of a newly revitalized 
German republic were taking hold, but the new identity could never be an exact 
replication of an American style democracy. The Germans remained strong allies 
throughout the entire Cold War, but beginning in the late 1950s and coming to full 
fruition in the late 1960’s was the new German democratic ideal that was independent of 
U.S. control. 
 In August 1947, as part of the European Recovery Act, America enacted JCS 
1779, which formally acknowledged the American goals of economic unification of the 
Western zones of Germany, and German self-government (Judt, 2005). America’s shift in 
policy toward Germany reflected Truman’s rhetoric, Marshall’s warnings about the threat 
of communism in Europe and U.S. support of European integration. 
 By 1948, the German economy was picking up steam, and currency reform was 
needed to make Germany stronger. The Western Allies decided upon currency reform for 
their zones and West Berlin, but the Soviets insisted they were only ones who could 
reform the currency in Berlin. On 16 June the Russians walked out of the Kommandatura, 
the joint managing body between the Allies on German affairs, in protest over the soon to 
be introduced Deutshemark (Stone, 2010). When the Allies introduced the Deutshemark 
on June 25, 1948, the Soviets stopped all remaining railway traffic to Berlin, which cut 
Berlin off from the outside world (Simpson, 1957). The Russians cut the railway on June 
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23 and by July 10 the canals were closed. The Allies were in a difficult position because 
there were no treaty arrangements covering land access by the Allies, but there were air 
rights (Stone, 2010). The Soviets were hoping to make West Berlin dependent on East 
Berlin supplies and slowly push Western personnel out. There was discord in the U.S. 
and West about the position of Berlin, which was militarily untenable. In an effort to 
avoid loss of American prestige, General Omar Bradley suggested withdrawing from 
Berlin before the Soviets put the squeeze on (May, 1998). General Clay and others knew 
the importance of Berlin could not be understated. As Soviet Foreign Minister 
Vyacheslav Molotov stated, “What happens in Berlin, happens to Germany. What 
happens to Germany, happens to Europe” (Roberts, 2008, p. 26). A military option in 
Berlin was not possible because the Allies were heavily outnumbered. General Clay 
decided upon an airlift. Clay reasoned, “Our remaining in Berlin is essential to our 
prestige in Germany and Europe” (Roberts, 2008, p. 26). By abandoning Berlin, the 
symbolic beacon of Western superiority in the Soviet zone, a negative precedent would 
be set and German fears of being overrun by the Red Army would be realized.  
June 26, 1947, marked the first day of the Airlift. American and British planes 
took off for West Berlin with supplies and landed safely at Tempelhof Airport in the 
American zone. Soon 1,500 flights a day delivered 4,500 tons of food, fuel, and supplies 
daily to West Berliners. During the blockade, Ernst Reuter, lord mayor of West Berlin, 
rallied Berliners to slightly lower their standard of living by decreasing their consumption 
of food and electricity to preserve their democratic freedom. Reuter became the first 
celebrated democrat of the new democratic Germany (Stern, 2006). Reuter symbolized to 
the world that democracy could succeed in Germany after the Third Reich. The Western 
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powers continued to pour in supplies to Berlin and with every plane that landed the West 
increased its prestige and prominence. The feeling throughout the West was summarized 
by British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who stated, “We cannot abandon those 
stouthearted Berlin democrats who are refusing to bow to Soviet pressure” (May, 1998, p. 
150). The Western Allies rallied to the defense of Western Berlin. The allies’ efforts 
made West Berlin seem no different than those that would be taken to defend New York 
or Los Angeles (May, 1998). After 11 months of flights the Soviets called off the 
blockade (Roberts, 2008). The city that was once the capital of Hitler’s Reich had 
become a symbol of democracy in Germany. The Berlin Airlift showed the resolve of a 
democratic Germany, and upheld American prestige. 
General Clay concluded that the Soviet Blockade stemmed from their desire to 
weaken the U.S. position in Europe (Clay, 1962). There was serious consideration in 
Washington of a strategic Allied withdrawal from Berlin which some considered 
militarily indefensible, a political liability and a possible source of tension in the future 
(Gelb, 1986). Stalin viewed a rapid demobilization of U.S. forces, as a gateway for the 
Soviets to the Atlantic Ocean. As a result, the Soviets made the case that Berlin was not 
worth fighting over (Clay, 1962). Clay, however, believed that Moscow was not prepared 
to go to war over Berlin and when challenged the Soviets would back off (Gelb, 1986). 
The Berliners, for their part, never asked the West to stand down. Berlin found a new 
sense of identity and purpose in surviving these hardships. In sharing the hardships and 
struggle to preserve freedom, Berliners and Germans found common cause protecting 
democracy against the communists (Gelb, 1986). Evidence supports Clay’s claim that 
Stalin was not willing to risk war over Berlin in 1948-49. When the Blockade did not 
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achieve the aims Stalin set forth, he opted to end it. He changed his diplomatic agenda in 
1949 and attempted to delay the creation of a new West German state (Judt, 2005). 
Ultimately, the Blockade had two unintended consequences—the creation of a new 
German state and the unification and revitalization of democracy in Western Europe. 
Soviet refusal to deal with the “German” issue by uniting their zone with the three 
Western Allied zones gave the Western Allies little choice but to forge ahead with their 
own plans of creating a new German state. On September 21, 1949, the Western Allies 
created the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Western German law was based on a 
constitution that guaranteed the rights of individuals, protection for the states and an 
adequate central authority. The final document shied away from the term constitution 
because its connotation was more permanent than the title “Grundgesetz” or “Basic Law” 
(Wells, 1949).  The Western Occupation Allies did reserve the right to intervene in the 
FRG “if they considered that to do so was essential to security or to preserve democratic 
government or in pursuance of the international obligations of their governments” 
(Simpson, 1957, p. 90). Under the new German government, the question of Berlin still 
remained undecided. Berlin was to be considered part of Western Germany, but Berlin 
did not have voting membership in the legislative bodies of the FRG nor was it governed 
by the FRG. Berlin could send a small number of representatives to attend the legislative 
meetings in Bonn (Simpson, 1957). Certain rights derived from the surrender of Germany 
in 1945 remained reserved to the Three Powers. Included in these rights under Article 2 
were the rights of Berlin. Under Article 6, the Three Powers were to consult the FRG in 
regard to the exercise of their rights relating to Berlin, and the FRG was charged to 
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cooperate with the Three Powers on the discharge of their responsibilities relating to 
Berlin (Simpson, 1957).   
Allied security forces remained in the new Republic and Berlin, and continued 
their duties, but were now garrisoned for the protection and defense of the free world. 
The FRG’s acceptance into NATO strengthened West Germany’s ties with Western 
Europe, but this was seen as a threat by the Soviets. The creation of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Soviet Eastern sector was Russia’s response to the 
FRG. The GDR was not recognized by Western powers as a legitimate state since it was 
not democratically elected (Simpson, 1957). The Western Powers delineated and 
published the respective rights and responsibilities of the Occupying Powers and the 
German government. There was never such a delineation of powers in Eastern Germany 
where the powers delineated to the Russians and GDR had always been left undefined 
(Simpson, 1957). The creation of the FRG and the tumultuous Berlin Blockade had a 
unifying effect on Western Europe. 
The Berlin Blockade caused great panic in Europe. The fear that the Americans 
would leave haunted the FRG. This fear continued through John F. Kennedy’s entire 
presidency. In May 1948, 700 delegates met in a ‘Congress of Europe.’ The British were 
even willing to support a Western Union complete with a Council of Europe and a Court 
of Human Rights (Stone, 2010).  There was one drawback; the French had yet to get over 
their fears of Germany. The chaotic events of the Berlin Blockade, the Prague coup, the 
agreement and creation of a West German state and plans for NATO caused France to 
reconsider. 
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Robert Schuman, a French politician, came up with the ‘Schuman Plan’ at the 
insistence of Dean Acheson and French politician, Jean Monnet. The ‘Schuman Plan’ 
allowed France to take the lead in integrating the new West German state into the 
European economy by placing the entire French-German steel and coal production under 
a joint High Authority which opened the way for more members of Europe to join the 
community. The ‘Schuman Plan’ became the blueprint of European integration, including 
the new West German state, which proved to be an economic powerhouse moving 
forward. The German government led by Konrad Adenauer quickly signed the ‘Schuman 
Plan’ followed by Italy, Benelux and the Dutch. The British did not accept Schuman’s 
invitation, but in April 1951 a Paris Treaty was signed founding the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was a precursor to the future European Economic 
Community (EEC) and eventually the European Union (Judt, 2005). The Blockade 
resulted in the integration of the three Western Allied zones which then merged into a 
new German government aligned with Western Europe. This was directly the opposite of 
what Stalin wanted to happen in Germany. 
Stalin wanted a united Germany under communist rule, but Germany was closer 
to uniting under democracy than communism. Stalin’s European policy and own errors 
are to blame for his loss of Germany. Historian Tony Judt (2005) argues while Stalin did 
not fear the Truman Doctrine because he wanted nothing to do with Turkey or Greece, it 
was his own miscalculations that doomed the Soviet cause in Germany. His mistakes 
began with his acceptance of rape and abuse of the German population in the Soviet zone 
after the war. The Soviets never gained the legitimacy or support the Western Allies did, 
even though the Germans were not particularly fond of the Western Allies. The West did 
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not abuse the Germans as badly as the Russians. Stalin preferred to wait, let Germany rot, 
and let it fall into his lap (Judt, 2005). Moscow expected the Western garrison in Berlin to 
pack up and go home leaving Berlin for the Soviets. Stalin thought the West would 
abandon Berlin after the typical disengagement of American forces after war (Gelb, 
1986). Marshall knew that Stalin had Germany at his feet, and there was little militarily 
the U.S. or Europe could do about it. All Stalin had to do was accept the Marshall Plan 
and convince the majority of Germans of Moscow’s good faith in seeking a neutral and 
independent Germany, and he could have controlled the future of German reconstruction 
(Judt, 2005). The majority of Germans preferred a united Germany over a divided 
Germany, as the FRG’s main goal over the remainder of the Cold War was to reunify 
Germany, but Stalin had misread America’s position to stay in Europe. Truman and Clay 
stood tough on Berlin, and despite the strong pressure from the Soviet Union, Berlin 
remained and a new Germany emerged. Truman, Clay and the Americans appeared as 
saviors that helped found a new era in Germany (Mathiopoulos, 1985). West Germany 
was experiencing a significant upward trend in economic and cultural sectors heading 
into the 1950s. 
1951-58: Western Growth, Eastern Unrest 
 The early 1950s were a time of peaceful transition in U.S.-German relations, but 
Germany’s Eastern sector under Soviet control faced a period of upheaval. Western 
Germany was working on re-establishing a sense of normalcy after the war within the 
new democratic confines of the FRG. The U.S. was turning its attention to Korea and the 
space race with Russia. With the creation of the FRG, the U.S. saw West Germany as a 
protégé which they were akin to psychologically. West Germany was being integrated 
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into the American system. Whatever harmed or threatened Germany injured the U.S. 
(Mathiopoulos, 1985). The Eisenhower administration was a great boon to the FRG. 
Germany became a significant and important trading partner with the U.S., and the 
personal relationship between John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, and 
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was strong. Adenauer accepted advice from Dulles 
on almost all issues, and Adenauer exerted influence over U.S. foreign policy 
(Mathiopoulos, 1985). Created in 1953, the Eisenhower administration outlined how the 
U.S. perceived its German ally in NSC 160/1. The outline included: a firm association 
with a united Germany or at least the FRG through an integrated European community, 
prevention of Soviet domination of all of Germany and a reduction in Soviet influence in 
West Germany, restoration of a united Germany that could prevent both communism and 
neo-Nazism, a healthy German economy independent of U.S. assistance, and 
maintenance of the Western position in Berlin (Mayer, 1996). The Eisenhower era was a 
“honeymoon” era in U.S.-German relations that was not present before or since 
(Mathiopoulos, 1985). While the Eisenhower years were a peaceful interlude after the 
chaos of the war and the tense Kennedy years, a significant event occurred in East 
Germany in 1953 that would have a lasting impact over the Cold War. 
 After the Berlin Blockade had ended, many of the communication channels 
between East and West Berlin were slow to reopen, but the transportation between the 
two parts of the city was quick to reopen. In a city of 3.3 million, there was sure to be a 
lot of interaction between the sectors and many lived in one sector, but worked in 
another. Berlin was a meeting place for not only people living in different sectors of 
Berlin, but also people from East and West Germany. While the daily interactions were 
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maintained, the political separation and drift between the democratic West and the 
communist east was rapidly increasing (Hofmann, 1969). Having two different economic 
and political ideologies ruling one city was a “crazy system, one East Berliner recalled. 
All you had to do [was] board a subway  or [a] surface train…and you were in another 
world…[Y]ou could go from socialism to capitalism in two minutes” (Gaddis, 2005a, p. 
113). The differences between the two systems boiled over in June 1953. 
 In early June, factory workers in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia stormed city hall and 
occupied the Skoda armaments factories burning pictures of Stalin and hoisting an 
American flag. A few weeks later German workers in the GDR began to get restless. 
Construction workers working on a high rise residential complex decided that the 
socialist government overworked them at a strenuous pace. A vote was taken and the 
workers decided to deliver a letter personally to GDR leader Otto Grotewohl. As the 
workers walked the streets of Berlin, they were quickly joined by other construction and 
factory workers till 10,000 workers ended up outside the GDR’s Council of Ministers. 
None of the leaders of the GDR came out to meet the workers, and a junior minister who 
came out to try to placate the workers was booed vociferously and a general strike was 
called for the next day (Taylor, 2008). Approximately 400,000 workers went on strike the 
next day. Stalin, before his death, had encouraged the GDR leadership to accept reforms 
and compromises to stop the hemorrhaging of skilled workers from the GDR to FRG, but 
his advice had been ignored and now the workers were on strike (Judt, 2005). The 
authorities were quick to react, closing down plazas and alerting surrounding police 
stations that there might be trouble, but the protests continued as Germans coming across 
from the American zone joined in the protests calling for free elections, unity, law and 
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freedom, which were the foundational principles of the FRG (Taylor, 2008). Around this 
time, the first Soviet vehicles could be seen in East Berlin, but the protests only 
intensified with chants of “We want freedom, we want bread, we will beat all Russians 
dead!” (Taylor, 2008, p. 85). A full scale uprising was in the offing and the Germans 
were now calling for reunification of the country under the FRG. 
 The Soviets, who were informed of the potential dangerous situation the day 
before, decided to move Russian T-34 tanks into East Berlin. After a large crowd veered 
off toward Potsdamer Platz, the Russians made their move. Supervised by Stalin’s 
executioner, Lavrenty Beria, the Russians opened fire on the East Berlin protestors. 
Demonstrators fought back with stones, bricks and chunks of metal, but they were no 
match for the Russian firepower. Their guns swept the border area near West Berlin to 
contain potential escapees. A state of emergency was declared at 1:00 p.m. and once the 
tanks had broken the protesters’ momentum they moved quickly to seal the border. East 
German Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP) units moved in to round up the protesters, often 
brutally beating them and shooting them in the back as they tried to escape (Taylor, 
2008). Nearly three hundred were killed, many thousands were arrested, of which 1,400 
were given long prison sentences, and two hundred ring leaders were shot (Judt, 2005).  
The 1953 uprisings gave communism a bad name across Germany and created 
irreparable harm between East Berliners and their government. The flow of refugees and 
skilled workers from East to West did not stop, but only intensified. Over 400,000 East 
Germans fled the GDR in the traumatic twelve months of 1953 with the number dropping 
to 200,000 in 1954 before rising again over the next three years (Taylor, 2008). The 
Soviets briefly thought about resigning in East Germany so a united neutral Germany 
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could be created, but that idea was quickly scrapped as the communists feared it would 
show weakness (Gelb, 1987). The repression exhibited by the Soviet regime in East 
Germany left the State Department with the conclusion that the Soviets were in control of 
its ‘zone’ for the foreseeable future. Non-intervention would be the official U.S. policy 
concerning matters in East Germany (Judt, 2005). The new U.S. policy was also 
unofficially applied to Eastern Europe, but was unbeknownst to Hungarian rebels in 
1956. 
 Stalin’s death in 1953 left a power vacuum in the Soviet Union. In 1956, Nikita 
Khrushchev became the leader of the Soviet Union. A speech by Khrushchev in February 
1956 set off a new wave of rebellion in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev’s speech denounced 
the crimes and monstrosities of the Stalinist era drawing a line between acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of communism (Judt, 2005). The release of the secret speech to the 
State Department and the subsequent leaking of the speech globally brought brief 
rejoicing across Europe (Stern, 2006). The speech was not released in the Soviet Union 
until 1988, but both the U.S. State Department and western communists quickly secured 
copies, which fueled new hopes for a more open Soviet Union. In denouncing Stalin and 
dismantling some of Stalin’s infrastructure within the Soviet zone, Khrushchev 
overlooked Stalin’s tight control over communist machinery (Judt, 2005). Without the 
fear of Stalin’s iron fist, Poland and Hungary started envisioning a more open and 
democratic society. 
 In October 1956, Hungarian students began organizing and calling for reforms in 
the Hungarian government. The students drew up a ‘Sixteen Point Manifesto’ calling for 
industrial and agrarian reforms, greater democracy and rights to free speech and an end to 
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the petty regulations and restrictions under Communist rule. Imre Nagy was installed as 
Prime Minister and he acted quickly to institute democratic reforms. Nagy ended one 
party rule, asked the United Nations to recognize Hungarian neutrality and was moving 
towards withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact (Judt, 2005). When Nagy initially took power, 
the Soviets were confident that he could restore order, averting a crisis and the need for 
Soviet intervention. The Soviet approach to Poland was similar. Wladislaw Gomulka 
oversaw minor reforms in Polish society, but was a trusted Party man for the Soviets. 
Nagy’s quick action, basing his authority on the will of the people, soon gave the Soviet’s 
pause regarding Nagy’s Party loyalty (Judt, 2005). Khrushchev was already losing an ally 
in Egypt, which was dealing with the Suez Crisis at the same time of the Hungarian 
revolt. When it came to choosing between Hungary and Egypt as allies, Khrushchev 
knew he needed to maintain strength in Europe. He chose to act in Hungary quickly and 
harshly, and he let Egypt drift away. Khrushchev’s rationale for clamping down in 
Hungary was clear: 
If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, 
English and French—the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness 
on our part and will go onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the 
weakness of our positions. Our party will not accept it, if we do this. To 
Egypt they will add Hungary. We have no other choice (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006, p. 130). 
 
Khrushchev considered Egypt a lost cause for the Soviets and that Egypt would move 
into a neutral unaligned position in the Cold War. Hungary, on the other hand, was 
looking to move towards an alliance or pro-western alignment. 
 A confident Khrushchev moved quickly to put down the rebellion. Soviet T-34 
tanks rolled into Budapest on November 4 and by November 7, 1956, Budapest was back 
under firm Soviet control. In the fighting and aftermath of the rebellion, approximately 
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2,700 died, 341 were tried and executed in the following years, and some 22,000 were 
sentenced to prison. Over 200,000 people fled Hungary or approximately 2% of the 
population (Judt, 2005). The downfall of Imre Nagy and the Hungarian rebellion put an 
end to the post-Stalinist liberalizing efforts (Taylor, 2008). Within the Soviet Union, the 
Hungarian revolts had a major impact. The revolts in Hungary and Poland were attributed 
to governments that had failed to provide an adequate standard of living. Khrushchev 
feared the same thing could happen in Russia if its economy failed. He ordered an 
immediate reexamination of the Soviet’s five year plan, which called for more residential 
housing and more material goods for Soviet citizens (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). The 
Committee on Soviet Economic Policy informed Khrushchev that the Soviet Union 
economy was facing serious challenges, most especially with demands of simultaneously 
producing an excessively high industrial expansion and targets on agriculture that were 
unrealistic (Hatzivassiliou, 2009). Khrushchev also hardened his stance towards political 
dissent at home. Instructions were sent to the KGB to root out dissenters. Soon 
afterwards, soldiers and citizens who were believed to sympathize with the Hungarian 
reformers were sent to prison (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). The crushing of the Hungarian 
dissent demonstrated the ruthlessness of the Soviets and the impotence of the West in 
Eastern Europe (Stern, 2006). Western governments, especially in the U.S., were quick to 
learn the lessons from 1956. 
 Until the aftermath of the Hungarian revolts, the U.S. recognized the 
“impossibility of detaching Eastern European satellites from Soviet control, continued to 
encourage the ‘spirit of resistance’ there” (Judt, 2005, p. 318). Covert actions by the U.S. 
government were taken in Soviet controlled countries fostering conditions which would 
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make liberation of these satellite countries more favorable in the future. One of these 
liberalizing actions was Radio Free Europe, an American radio broadcast. Radio Free 
Europe broadcasts encouraged Hungarians to take up arms and advanced promises of 
imminent foreign support. Rebels were bitter and disillusioned with the lack of Western 
and American support (Judt, 2005). In response to the Hungarian and Polish rebellions, 
the U.S. drew up NSC5608/1 which stated, “the United States is not prepared to resort to 
war to eliminate Soviet domination of the satellites’” (Judt, 2005, p. 319). U.S. official 
policy was non-intervention in Eastern Europe. 
 After the tumultuous year of 1956, 1957 saw the dawn of a new European age led 
by France and Germany. With the Treaty of Rome, Adenauer along with Robert 
Schuman of France and Italy’s Alcide De Gasperi created a common market between the 
FRG, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Treaty of Rome 
marked the beginning of new ‘European’ identity along with the economic integration 
that the U.S. had been stressing since the Marshall Plan. The older generation of 
Europeans had learned their lesson from the two World Wars and the younger generation 
was attracted to a “super-national identity” (Stern, 2006). The Hungarian revolutions also 
brought hope to the Germans. Shepard Stone, director of international affairs at the Ford 
Foundation, asked Fritz Stern to help write a proposition paper on German unification. 
Stern’s draft recognized the danger and instability of Germany’s division. He did not 
believe a united neutral Germany would be a stable minor nation because Germany was 
the third most powerful economy in 1957-58.  A Germany politically adrift brought fears 
of giving into Soviet demands. Stern concluded, “the Federal Republic must remain 
integrated in the West, but that an Allied study of huge inner-German issues attendant on 
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reunification should be undertaken” (2006, p. 219). The idea of Germany reuniting 
overnight was foolish, but the West could “take heart…from the unpredictable power of 
man’s spontaneous will to freedom, which has brought glory and misery to Hungary” 
(Stern, 2006, p. 219). The Hungarian Revolts brought a change in official U.S. policy 
towards Eastern Europe, but also brought hope in humankind’s will to freedom.  
The establishment of a communist GDR and a capitalist FRG juxtaposed the 
competing Cold War ideologies in the two separate German countries, while 
simultaneously serving the goals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. But, neither the Americans 
nor Soviets had the German’s best interests at heart. The Germans wanted unification of 
their divided country. America and Russia used their respective power and influence to 
make a divided Germany a propaganda tool for the Cold War. The U.S. did legitimately 
help the West Germans, but West Germany was always part of the larger Cold War 
strategy for America. The goal of the Americans throughout the 1950s was to reunify the 
two Germanys into one unified state, but the Soviets were not open to a democratically 
unified Germany with ties to the West (Ross, 2004). America was solidifying the FRG’s 
place in the Western Alliance, and the GDR and Soviets were clearly being 
outmaneuvered in Europe. The Eisenhower administration gave full sovereignty to the 
FRG, pledged American support to the FRG and Berlin’s defense, and worked toward the 
peaceful unification of Germany (Lang, 1995). The FRG pledged rearmament within the 
NATO structure, joined the European Community, and worked toward the peaceful 
unification with the Soviet zone (Lang, 1995). The perceived political threat to Russia 
was severe and was causing rumblings of discontent in Moscow, but a more pressing 
issue was heating up in the GDR. 
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In Berlin, the lure of earning Western wages was tempting East Germans to cross 
into West Berlin to earn a living to enjoy the privileges of a capitalist lifestyle, while 
living cheaply in East Berlin. The GDR attempted to prevent East Berliners from crossing 
the border, but all attempts proved to be fruitless. Police sanctions and naming-and-
shaming East Berliners did not stop the flow of workers and refugees heading west. The 
shortage of consumer goods in the GDR kept the flow of border crossers coming and was 
proving to be a propaganda coup for the West Germans and Americans (Ross, 2004). To 
regain lost momentum in Germany and at the behest of Walter Ulbricht, Khrushchev 
issued an ultimatum in 1958 threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. 
1958-61: Rising Tensions: An Ultimatum at the Heart of Europe 
 Khrushchev saw Berlin as the bone in the U.S.S.R.’s throat and “the testicles of 
the West. Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin” (Taylor, 
2008, p. 103). Tensions over Berlin and West Germany heated up in 1958, when 
Khrushchev gave an ultimatum to the Eisenhower administration: that the West must 
“liquidate the occupation regime’ and turn West Berlin into a demilitarized “free city.” If 
the West did not agree to this, Khrushchev would unilaterally sign a treaty with the GDR, 
and turn over the transit access to East Berlin to the East Germans, ending Allied rights in 
Berlin” (Taylor, 2008, p. 104). The war-ending peace treaty would require U.S., British 
and French soldiers to gain permission from Ulbricht to enter any part of Berlin via air or 
road (Kempe, 2011). According to Kempe (2011) Khrushchev’s motives for issuing the 
ultimatum are many and range from political fears of German revanchism to pressure 
from GDR leader Walter Ulbricht, but three of the main reasons Khrushchev issued the 
ultimatum were: to gain the attention of President Eisenhower, who had been 
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disregarding his demands for negotiation on Berlin, Khrushchev’s growing power at 
home after putting down a so-called anti-party coup in 1957, and the bleeding refugee 
problem in East Berlin (Kempe, 2011). 
Soviet fears of foreign invasion from the West are deeply ingrained throughout 
Russian history and the traumatic events of World War II only increased Russian fears of 
German attack, even from a divided Germany. Khrushchev had fears, and as 
demonstrated by recent historical research, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
had nuclear aspirations for the FRG. Adenauer desired nuclear weapons solely for the 
defense of the FRG, which was a result of fears created by Soviet actions. Eisenhower’s 
nuclear sharing policy to European nations scared Khrushchev. Eisenhower believed that 
the British, French and Germans should have nuclear weapons and that America should 
help them acquire these weapons (Trachtenberg, 2001). However, Khrushchev was intent 
on not losing the propaganda battle with the West. Berlin was the GDR’s capital and the 
fact that part of the city was noncommunist and under Western control was symbolically 
troubling (May, 1998). On a practical economic level, the GDR pronounced in 1958 that 
its task was to overtake West Germany in the consumption of basic goods by the end of 
1961.  
About a year after the pronouncement and Khrushchev ultimatum, problems arose 
in guaranteeing an adequate supply of consumer goods (Ross, 2004). The failure of the 
GDR to achieve a standard of living equal to the FRG was most apparent in Berlin where 
the opulence of the West was on display and the failures of the East became glaringly 
apparent (May, 1998). Skilled workers and anybody who wanted to escape the toils of 
socialism had an easy escape route simply by crossing into West Berlin from East Berlin. 
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The decision by the Soviets to spark a confrontation over Berlin is not illogical based on 
the fears the Soviets had about a strong, independent and nuclear Germany; their fears 
were bound to increase if Germany unified under a Western banner (Ross, 2004). The 
combination of all these factors led to Khrushchev’s 1958 ultimatum and his insistence 
on resolving the Berlin issue within six months.  
Eisenhower did not act on Khrushchev’s ultimatum. Khrushchev toured the U.S. 
in 1959 calling for the urgent need to change the status of Berlin and proposing it as a 
topic to be discussed further at the Paris Summit in May 1960. The downing of a U2 
reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Union caused Khrushchev to walk out on the 
summit in protest. He then insisted that after the 1960 presidential election the new 
president-elect needed to come to terms over Berlin (May 1998). Khrushchev would not 
admit it publically, but he was reluctant to hand over power to the GDR for fear the GDR 
would start a war the Soviets did not want. He still planned on using Berlin and superior 
Soviet military numbers in Europe to try to work out an agreement favorable to the 
Soviets.  The next major developments would unfold in the Kennedy administration. 
John F. Kennedy: A Presidential Worldview 
 John F. Kennedy grew up in a privileged household, with his father being the 
ambassador to England in the years leading up to World War II. Kennedy attended 
Harvard University, and graduated in 1940. In the same year he published Why England 
Slept, which analyzed the reasons England did not mobilize for the war earlier. In Why 
England Slept, Kennedy explored the short term flaws of democracy, though he was a 
proponent of democracy’s long-term desirability (Meagher, 1997). In the short term, 
democracy’s defects involved the unwillingness of the public to sacrifice for the long 
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term benefits of democracy. Without sacrifice, a democratic society would grow corrupt 
and morally weak. For Kennedy, democracy required an elite leader capable of 
manufacturing fear during a crisis situation to unify society while simultaneously 
focusing on the long-term health of the democracy (Meagher, 1997). Kennedy’s study of 
Britain showed that public opinion coalesced around change as a negative, which caused 
Britain’s slow response to Hitler. British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, failed to 
motivate Britain to act; instead he inspired hopelessness among the people (Meagher, 
1997). Kennedy admired Winston Churchill because Churchill stood against the “inertia 
of human thought” that captivated other British leaders. Political courage for Kennedy 
was nothing if not a leader standing on principle. Kennedy’s democratic theory defined a 
leader as successful and politically courageous if “he supported the unpopular cause, and 
tried to change public opinion via the mechanism of fear” (Meagher, 1997, p. 476). 
Kennedy had not planned on entering politics, but in 1945 he decided to run for 
Congress.  
 Kennedy’s first foray into politics was to run for an open House of Representative 
seat in the Eleventh Congressional District in Massachusetts. Kennedy began planning 
his campaign over a year before his election in 1945. The election for the House set the 
Kennedy blueprint that he would employ for both his senatorial and presidential 
campaigns: Always campaign much earlier than your opponents and outwork them, meet 
as many people face to face as possible, use house parties and receptions to meet voters 
and gain volunteers, follow up with everyone possible who attends your political events, 
and present an image to the public that is comfortable for you (Silvestri, 2000). 
Kennedy’s hard work paid off, he took the Congressional seat with nearly a two to one 
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victory ratio. His career in the House was rather undistinguished; his only real 
accomplishment was his record of absenteeism due to his indifference, health issues or 
travels. In 1952, Kennedy won a seat in the Senate. Over his seven years in the Senate 
Kennedy’s worldview and conception of democracy changed very little. In 1953, 
Kennedy married Jacqueline Bouvier. A spinal operation in 1954 that nearly cost him his 
life threw Kennedy into a period of somber reflection. He began researching and writing 
a book, Profiles in Courage, along with his aid Ted Sorensen, which won the Pulitzer 
Prize in 1957 (Sorensen, 1965). In 1956, Kennedy almost won the Vice presidential 
nomination, but more significantly he penned a foreign policy platform called “The 
Strategy for Peace.” The principles therein were present in Kennedy’s Berlin rhetoric. 
 After almost gaining the Vice Presidential nomination in 1956, Kennedy sought 
to take advantage of the national exposure. He set his sights on the 1960 Presidential 
nomination. Foreign policy was always Kennedy’s greatest interest. It also provided him 
with a chance to display presidential ethos. In “The Strategy of Peace,” JFK outlined a 
prescription for reenergizing American foreign policy. He argued that the U.S. needed to 
reestablish a sense of purpose and direction (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1995b). He 
stressed an idealistic and action-oriented style of leadership. The Kennedy persona 
embodied this action-oriented style of leadership, which displayed a willingness to cope 
with the problems facing America while conveying an impression of knowing what 
policies, programs and actions would best serve U.S. foreign policy interests (Goldzwig 
& Dionisopoulos, 1995b). Kennedy spent the next two years traveling across the country 
getting to know as many people as possible and discussing the problems that faced the 
country, especially in the realm of foreign policy (Sorensen, 1965). The U2 incident 
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provided Kennedy with the opportunity to show how the Eisenhower administration and 
his opponent in 1960, Richard Nixon, seemed to be without clear direction. Kennedy’s 
“Strategy of Peace” evoked an air of crisis and drift in foreign policy, conveyed a sense 
of critical mission that only he could fulfill for the American people, and used extensive 
historical materials and examples (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1995b). These rhetorical 
strategies resurfaced in JFK’s Berlin Addresses. Kennedy’s idealism allowed him to 
locate testing points for America’s character and allowed him to rally supporters for his 
policies (Bostdorff & Goldzwig, 1994). Kennedy secured the Democratic nomination for 
the 1960 Presidential race against Richard Nixon. 
 In his 1960 presidential election bid, Kennedy attempted to make foreign policy a 
major issue, and remake the Democratic Party’s foreign policy. Kennedy wanted to re-
establish American foreign policy in a new purposeful direction and to restore a lost 
idealism (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1995 b). In Kennedy’s transition meetings with 
Eisenhower, he was horrified at the limited and inflexible war-fighting options he was 
given. If the Soviets attacked Berlin, he knew he was in no position to win a conventional 
war, but he and his European allies would be reluctant to exchange nuclear blows 
(Kempe, 2011). Kennedy was in a no-win situation in Germany, but this was a country 
Kennedy recognized as pivotal and important: “Our position in Europe is worth a nuclear 
war because if you are driven from Berlin, you are driven from Germany. And if you are 
driven from Europe, you are driven from Asia and Africa, and then our time will come 
next” (Kempe, 2011, p. 55).  Given such a domino theory, Kennedy desperately needed 
an updated military strategy to defend Berlin and the West. 
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With Kennedy’s election to the Oval Office, he gathered around him a young, 
energetic advising corps, “action intellectuals” or “whiz kids,” who wanted to get the 
country going again. The action intellectuals shared Kennedy’s idealism, and brought a 
sense of pragmatism that all problems could be solved through careful rational thought 
and weighing the positives and negatives (Herring, 2008). Kennedy’s “Strategy of Peace” 
campaign as a Senator was the precursor to his New Frontier foreign policy during his 
presidency. The New Frontier suggested that America was done sitting back and giving 
up when things got difficult, but instead would adopt a zealous, can-do attitude and go 
out and solve the problem (Hartley, 1971). Kennedy’s pragmatism provided him with the 
ability to calculate and then recalculate existing power relations. This was almost second 
nature to him. Kennedy’s pragmatism helped him formulate broad rules that could be 
applied in any situation: avoid getting boxed into a corner, keep options open as long as 
possible, maintain lines of communication to opponents and friends and when it comes 
time to strike, strike hard (Freedman, 2000). The roots of Kennedy’s Flexible Response 
initiative and his overall strategy for discussions with Khrushchev are connected with this 
political philosophy. 
 Kennedy adopted a foreign policy philosophy described by Philip Wander (1984) 
as “technocratic realism,” which developed out of the university intellectuals, 
government bureaucrats, and skilled professionals that Kennedy assembled for his 
administration. A technocratic realist perspective viewed the world, specifically foreign 
policy, as a complex and interrelated web. Technocrats take a hard-headed, realist look at 
American interests; they conduct a cost-benefit analysis of various actions to determine 
the best way to proceed (Wander, 1984). According to Wander (1984) one major a 
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benefit of technocratic realism was being able to justify more moderate courses of action, 
which was not the case when the Eisenhower administration was confronting “evil” from 
a moralistic and monolithic view. Wander (1984) stresses that Kennedy’s pragmatic 
approach could evaluate a doctrine by its consequences, what it is good for and what 
other possible avenues of action could be taken. Part of Kennedy’s pragmatic approach 
was negotiation with the Soviet Union. Kennedy wanted a dialogue between himself and 
Soviet leader Khrushchev in an attempt to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict and 
explore areas of mutual interest that might help mitigate competition between the two 
powers (Hartley, 1971). Pragmatism plays a key role in Kennedy’s foreign policy, but 
like all American politicians, he also used idealism to legitimate his policies. 
 With his modern technocratic-realist team assembled, Kennedy was ready to 
move forward in developing his foreign policy. As Kennedy put the new challenge, we 
“must move forward to meet communism, rather than waiting for it to come to us and 
then reacting to it” (Herring, 2008, p. 704). Kennedy’s dislike of communism was not 
based on the differing political or economic ideology, but on his fear of communism’s 
ruthless ambitions (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy’s resolve to confront communism 
followed Truman’s containment ideology, which aimed at preventing the spread of 
communism around the globe. As Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev in 1961, “What your 
government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the world’s 
business” (Sorensen, 1965, p. 514). Kennedy and his team feared another great World 
War, but were determined to lead the nation through perilous times to ultimate victory. 
This was a Wilsonian view of destiny, defending the nation and its democratic ideals 
(Herring, 2008). But, for all the Wilsonian idealism, Kennedy took a pragmatic approach 
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to communism and certainly did not want to provoke another great war. Kennedy’s 
technocratic-realists viewed the Free World’s superior economic and social systems as 
major advantages over the communist system (Wander, 1984). 
 Kennedy faced certain challenges that all Cold War presidents shared. More than 
any other president before him, and few after, Kennedy was well versed in the 
requirements for the rhetorical presidency. His college career and study of political 
ideology prepared him for the challenges he faced as president (Meagher, 1997). 
Kennedy was very sensitive to press coverage and went to great lengths to influence the 
media’s coverage of his policies. He used the media to introduce and market policies, a 
standard that future presidents would follow. He charmed reporters making them feel as 
though they were true confidants, but he could quickly drop the relationship if he felt 
maligned. As a Cold War president, Kennedy would have to constantly balance charges 
of appeasing communism while refraining from rash actions and rushing into war 
(Freedman, 2000). Kennedy’s mixture of idealism and pragmatism served him well in his 
efforts to keep the media on his side. One of Kennedy’s biggest foreign policy tests began 
in Vienna 1961. 
The Berlin Issue 
 Kennedy took office in 1961. He advocated a new policy with the Soviets that 
was premised on the U.S. preparing to “take risks to bring about a thaw in the Cold war” 
(Mayer, 1994, p. 85). This required “a new approach to the Russians” (Mayer, 1994, p. 
85). This new approach by Washington triggered the fears of West German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer, whose opposition would be evident throughout Kennedy’s presidency. 
Kennedy and his team of action intellectuals wanted to review all U.S. policy decision-
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making, especially toward Germany, with fresh eyes (Freedman, 2000). Kennedy’s 
roaming ambassador, W. Averell Harriman announced in Berlin in March 1961 that the 
U.S. did not consider itself bound by any previous negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin 
and that all such negotiations would “begin from the start” (Mayer, 1994, p. 86). A 
reporter also asked Kennedy why he did not mention Berlin in his Inaugural Address, to 
which Kennedy responded that it was “very difficult to name every area of trouble” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 175) Kennedy was hoping that his continued silence would 
encourage Khrushchev to let the problems in Berlin subside. Kennedy found it “difficult 
to understand why the Soviets found it necessary to question a situation with which, 
despite obvious disadvantages to both sides, we have managed to live for many years” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 175). In preparing to take U.S.-German and U.S.-Soviet policy in a 
completely new direction, Kennedy was hoping to restore the channels of communication 
between the two superpowers which, Kennedy believed, was the only way to progress in 
the Cold War. 
 Adenauer did not disagree with Kennedy’s strategy, but he was worried by the 
new approach and Kennedy as a leader. Adenauer believed the U.S. government was 
deliberately keeping a low profile on Berlin. Kennedy told German Foreign Minister 
Heinrich von Brentano that as “long as there was a lull, however, he did not want to 
provoke either action or comment on the matter [Berlin]’ (Mayer, 1994, p. 86).  Any 
negotiations with the Soviets should occur after Germany was reunified, which, in turn, 
should foster a détente-like arrangement with Moscow (Mayer, 1996). Adenauer valued 
experience over intellectual brilliance and was wary of Kennedy’s action intellectual 
foreign policy. Adenauer did not see the experience and discipline in Kennedy’s 
74 
 
administration that he saw in Eisenhower’s administration (Mayer, 1994). Faith in the 
Kennedy administration shrunk to new lows following the Bay of Pigs fiasco and 
reinforced Adenauer’s fears of Kennedy’s inexperience. Kennedy, for his part, felt that 
after meeting and talking with Adenauer for the first time that he had been “talking not 
only to a different generation but to a different era, a different world” (Smyser, 2009, p. 
49). Throughout Kennedy and Adenauer’s relationship the generation gap between the 
two caused them to see the world differently precipitating distinct differences in policy 
orientation. West German diplomat Wilhelm Grewe kept reminding Kennedy about the 
arrangements that gave the FRG its sovereignty, but Kennedy grew annoyed with this 
pedantry and told Grewe that line of thought was old-hat and the U.S. wanted to strike 
out in a new direction. 
Adenauer’s policy centered on Europe and his central priority was halting Soviet 
momentum across the continent. Reunification of Germany was his number one 
precondition for any détente discussions with the Soviet Union; he was against any sort 
of U.S.-Soviet rapprochement at the expense of German interests (Mayer, 1994). 
Adenauer based his foreign policy on the premise that the reunification of Germany in 
postwar Europe was the only possible context of a Western victory in the Cold War 
(Lunak, 2003). Kennedy and the Western Alliance were asked to agree to Bonn’s policy 
of working toward the reunification of Germany, an act that tied the Americans to Europe 
and to the defense of the West Europe from Soviet attack (Freedman, 2002). Included in 
the Bonn platform was the non-recognition of the GDR. West Germany did not have any 
contact with the GDR. Von Brentano explained Bonn  
had for many years considered the question of discussion between the two 
Germanys and had found this impossible. The Government of the so-
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called GDR had no meaningful mandate to discuss reunification…The 
moment the Federal Republic started talking with the GDR it would place 
itself on the same level. This was not a question of prestige, but the 
moment that Adenauer and Ulbricht [the Communist leader of East 
Germany] sat down together…the Federal Republic would in effect 
abandon itself, and the consequences would be disastrous (Mayer, 1996, p. 
26). 
 
Although, Adenauer’s public posture was to refuse to deal with the GDR, he was also 
criticized at home for slowly pulling the two Germanys apart. He chose to rehabilitate 
Germany by aligning the FRG with the West, many Germans felt this policy accentuated 
the differences with the GDR and created a further rift (Freedman, 2000). Adenauer 
wanted the West to pay homage to the reunification ideal, not negotiate behind the FRG’s 
back with the Soviets. This issue greatly divided Kennedy and Adenauer (Freedman, 
2000). The FRG’s refusal to deal with the GDR caused problems between Kennedy and 
Adenauer because Kennedy wanted the Germans to solve German issues, while the U.S. 
and Soviets worked out global issues. Kennedy would end up urging Berlin Mayor Willy 
Brandt to begin détente with the GDR in 1962-63, but in 1961 the Americans and 
Germans were worlds apart, especially on Berlin. 
Kennedy wished to stay away from becoming entangled in Berlin, but he could 
not escape the city’s past, his differences with Adenauer concerning U.S.-German policy, 
and Khrushchev’s demands to settle the issue. In an interview as a senator, Kennedy had 
noted that the U.S. pledge for reunification should not stand in the way of U.S.-Soviet 
relations. As Kennedy noted, 
Berlin and the problems suggested by Berlin are going to be with us for 
many years. I think, hopefully, we would like to get a commitment 
perhaps guaranteed by the United Nations, to reaffirm the concept of a 
corridor into Berlin and therefore free access…but German reunification, 
which represents the long-range goal, is certainly not in the cards for many 
years (Mayer, 1996, p. 8). 
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Kennedy’s ideas on Berlin conflicted with those of Adenauer and the links to Berlin’s 
past. The heroic effort made by Luscious Clay and the Allied Air force in 1949 to 
preserve the divided city made Berlin a “source of pride and a sort of prize” (Freedman, 
2002, p. 3). Because Berlin was a symbol of hope for the Germans and a propaganda tool 
for the West Kennedy, like his fellow Cold War presidents, felt bound to Europe.  
Another issue tying the Americans to Europe was American nuclear deterrence. 
Both the British and French gained nuclear arms, but neither would release the weapons 
to NATO for the common defense of Europe. The only nuclear deterrent preventing a 
Soviet conventional arms or nuclear attack was America’s promise of massive U.S. 
nuclear retaliation (Judt, 2005). In January 1961, NATO cut the number of active 
divisions allocated for the European central front with the explanation that “the 
Americans tied their fate and their nuclear arsenal closely to that of Europe” (Freedman, 
2000, p. 50). Any withdrawal by the Americans would threaten Western security because 
of a possible Soviet invasion. 
Adenauer was not the only Western leader who disapproved of Kennedy’s 
negotiation with the Soviet Union. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was the 
closest ally in terms of agreeing with Washington on how to deal with Berlin, but 
Macmillan fought two wars against the Germans. He believed America was the only 
country who could be counted upon of Britain’s friends. Macmillan believed Allied rights 
in Berlin were “slightly tarnished” and that “the right of conquest that lay at the 
foundation of Western occupation rights in Berlin was wearing thin” (Smyser, 2009, p. 
44). Macmillan though was the strongest proponent of negotiation with the Soviets over 
Berlin and believed that the West could not abandon Berliners. Macmillan stated, “I 
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would not much mind if [the negotiations] ended up with the recognition of the GDR 
government” as a price for settling the Berlin issue (Smyser, 2009, p. 45). Macmillan’s 
idea of GDR recognition was contrary to Adenauer’s advocacy of non-recognition and he 
believed Macmillan wanted to cede too many Western rights over Berlin. 
The other Allied leader, French president Charles de Gaulle, opposed negotiations 
with the Soviets over Berlin. De Gaulle was not about to relent “just because Mr. 
Khrushchev whistled” (Smyser, 2009, p. 45). De Gaulle firmly believed the Soviets were 
not willing to push the West out by force and that Khrushchev did not want war. 
Therefore, he rationalized that the West needed to make no concessions on Berlin 
(Smyser, 2009). When Khrushchev issued his deadline, de Gaulle observed, “Khrushchev 
is bluffing and he’ll never sign that treaty…It would be crazy and I’m sure he’s not 
crazy” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 235). He also wanted to cultivate a strong relationship with 
Adenauer and the FRG. De Gaulle envisioned creating a Europe anchored in France, not 
in London or under Washington’s protection. He believed that a strong Western Germany 
tied to France would be an economic powerhouse that could diminish American and 
British influence on the continent. De Gaulle was strongly suspicious of the Anglo-
Saxons and still smarted at how London and Washington treated him toward the close of 
World War II and at the peace conferences (Smyser, 2009). De Gaulle feared German 
reunification because he wanted to balance the power of the Western Alliance between 
Europe and America (Lunak, 2003). While de Gaulle was fierce in his belief that the 
Soviets would not use force in Berlin and had no intentions of turning on his Western 
Allies, he continually attempted to upstage the Americans to gain favor with the FRG. 
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Throughout the Kennedy administration, there would be tension between France and 
America over how continental European policy should be handled. 
 Berliners and Germans in general did not put much faith in the British or French. 
They expected words of sympathy during times of danger, but they believed the key to a 
free Berlin was in America. If America wanted to keep Berlin free, they could, unlike the 
British or French. If the Americans wanted to let Berlin wither and die, they could 
(Smyser, 2009). The problem for Kennedy was that Khrushchev hoped to exploit the 
internal differences among the Western Allies. Khrushchev regarded the weakening of 
the bonds between the FRG and the West as the best way of preventing a possible rebirth 
of German expansionist policies (Lunak, 2003). Kennedy would have to show resolve 
and leadership in his public address on these issues while at the same time placating the 
various fears and holding the alliance together in private.  
Khrushchev and the Soviets were inextricably tied to the GDR and East Berlin. 
Khrushchev was pushing for a four-power agreement involving a final peace settlement 
between the Allies from World War II and the two Germanys. Desperate for an 
agreement on Berlin, Khrushchev proposed to turn Berlin into a “free city” (Freedman, 
2000, p. 59). For Khrushchev, unlike for Adenauer, détente between the U.S. and Soviets 
began in Berlin, whereas for Adenauer détente could only begin after a Berlin and 
German settlement had been reached (Freedman, 2000). Khrushchev’s ultimatum would 
be reiterated at the Vienna Conference to Kennedy. As the Soviet ambassador to the 
GDR noted: 
The presence in Berlin of an open and, to speak to the point, uncontrolled 
border between the socialist and the capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts 
the population to make a comparison between both parts of the city, 
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which, unfortunately, does not always turn out in favour of Democratic 
Berlin (GDR) (Judt, 2005, 250). 
 
The real threat perceived by Soviet officials was not an attack from the West, though the 
FRG’s drive for nuclear weapons was worrisome, but rather the real threat was internal. 
The fleeing of thousands of trained workers from East Berlin and East Germany to the 
West through Berlin was leaving the GDR without skilled workers (Fursenko & Naftali, 
2006). The rate of exodus in Berlin grew faster every year, with about 199,000 people 
leaving Berlin in 1960 (Taylor, 2008). The economic conditions in East Germany were 
falling behind the powerhouse FRG economy. 
 The 1958 Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany or SED) pronouncement that they would overtake the FRG in economic output 
placed pressure on the Soviet Union and GDR to fulfill that promise, but neither country 
could boost the struggling economy. Within the GDR, leading economic functionaries 
were skeptical about catching the FRG. Public outcry occurred over recent Soviet success 
in the space program, the launching of Sputnik. East Germans and Berliners were 
irritated that the Soviets could spend lavish amounts on a space program to reach the 
moon, but could not prevent shortages of basic commodities (Ross, 2004). As a popular 
slogan in the GDR in 1959 snarled, “There’s no cream, there’s no butter, but on the moon 
the red flag flutters” (Ross, 2004, p. 27). The living conditions in East Berlin were no 
better. W.R. Smyser, a U.S. diplomat in Berlin during the crisis years, described East 
Berlin as belying whatever “Khrushchev might believe or say about the glorious future of 
Communism” (Smyser, 2009, p. 39). East Berlin was “drab, gray, and cheerless. The 
shops featured few of the consumer goods and food that one could easily find in West 
Berlin. Many blocks of the old city center, having been carpet-bombed by the allies 
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during World War II, still remained as empty lots. Most cars were official government or 
diplomatic vehicles” (Smyser, 2009, p. 39). East Berliners did not dare dress brightly 
because they were accused of succumbing to Western influences. They could lose their 
jobs, housing permits and student assignments if they were perceived too Western 
(Smyser, 2009). Given these various restrictions and threats, there is little wonder why 
thousands were leaving the socialism of the GDR behind for the freedom of West Berlin 
and West Germany. 
In the Soviet Union itself, low birth rates were becoming a concern as labor was 
becoming scarce, but the reduction in armed forces announced in 1960 and other cuts 
kept the Soviet economy strong and a threat to the West (Hatzivassiliou, 2009). East 
Germany and much of Eastern Europe was not as fortunate as Russia. Between 1949 and 
1961, about 2.7 million people either voted for freedom or a betrayal of socialism by 
leaving the GDR. The lack of goods in East Germany combined with the “economic 
miracle” in Western Germany created a migration of Germans from East to West. A 
shortage of consumer goods and housing in the GDR helped in the mass exodus along 
with the lack of career prospects for the youth, whose careers were tied to their social 
background. The mass migration of people cost the GDR approximately 2.5 to 3 billion 
DM (Ross, 2004). Factoring into the loss in capital in the GDR were the many East 
Berliners who lived in East Berlin cheaply and worked in West Berlin where they earned 
higher wages. The GDR tried stopping such action through police sanctions or naming-
and-shaming campaigns that were completely ineffective (Ross, 2004). Walter Ulbricht 
exerted pressure on Khrushchev to put an end to this untenable and unnatural situation. 
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The Vienna Conference, 1961 
 Khrushchev went to Vienna with one major issue in mind; he wanted Berlin 
resolved. He took a leisurely trip through the Eastern bloc on his way to Vienna, and 
along the way he told a Czech Communist official that he planned to scare Kennedy into 
accepting any deal on Berlin and that the Soviets would take unilateral steps, if necessary, 
to end Western rights (Smyser, 2009). Heading into Vienna, Khrushchev knew very little 
about Kennedy. He was briefed by a KGB report that Kennedy was “unlikely to possess 
the qualities of an outstanding person” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 340) and that the 
new president was inexperienced in foreign affairs. Khrushchev believed he could best 
achieve his aims on the Berlin issue by applying pressure on Kennedy face-to-face, 
instead of negotiating a test ban treaty from afar, which he saw as an attempt by the 
Americans to take the lead in nuclear technology (Freedman, 2000). Khrushchev was also 
not averse to taking bold risks at Vienna because he saw the potential to reap rewards. He 
knew that NATO forces would soon be adding more West German, Bundeswehr forces. 
Reports circulating around the Kremlin showed that, by 1963, with the addition of the 
Bundeswehr forces earmarked for NATO, his Warsaw Pact advantage would not be so 
prominent (Lunak, 2003). The external pressure exerted on Khrushchev by the Berlin 
situation was only part of the reason he pushed hard on Kennedy.  
Khrushchev viewed the U.S. political system as being a contest between 
militarists and moderates. His greatest fear was a takeover by the militarists in the U.S. 
government, which might lead to nuclear war. Khrushchev believed Kennedy to be a 
moderate, but feared his weak character could allow the militarist wing in the American 
government to take control. Nevertheless, Khrushchev believed that the Soviet’s superior 
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number of conventional forces in Berlin and East Germany would induce the U.S. to 
agree to any deal involving Berlin (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Along with the U.S. 
folding on Berlin, the rest of the Western Alliance in Europe would follow suit because 
Khrushchev viewed the Western Alliance as nothing more than a smoke screen for U.S. 
dominance (Lunak, 2003).  
While Khrushchev considered Kennedy a light weight, there was one person in 
the Soviet government who disagreed with Khrushchev’s strategy, Anastas Mikoyan. 
Mikoyan feared that Khrushchev was gambling too much on the West not going to war 
over Berlin and feared that Khrushchev’s bullying would back Kennedy into a corner, 
leaving Kennedy with no choice, but to go to war. Mikoyan was not ready to make as 
rash a judgment on Kennedy’s character as Khrushchev (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). 
Mikoyan also understood the depth of American commitment to Berlin. He thought that 
any “demands to change the regime in the air corridors might indeed risk war;” He 
suggested that Khrushchev “offer a constructive dialogue on Berlin, leading to an 
improvement in Soviet-American relations across the board” (Smyser, 2009, p. 59). 
Khrushchev disagreed with Mikoyan and believed a firm and unyielding position would 
carry the day. Mikoyan backed off and Khrushchev proceeded undeterred. 
Khrushchev was also looking to institute a new fewer-guns-more-butter policy. 
The Sino-Soviet split, unknown to Americans at the time, was an impetus for Khrushchev 
to secure a quick victory on the Berlin issue in an effort to achieve a rapprochement 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Beschloss, 1991). This would allow him to 
institute his new policies and focus his attention on the Chinese who were angered by his 
liberalizing reforms (Kempe, 2011). By taking a hard line on the Berlin issue, 
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Khrushchev was attempting to quiet his critics in China. Khrushchev also wanted to 
impress upon neutral third world countries that the Soviet Union was the undisputed 
leader in the world (Beschloss, 1991). In a fit of rage, he lambasted Mao and the Chinese 
for wanting a “demigod to blame when things go wrong…someone you can piss on…If 
you need Stalin that badly, you can have him—cadaver, coffin, and all!” (Beschloss, 
1991, p. 43). Even with the difficulties arising with China, a tentative compromise with 
the Chinese was reached. The Chinese recognized that war was not inevitable with the 
West. They wanted Khrushchev’s pledge for more energetic political warfare in the Third 
World. With a peace treaty favorable to the Soviets, Western guarantees of security and 
commitment would be undermined and uncommitted nations would view the Soviet 
Union as a rising force in the world (Beschloss, 1991). Vienna was the opportunity for 
Khrushchev to work out his problems with America and focus Soviet energies in 
different directions. 
 Going into the Vienna Conference, Kennedy had no clue what his Soviet 
counterpart was going to be like, nor did he have a focused agenda. Kennedy went to 
Vienna with the idea of showing toughness if he was pushed. However, Kennedy 
remained convinced similarities between the two powers that were obscured in the past 
could now be addressed and that the two nations could work together rationally to ease 
tensions (Freedman, 2000). Kennedy did have second thoughts about going to the summit 
after the Bay of Pigs failure; he told Nixon that his failure may have suggested to 
Khrushchev “that he could keep pushing us all over the world” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 158). 
Kennedy felt a summit would allow him the chance to demonstrate his strength and 
pursue direct talks with Khrushchev to call a halt to the Cold War (Beschloss, 1991). At 
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Vienna, Kennedy hoped to establish a relationship between the two leaders that would 
open communication channels for future talks (Freedman, 2000). Kennedy’s central 
thesis was the two major nuclear powers should avoid “situations which committed their 
vital interests in a direct confrontation from which neither could back down” (Sorensen, 
1965, p. 545). Feeling among the West ran from mild expectation to outright worry. 
Senators, businessmen and diplomats alike fretted that a summit held immediately after 
the Bay of Pigs was not a good time to negotiate and that the wily old Soviet statesmen 
would take advantage of a young idealistic president (Beschloss, 1991).  
Kennedy prepared for Vienna by studying up on his opponent. He used various 
methods to size up Khrushchev from reading CIA reports to interviewing and talking 
with people who met him to reviewing all previous conversations held between the two 
(Sorensen, 1965). There were fears that the meeting was going to be used to create 
another international incident, especially in the CIA. Reports from the CIA characterized 
Khrushchev as ‘folksy.’ His speech was “larded with peasant proverbs and even biblical 
phrases,” he was “the poor man’s universal genius with solutions to all problems…an 
expert on everything” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 167). The CIA warned that Khrushchev might 
try to throw Kennedy off balance and that Khrushchev prided himself on his “mastery of 
the realities of the balance of power, he is imbued with the idea that he can utilize Soviet 
power to move the world toward communism during his lifetime” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 
167). The two men had similar discursive traits. Both liked to use historical references 
and were unyielding, but courteous. Both argued vigorously, but civilly. Kennedy was 
more precise when speaking and Khrushchev, for his part, was more colorful. Kennedy 
initiated conversations and kept them on track, while Khrushchev spoke at longer lengths 
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(Sorensen, 1965). Vienna provided the two great leaders with an opportunity to speak 
about the three most urgent foreign policy issues: Laos, a test ban treaty and Berlin. 
Vienna opened with the two leaders recalling their very brief first meeting in 1959 
at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting when Khrushchev was visiting 
America. Khrushchev began by one-upping Kennedy, when he remembered that he had 
“no opportunity to say much except hello and good-bye” because of Kennedy’s tardiness 
(Kempe, 2011, p. 223). Khrushchev told Kennedy he heard at the time that Kennedy was 
a young and promising politician. To which, Kennedy quipped that he also had said at the 
time that “Kennedy looked too young to be a senator” (Kempe, 2011, p. 223). 
Khrushchev questioned Kennedy’s memory because normally he “did not say such things 
because young people want to look older and older people like to look younger” (Kempe, 
2011, p. 223). Khrushchev finished by joking about graying prematurely and sharing his 
years with the president or switching places (Kempe, 2011). The tone of the conference 
was set; Kennedy’s short statements would be met by long diatribes from Khrushchev. 
 Berlin was the most somber and serious issue under discussion at Vienna. When 
the issue of Berlin was raised on the second day of the Vienna Conference, Khrushchev’s 
tone grew harsher, more intense, and more insistent. A rearmed FRG, with the possibility 
of nuclear weapons, was a prospect the Soviets would not allow (Smyser, 2009). As the 
issue turned to Berlin, Khrushchev began by asking why there was no viable peace treaty 
to World War II and why Germany, the country that began the war, had been rearmed to 
the point that threatened a third world war. Khrushchev told Kennedy that he wanted to 
solve the German issue with him; otherwise he would sign a peace treaty with the GDR 
(Sorensen, 1965). Under the treaty, all Western “commitments stemming from 
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Germany’s surrender will become invalid. This would include all institutions, occupation 
rights, and access to Berlin, including the corridors” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 216).  
Khrushchev proposed a free city where troops from both the Soviet Union and 
U.S. would be present. Guarantees of noninterference by the Soviets would be ensured. 
Kennedy thanked Khrushchev for being frank, but he reiterated that Berlin was not Laos 
and the U.S. was not there merely because of someone’s sufferance (Sorensen, 1965). 
The U.S. was in Berlin because “We fought our way there, although our casualties may 
not have been as high as the U.S.S.R.’s. We are in Berlin not by agreement of East 
Germans but by contractual rights” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 216). Kennedy maintained that 
America had been in Berlin for fifteen years and there was no reason to accept an 
arrangement inimical to U.S. interests (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy countered the Soviet 
claim at Yalta and Potsdam that they deserved the lion’s share after the war. Kennedy 
was firm: “If we were to accept the Soviet proposal, U.S. commitments would be 
regarded as mere scraps of paper” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 216). Kennedy believed that if the 
situation in Berlin changed, the balance in Western Europe would change and the U.S 
could not afford that outcome. Khrushchev could not accept Kennedy’s call to halt the 
Cold War and was infuriated by his willingness to ignore Soviet concerns in Berlin. If the 
Soviets renounced the ideal of dynamic world communism, it would further worsen the 
situation with the Chinese. Khrushchev was not pleased with Kennedy brandishing U.S. 
superiority with such abandon (Beschloss, 1991).  
Khrushchev continued to push for a German peace treaty. He urged his idea of a 
free Berlin, an idea that in his opinion removed the obstacles between East and West. If 
East and West agreed on Berlin and Germany, the door was open to further peace 
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proposals globally. A peace treaty that recognized the GDR’s boundaries and sovereignty 
would normalize the situation, but Khrushchev could not envision a treaty allowing the 
U.S. troops to remain in Berlin (Beschloss, 1991). Kennedy asked if the treaty would 
alter Western access rights to Berlin, to which Khrushchev affirmed that access rights 
would be altered. This proposed change in rights crossed the red line for Kennedy on 
Berlin (Kempe, 2011). The West could only have rights in Berlin if new rights were 
negotiated with the GDR (Smyser, 2009). Kennedy argued that Khrushchev had no right 
to unilaterally break the Potsdam Accords. Khrushchev gave Kennedy six months, after 
which the Soviets would “disavow our responsibilities. And then anyone would be free to 
conclude a peace treaty” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 219). A separate peace treaty between each 
Western ally and the GDR would allow each power to maintain their prestige, which was 
precisely the reason Khrushchev gave Kennedy (Sorensen, 1965). Late in the afternoon, 
they tried one last time to broker an agreement. Khrushchev believed the U.N. could 
watch over the city and small contingents of U.S. and Soviet troops could be left in West 
Berlin. Kennedy opposed a Soviet troop contingent. Khrushchev told Kennedy, “I want 
peace. But if you want war, that is your problem,” to which Kennedy replied, “It is you, 
and not I who wants to force change” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 223). Khrushchev countered 
by saying the Soviets were up to the challenge and that “It is up to the U.S. to decide 
whether there will be war or peace” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 223-224). Khrushchev 
concluded, “The decision to sign a peace treaty is firm and irrevocable. The Soviet Union 
will sign it in December” (Smyser, 2009, p. 70-71). Kennedy retorted, “If that is true, it 
will be a cold winter” (Sorensen, 1965, p. 586). The Summit was over. The standoff was 
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harrowing. The mood between the two leaders was bleak and the situation in Berlin was 
dire. 
 After the summit, Khrushchev was pleased with his performance, believing that 
he had dealt Kennedy a blow on the Berlin issue. A photo of the two, taken after the last 
exchange, left the press wondering why Kennedy’s trademark smile had vanished 
(Beschloss, 1991). For his part, Kennedy was reported to be “not only anxious, but 
deeply upset” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 364). This report was confirmed by Austrian 
chancellor Bruno Kreisky whose nation hosted the Conference and who saw both leaders 
off. Kreisky and the president departed after the last meeting. When Kreisky met with 
Khrushchev, after seeing Kennedy off, Kreisky reported, “The President was very 
gloomy at the airport…He seemed upset and his face had changed. Obviously the 
meeting did not go well for him” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 364). Kennedy confided 
to James Reston that because of the Bay of Pigs, Khrushchev “thought anyone who was 
so young and inexperienced as to get into that mess could be taken. And anyone who got 
into it and didn’t see it through had no guts. So he just beat the hell out of me…I’ve got a 
terrible problem” (Kempe, 2011, p. 257-58). Ted Sorensen (1965) held that the Berlin 
issue was the most sobering and grimmest discussion at Vienna and the topic with the 
least mutual understanding between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Kennedy later stated, “I 
did not come away with any feeling that…an understanding-so that we do not go over the 
brink…would be easy to reach” (Sorensen, 1965, p. 549).  
Kennedy ended up looking weak; forming the perception that Khrushchev carried 
the day. Kennedy worried, “I’ve got a terrible problem; if he thinks I’m inexperienced 
and have no guts, until we remove those ideas we won’t get anywhere with him. So we 
89 
 
have to act” (Smyser, 2009, p. 74). Kennedy was a man who strongly believed that power 
was “as much a function of perceptions as of hardware, position, or will: minute shifts in 
its distribution or even the appearance of such shifts—could cause chain reactions of 
panic to sweep the world, with potentially devastating consequences” (Gaddis, 2005b, p. 
200-201). He was frustrated by his performance at Vienna and on the plane home his 
anger finally overcame him. He cursed Khrushchev as a “bastard” and a “son of a bitch.” 
He could not rationalize being “stuck in a ridiculous situation. It seems silly for us to be 
facing an atomic war over a treaty preserving Berlin as the future capital of a reunited 
Germany when all of us know that Germany will probably never be reunited” (Beschloss, 
1991, p. 225). He recognized Khrushchev’s Berlin predicament as economic and had 
much sympathy for him; with West Berlin’s thriving economy draining East Germany of 
its talent, but he was still frustrated at Khrushchev’s stubbornness (Kempe, 2011). 
However, American prestige was on the line and Kennedy knew he had to keep 
America’s long standing commitment to the city. If he did not, then American prestige 
would suffer and conducting effective foreign policy would be very difficult. Kennedy 
was frustrated that he seemingly had allowed Khrushchev to place him in a position of 
weakness and that he had failed to negotiate terms with Khrushchev, lessening his ability 
to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. 
 However, Kennedy may have had more impact than he realized. Shortly after 
Vienna, Khrushchev commented that Kennedy had been “tough,” especially on Berlin, 
and he liked the President personally, but that Eisenhower was more reasonable and 
easier to get along with (Sorensen, 1965, p. 550). Khrushchev was also impressed with 
Kennedy’s intelligence because “he did not rely on his staff for prompting during their 
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discussions,” and the president seemed “more intelligent than any of the [p]residents 
before him” (Silvestri, 2000, p. 182). The Vienna conference had been a stalemate. 
Khrushchev was not swayed by Kennedy’s charm and reason, and Kennedy did not panic 
at Khrushchev’s tough talk. While no progress in the Cold War was made, both men 
defended their nation’s interest. Both had made a lasting impact on the other, and both 
had expressed steadfastness and pointed arguments (Sorensen, 1965). The President had 
made no concessions on either the Berlin issue or on the idea of an immediate peace 
treaty (Taylor, 2008). Kennedy’s resolve on Berlin may have given Khrushchev some 
pause on moving forward on any peace treaty between the Soviets and the GDR. 
Khrushchev expected to roll over Kennedy, but as he noted to a reporter when he left 
“We parted each sticking to his own opinion” (Sorensen, 1965, p. 550). Kennedy may 
have looked beaten and downtrodden, but he had proven the KGB wrong; he did not lack 
character. 
 Khrushchev’s offensive and bellicose style aimed at drawing concessions from 
Kennedy. Khrushchev was gambling that the West’s greater fear of war would allow him 
to extract concessions on Berlin (Freedman, 2000). Khrushchev wanted to gradually push 
the West out of West Berlin, but he could not be expected to risk war by sending in 
Soviet troops to drive the West out (Lunak, 2003). Unbeknownst to the East Germans, 
Khrushchev’s bellicose rhetoric about missile parity with the U.S. was false. So while the 
East German government was willing to go the distance with Khrushchev over the Berlin 
issue, it was Khrushchev who was having second thoughts about handing over the reins 
of Berlin to the GDR; he feared they might start a war with one of the Western powers. 
The East Germans were simply unaware that Khrushchev was bluffing about his boasts 
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on missile production (Freedman, 2000). The greater the crisis became, the more the 
weaknesses of the GDR were made manifest. East Germans and Berliners saw the threat 
of war or at least a looming closure to the borders and began leaving in droves. The rising 
threat of crisis coupled with a 1960 food shortage raised the risk of riots in the East. By 
February 1961, a 40 percent increase in émigrés occurred from February 1960, and by 
March, 16,098 East Germans left (Freedman, 2000). Khrushchev’s performance at 
Vienna may have shaken Kennedy to the core, but it only added to the sense of fear and 
crisis in East Germany. 
 If there was going to be war, Kennedy had only six months before the Soviets 
signed a separate peace treaty with the GDR. Kennedy needed a new Cold War strategy. 
From the beginning of June 1961 to July 25, 1961, the Kennedy administration worked 
on creating a new strategy. The administration was aided by the old Cold Warrior, Dean 
Acheson, and some vital intelligence from U.S. spy agencies. 
Lead Up to the July 25, 1961 Address 
 Kennedy’s plane ride after Vienna was described by his Air Force One aide, 
Godfrey McHugh as “like riding with the losing baseball team after the World Series” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 223). Kennedy recalled Dean Acheson, a veteran of Stalin’s 
blockade of Berlin in 1948-49, to advise him on the Berlin situation in early March 1961, 
prior to Vienna. Acheson would be called upon again to advise the administration in the 
wake of Vienna.  Acheson’s aid recalled that he looked “better and younger than I have 
seen him in years” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 242). Acheson felt the Europeans had just 
watched “a gifted young amateur practice with a boomerang when they saw, to their 
horror, that he [Kennedy] had knocked himself out” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 242). Acheson 
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would challenge and prod the Kennedy administration to offer solutions (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006). Acheson firmly believed Western resolve had ended the first Berlin Crisis. 
Now he advocated an immediate conventional buildup and cautioned the administration 
not to negotiate with Khrushchev until the Soviets understood U.S. determination to 
defend American interests by force if necessary (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Acheson’s 
report on the Soviets concluded that they were using military threats to gain political 
concessions from the U.S. and would not actually go to war. National Security Advisor 
McGeorge Bundy supported the Acheson report telling Kennedy that “Berlin is no place 
for compromise and our general friendliness and eagerness for improvement on many 
other points really requires strength here in order to be rightly understood” (Schake, 
2002, p. 31). Acheson believed that “only by winning the test of will can we change the 
Soviets’ purpose” (Schake, 2002, p. 32), which, it was felt, could only be achieved by a 
significant military buildup of conventional forces.  
Even before Acheson’s report appeared, Kennedy was promoting Maxwell 
Taylor’s ideas on conventional weapons, and their importance in Cold War strategy. 
Maxwell Taylor distinguished himself in World War II. He proved his grit in the Battle of 
the Bulge. General Taylor argued against Eisenhower’s nuclear policies of the 1950s. 
Kennedy and his administration agreed with Taylor’s assessment. Kennedy saw the 
expansion of options to deter undesirable shifts in the balance of power as a necessary 
creation (Gaddis, 2005b). Taylor was upset that Eisenhower’s heavy reliance on nuclear 
weapons devalued the currency of deterrence (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Kennedy 
concurred with Taylor believing Eisenhower had used nuclear threats to achieve changes 
in the power balance leaving nations few options below the nuclear level (Gaddis, 
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2005b). Taylor promoted a balanced approach with a buildup of U.S. non-nuclear 
conventional forces that could be used in conventional warfare. By building up the non-
nuclear forces, Taylor believed a message could be sent to the Kremlin about the 
seriousness of U.S. determination in deterring Soviet action. Conventional forces would 
demonstrate to Khrushchev that conventional warfare was still possible in the nuclear 
age. America’s refusal to either call Khrushchev’s bluff or go to war over Berlin fed into 
Khrushchev’s belief that the U.S. was too timid to face consequences of nuclear war, 
which was exactly what Khrushchev believed heading into Vienna (Fursenko & Naftali, 
2006). By giving Kennedy a middle option, flexible response, the U.S. would be able to 
meet commitments around the globe without being forced into the dreaded two-choice 
option of either humiliation or nuclear war. 
 Kennedy was contemplating all his actions, including the full Achesonian option, 
which included declaring a state of national emergency. Acheson was prompting 
Kennedy to call up reservists and put the United States on full military alert by requesting 
a national emergency. Prompting Acheson’s request, besides his hard line approach, was 
a series of bellicose speeches made by Khrushchev in June and July. For example, in one 
speech Khrushchev stated, “If certain [W]estern powers do not wish to respect the 
sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and if, for this reason, they believe they 
have the right to resort to force, it is the right of the highwayman. A highwayman can be 
beaten off only with a stick” (Pucci Jr., 1994, p. 61). On July 8, Khrushchev announced a 
one-third increase in the Soviet military budget and boldly proclaimed, “our armed forces 
[will] administer a worthy rebuff to any aggressor if he dares raise a hand against the 
Soviet Union or our friends” (Pucci Jr., 1994, p. 61). As tensions continued to rise, 
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between January 1961 and August 1961, 160,000 refugees fled from East Germany to 
West Germany, with approximately 60,000 fleeing in June and July alone (Mayer, 1996; 
Pucci Jr., 1994). Walter Dowling, U.S. ambassador to the Bonn Republic, told Kennedy 
on July 12 that the flow of refugees was reaching a critical scale and that revolts similar 
to 1953 might break out (Mayer, 1996). With the rising tensions, Kennedy was able to set 
the terms for debate through his use of the media. He employed a number of press 
conferences between the Vienna Conference and his address on July 25 in an effort to 
accuse the Soviet Union of manufacturing the crisis and to rebuff Khrushchev’s proposal 
for a “free city” in Berlin. For Kennedy, what was “free” for the Soviets was the slow 
disintegration of rights for West Berlin (Pucci Jr., 1994).  
Events leading up to Kennedy’s July 25 speech proved pivotal. In mid June, the 
CIA provided Kennedy with information on the state of the Soviet Union. The CIA had 
been working with an agent inside the Soviet military intelligence service, Oleg 
Penkovsky. The CIA reported that Khrushchev believed the West would not risk war 
over Berlin, and the Soviets did not want war over Berlin; they only wanted to threaten 
the West in an effort to jump start negotiations with the GDR on access rights to West 
Berlin (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Western recognition of the GDR would go against 
long standing Western policy and potentially stress its alliance with the FRG. To 
recognize the GDR would give the GDR legitimacy in world affairs (Mayer, 1996).  
All of this wrangling must be seen against the backdrop of nuclear capability. The 
Corona satellite program had replaced U-2 spy missions, and the latest reports showed 
that there were only two intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites between 
Leningrad and the Ural mountains, with eight total launch pads. The missile gap Kennedy 
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had complained about turned out not to be true. Instead of a major Soviet advantage, it 
was the U.S. who held the advantage. The Soviets had fewer than twenty missiles, 
enough to destroy New York and Washington if accurate. The U.S. had over two hundred 
Titan and Atlas missiles and hundreds of new Minutemen missiles in development 
(Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Even with this evidence, Kennedy remained unsure which 
direction to take with tensions in Berlin rising. 
 The most compelling advice given to Kennedy was by former President 
Eisenhower, who advised Kennedy not to overreact. The declaration of a national 
emergency in Ike’s view “would be the worst mistake possible in that it would give 
Khrushchev the idea that all [he] has to do is needle us here and there to force us into 
such radical action” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, 371). Kennedy’s cabinet meetings also 
took up the issue of national emergency. Bundy cautioned that there is no “limited” 
national emergency and Dean Rusk warned that a declaration would have “a dangerous 
sound of mobilization” (Freedman, 2000, p. 70). Kennedy had also tapped then Harvard 
University professor and future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as a consultant in his 
administration. Kissinger was against the national emergency, arguing that Khrushchev 
would be more impressed by a broad continued improvement and buildup of American 
military might (Smyser, 2009). Sorensen cautioned Kennedy against engaging 
“Khrushchev’s prestige to a point where he felt he could not back down from a 
showdown, and provoke further or faster action on his part in stepping up the arms race” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 257).  
Robert McNamara made the winning argument to Kennedy when the National 
Security Council met on July 19. McNamara argued that a national emergency would not 
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need to be declared before September 1 at the earliest, and that he did not want a large 
reserve force on hand without a mission (Freedman, 2000). As Bundy noted, there could 
be no “limited” national emergency and a declaration to that effect would be “a quantum 
jump” (Freedman, 2000, p. 70). McNamara’s proposed timetable for deployment in a 
non-national emergency situation was acceptable to Kennedy. He demonstrated that 
forces would be available if the crisis deepened, but his plan ensured that the deployment 
of forces would not be seen as a mobilization that would worsen the situation. Kennedy 
chose to “lean forward” on negotiations. By establishing American resolve, Kennedy 
would be negotiating from a position of strength and prohibit Khrushchev from choosing 
the “framework of discussion” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 257). Also in the July 19 meeting, 
Kennedy received the “Outline on Germany and Berlin”— a report assembled by 
Assistant Secretary of State, Foy Kohler and Office of German Affairs, Martin 
Hillenbrand. The report was a blue-print for the New Frontier strategy for working with 
the Adenauer government. It outlined four major tenets: the presence and security of 
Western forces in West Berlin, the security and viability of West Berlin, physical access 
to West Berlin, and the security of the Federal Republic against attacks from the East 
(Mayer, 1996). Kennedy had now made all the necessary decisions for responding to 
Khrushchev’s ultimatum issued at Vienna, but he added one more section to his 
upcoming speech that would cause some controversy and set an ominous tone for his 
address, civil defense. 
In a July meeting, Kennedy was discussing civil defense when the issue of fallout 
shelters was brought up. He asked for the number of casualties if the Soviet Union 
attacked America with nuclear weapons. The response was around seventy-nine million 
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people would be killed, a number that shocked and horrified Kennedy. He was advised 
that if fallout shelters were built and implemented on a massive scale the number could 
be reduced to fifty million, still a very large number, but a reduction of about one-third. 
Kennedy decided he would ask Congress for $207 million for civil defense (Beschloss, 
1991).  Kennedy was now prepared to announce his plans to America. He had chosen a 
middle ground of a slow military buildup of conventional forces that would allow him 
flexibility in responses to crises, but did not initiate a national emergency. He decided 
that America needed to be educated on the potential costs of nuclear war and initiate a 
civil defense plan for civilians. Most significantly, Kennedy hoped to regain the superior 
negotiation position he lost at Vienna and ultimately open up negotiations on détente with 
Khrushchev. 
 After the Vienna Conference, Kennedy commented to John Kenneth Galbraith, 
ambassador to India, “There are limits to the number of defeats I can defend in one 
twelve-month period. I’ve had the Bay of Pigs and pulling out of Laos. I can’t accept a 
third” (Smyser, 2009, p. 78). The Bay of Pigs came at great cost to Kennedy’s 
presidential ethos. The immediate after effects were protests and rallies on American 
campuses, demonstrations in Moscow and Eastern Europe, and picketing at the White 
House. An article in the New York Times observed, “that the expedition has involved the 
United States in a tremendous loss of prestige and respect…The reviving confidence of 
the United States’ Allies in its qualities of leadership has been shaken” (Pucci Jr., 1994, 
p. 54). Arthur Schlesinger reported, “In one day American prestige collapses lower than 
in eight years of Eisenhower timidity and lack of determination” (Pucci Jr., 1994, p. 54). 
Laos was not as big a blow as Cuba, but Kennedy’s waffling on whether to intervene in 
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Laos diminished his perception as a firm leader with his allies and his adversaries (Pucci, 
1994). In July 1961, Kennedy hoped to avoid a “third loss” in Berlin and reestablish his 
ethos as leader of the Western Alliance. On 25 July 1961, Kennedy would appear before 
the American public on television to deliver a momentous address on the state of foreign 
affairs, specifically Berlin and how the U.S. was going to respond to the Soviet challenge. 
Chapter III. Rhetorical Analysis 
Kennedy’s Radio and TV Address to the American People 
Kennedy delivered his Radio and Television Report to the American People on 
the Berlin Crisis from the Oval Office on July 25, 1961. On hand were seven television 
and newsreel cameras, White House aides, Secret Service men, technicians, still 
photographers, and print reporters, over sixty people in total jammed into the office 
(Beschloss, 1991 & Kempe, 2011). One aide remembers Kennedy looking tense and 
nervous, and the president complained about the heat, mopping up his hair and going 
outside before delivering the speech (Beschloss, 1991). The Oval Office was sweltering 
that night as Washington hit a high of 94 degrees that day and the air conditioning was 
turned off for better sound quality (Kempe, 2011). Jacqueline, watching from Hyannis 
Port, felt “a little shooting pain of fright” and worried “even Jack might not be able to 
make this crisis turn out for the best” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 260). New York Times 
columnist James Reston predicted the speech would “inaugurate a new flexible policy, 
not only for Berlin, but for the whole ‘cold war’ front” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, 376). 
Kennedy looked into the camera and delivered his speech. Kennedy’s July 25, 1961, 
speech was delivered from the White House via television, reaching an estimated 50 
million U.S. viewers (Freedman, 2000).  
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The purpose of Kennedy’s speech was to introduce his new policy, flexible 
response, and to reinforce the resolve of the Western Alliance, specifically to show that 
America now had options and was no longer chained to a grim humiliation or holocaust 
either-or. Flexible response would be presented as a means of answering the Soviet 
challenge and give Khrushchev pause before he acted precipitously. Kennedy called West 
Berlin “the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our 
solemn commitments…and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation” 
(Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy intended to show his mettle as a presidential leader. Kennedy 
wanted to impress upon Khrushchev that the United States was going to honor its 
commitments to its European Allies. 
Historical Constraints: Potsdam, Yalta and Basis for Western Presence in Berlin 
 The rationale behind the 1961 Berlin crisis and Khrushchev’s 1958 ultimatum 
was the Allied presence in Berlin. Khrushchev hoped to sign a treaty with the GDR 
granting the GDR the rights currently held by the Soviet Union under the quadripartite 
agreement finalized at Yalta and Potsdam. The Soviets attempted to act unilaterally 
without consent from the other three major governing powers. Khrushchev’s proposed 
treaty would change the legal status of all four major powers in Berlin by forcing the 
West to gain access from Ulbricht and the GDR. This change in legal status could have 
granted the GDR the power to remove the Western Powers from Berlin. The Allied 
successful defense of Berlin during the Blockade and the prosperous West German 
economy created the conditions for the refugee problem and the drain of East German 
industrial talent. These historical pressures bore down on Khrushchev and influenced his 
actions at Vienna, which called for a direct response from Kennedy. 
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 Kennedy’s Radio and Television Address was his response to Khrushchev’s 
ultimatum. Kennedy defended American and Western rights in Berlin by citing the 
origins of American presence in Berlin and the legal rights granted to the Americans at 
Yalta and Potsdam. America was in Berlin “as a result of our victory over Nazi 
Germany—and our basic rights to be there, deriving from that victory” (Kennedy, 1961). 
Kennedy further stated, “These rights have been repeatedly confirmed and recognized in 
special agreements with the Soviet Union” (Kennedy, 1961). Western access to Berlin 
“cannot be ended by any act of the Soviet government” (Kennedy, 1961).  
 Kennedy defended American rights in Berlin based on historical and legal 
precedent. In the lines quoted above, Kennedy established the basis for American 
presence in Berlin. Any change in these rights originating with a Soviet unilateral treaty 
would be a violation of the Potsdam and Yalta agreements. America, along with the 
Western Allies and the Soviet Union, defeated Nazi Germany. After the defeat, the four 
governing powers agreed to the legal status of Berlin. Though Kennedy wanted to look at 
Berlin and Germany with fresh eyes, he was bound by the historical pacts at Yalta and 
Potsdam, as well as the tradition of American Cold War presidents had established to 
defend Western rights in Berlin.  
 Khrushchev’s counterargument could have been that Berlin was part of East 
Germany. However, Kennedy identified the flaw in this argument and countered, “Berlin 
is not part of East Germany, but a separate territory under the control of the allied 
powers” (Kennedy, 1961). With Berlin being the capital of Nazi Germany, the Allies 
divided the city rather than giving it as a prize to one allied power. The implication being 
that each allied power could govern its respective zone according to their prerogative, but 
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that Berlin was to be jointly governed until Germany was reunified. Kennedy grounded 
his legal argument in a clause that the Soviets had agreed to in 1945.  
Kennedy was an astute student of history and often alluded to or cited historical 
events or figures to buttress his arguments in his Radio and Television Address. To 
support his call for remaining in Berlin and to strengthen the resolve of the West, 
Kennedy used a historical reference to America’s strength by citing the battle of 
Bastogne in World War II. Kennedy rebuked those who believe West Berlin is untenable 
by stating “I hear it said that West Berlin is military untenable. And so was Bastogne. 
And so, in fact, was Stalingrad. Any dangerous spot is tenable if men—brave men—will 
make it so” (Kennedy, 1961). These two lines provide insight into Kennedy’s thinking on 
Berlin. First, both Bastogne and Stalingrad were defensive battles, won by a strong willed 
mentality and toughness. Kennedy’s allusion to these battles demonstrated he was not 
going on the offensive in Berlin, but merely maintaining America’s defensive stance 
since 1945. He also established a link between Berlin and Bastogne. Just as Berlin was 
surrounded by a numerically superior enemy, so too were the Americans at Bastogne in 
1944, yet they survived and defeated the Nazis. Bastogne served both as a symbol and 
rationale as to why the Americans were not going to give in under Soviet pressure. 
Second, Kennedy harkened back to a time when the Americans and Soviets were 
allies. Each can celebrate their defensive victory and take pride in their military 
accomplishments. However, it also served as a reminder that only fifteen years prior, 
these two great superpowers worked toward the common good of humanity. The Soviet 
Union and United States do not have to be adversaries, but they can work toward the 
common good of humanity. However, Kennedy continued, “We do not want to fight—
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but we have fought before” (Kennedy, 1961). This line reasserts the American will to 
fight and establishes strength in possible future negotiations. Nieburg and Nieburg (1991) 
have called on presidents to show mettle at critical junctures, and this is one of the 
instances where Kennedy showed American strength. By demonstrating American 
strength and will to fight, Kennedy attempted to dissuade Khrushchev from pushing his 
Berlin policy any further.  
 A third historical image is found in Kennedy’s statement, “a beacon of hope 
behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees” (Kennedy, 1961). Here Kennedy 
used juxtaposition of light, the beacon, symbolizing warmth, softness and freedom 
emanating from darkness, the Iron Curtain, which conjures imagery of steel, darkness and 
impersonality. The “beacon of hope” also refers back to the allusion of America as a “city 
upon a hill” shining light to all corners of the earth. Supporting the “city upon a hill” 
metaphor Kennedy further alludes to the fact that America cannot separate Berlin’s safety 
“from our own” (Kennedy, 1961). Berlin’s cause is America’s cause. Americans were to 
view Berlin and Berliners as a similar and co-equals in democratic ideals and goals. 
Kennedy’s idealism sought to transcend the differences between Adenauer and himself 
and to create a new vision of Berlin and solidify the U.S.-German relationship. 
Zarefsky (2008) notes that rhetors can work to create community and shared 
vision. In Kennedy’s Radio and Television Address, he does this with the Western Allies 
by recounting their shared success from World War II to the present: “the challenge of 
European chaos in 1947, of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the challenge of Communist 
aggression in 1950” (Kennedy, 1961). The basis of the Western Alliance and the success 
of the alliance was not based solely in ideology, but common history, shared struggle and 
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victory. “[T]he Atlantic Community will not forget either its history or the principles 
which gave it meaning,” stated Kennedy (1961), as he sought strengthen the Alliance for 
its biggest challenge, the Soviets in Berlin. Kennedy’s reference to the Western Alliance 
also demonstrated the limitations of American power. Kennedy recognized the ambitions, 
goals and policies of his main allies. The president was not in a position to dictate policy 
or unilaterally break from his allies’ policy.  
France, Britain and West Germany all had their own ambitions, policies and 
opinions on how to react to the Soviet threat. Kennedy’s ambitions were curtailed by 
each country’s global position and historical concerns. France feared a strong and united 
Germany, the British were facing the end of empire and economic stagnation and the 
West Germans cared about unification before any further negotiations. Kennedy needed 
to balance these concerns rhetorically and build support for his policies through rhetorical 
community building. 
Kennedy’s historical references accomplished two goals. First, he wanted to 
remind America and the West of their common struggles and the history that had brought 
the Alliance together. By reminding the Alliance of its past, Kennedy hoped to strengthen 
its future. The Western Alliance had triumphed through many difficult crisis situations in 
the past. The present situation was just a new challenge, but a challenge that could only 
be overcome if the West remained unified in the face of a common threat. America and 
Western Europe not only shared a common history, but also similar values and economic 
and political systems. Second, by recounting Western history, Kennedy was hoping to 
deter Khrushchev’s plans in Berlin. Both leaders knew the strength of the West was 
derived from its unity. Kennedy’ historical references were strategic and argued that 
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every Soviet challenge had only solidified the unity of the Western Powers. Another 
Soviet challenge would only strengthen the West again against the Soviets. Kennedy 
wanted to persuade Khrushchev to back down and lessen the Soviet pressure on Berlin, 
resorting to diplomatic channels to solve the current crisis.   
The Middle Ground: Flexible Response 
 Kennedy sought to prevent any undesirable shifts in the balance of power. 
Kennedy believed that the Eisenhower administration did not plan for shifts in power by 
relying too heavily on nuclear deterrence (Gaddis, 2005b). Kennedy veiled his criticism 
of the Eisenhower administration in his address when discussing the limitation of choices 
presented by an “atomic holocaust” or “surrender” policy (Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy and 
his administration took it as their personal responsibility to expand the number of options 
open to the president in times of crisis (Gaddis, 2005b). Kennedy’s July 25, 1961 speech 
was Kennedy’s opportunity to expand the number of options open to the U.S., but also 
for Kennedy to become the embodiment of the nation in foreign affairs. As Wander 
(1984) has noted, presidents often become the embodiment of the nation when addressing 
foreign affairs. 
 Kennedy’s proposed flexible response was part of a military strategy to deal with 
Khrushchev’s threats at Vienna. Leaving Vienna, Kennedy had remarked upon the fact 
that he had gotten the hell beat out of him. His previous foreign policy failures had 
weakened his presidential ethos. He used the policy of flexible response not only to 
create more options, but to reestablish faith in American vision, leadership, and policy. 
One of the major ways to restore faith in America was to offer a vision, and one of the 
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principle functions of discourse is to inspire people to achieve goals by articulating a 
vision (Zarefsky, 2008). 
 Kennedy’s vision entailed a new military option that could also provide a flexible 
negotiating strategy. This strategy acknowledged Khrushchev’s desire to stabilize East 
Germany, but did not abridge Western rights (Gaddis, 2005b). As Kennedy 
acknowledged in largely sympathetic terms, “the Soviet Union’s historical concern about 
their security in Central and Eastern Europe, after a series of ravaging invasions, and we 
believe arrangements can be worked out which will help to meet those concerns” 
(Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy also left open negotiations saying, “we shall always be 
prepared to discuss international problems with any and all nations that are willing to 
talk” (Kennedy, 1961). By offering both a military strategy and negotiating strategy, 
Kennedy was keeping open all possible avenues of this action, putting into operation a 
major tenet and strategy of the Kennedy administration. 
 Kennedy rejects the Achesonian proposal for a state of emergency,  
While it is unwise at this time either to call up or send abroad excessive 
numbers of these troops before they are needed…I intend to take, as time 
goes on, whatever steps are necessary to make certain that such forces can 
be deployed at the appropriate time without lessening our ability to meet 
our commitments elsewhere (Kennedy, 1961). 
 
By rejecting the Achesonian state of emergency and replacing it with a clear new military 
strategy, Kennedy was showing his strength as a leader. He was becoming the leader he 
hoped America would be in the world, strong, cool under pressure and capable of 
handling any threat; not indecisive, panic stricken and trigger happy when threatened.  
 Flexible response was originally devised as a means of maintaining Allied rights 
in West Berlin. Kennedy defined flexible response as having “sea and air lift capable of 
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moving our forces quickly and in large numbers to any part of the world” (Kennedy, 
1961). These forces would be capable of being placed “in any critical area at the 
appropriate time a force which combined with those of our allies, is large enough to make 
clear our determination and ability to defend our rights at all costs…We intend to have a 
wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action” (Kennedy, 1961). 
To implement flexible response, Kennedy called for an increase in the armed 
forces budget, making more men available for deployment, increased numbers in the 
Navy and Air Force, retention of older equipment, and money for the procurement of 
non-nuclear weapons, ammunition and equipment. Kennedy asked for $3.2 billion 
increase in the Armed Forces with $1.8 billion going towards conventional forces. For 
those who feared the budget increase would strain the American economy, Kennedy 
assuaged such fears, “This improved business outlook means improved revenues; and I 
intend to submit to the Congress in January a budget for the next fiscal year which will be 
strictly in balance” (Kennedy, 1961). While not intent on ruining the economy or 
destroying the American infrastructure to achieve his goal, Kennedy did caution that 
there might have to be an increase in taxes, but he was confident that America would 
“bear the burden” to preserve freedom (Kennedy, 1961).2  
 Kennedy’s flexible response strategy was a global military strategy to protect 
freedom, “The immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin. But that isolated outpost is 
                                                 
2
 Republicans were worried that the economy could not handle Kennedy’s $3.454 billion in budget 
increase; however, they did not understand Kennedy’s personal economic beliefs. The Kennedy 
administration’s “new economics” viewed the foreign policy expenditures as a benefit to the domestic 
economy: “We are recovering strongly from this year’s recession…And for the first time since fall 1959, 
our gold position has improved and the dollar is more respected abroad. These gains, it should be stressed, 
are being accomplished with Budget deficits far smaller than those of the 1958 recession” (Kennedy, 1961). 
Kennedy believed the economy not only could withstand, but would benefit from the proposed increases in 
national defense and domestic civil defense. Paul Samuelson, one of Kennedy’s economic advisors, stated 
“[A]ny stepping up of these programs that is deemed desirable for its own sake can only help rather than 
hinder the health of our national economy in the period immediately ahead” (Gaddis, 2005b., 203).  
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not an isolated problem. The threat is world-wide…We face a challenge in Berlin, but 
there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia” (Kennedy, 1961). By offering a clear vision 
and set of goals, Kennedy was reestablishing himself as a world leader, repairing the 
damage he incurred from the Bay of Pigs, Laos and Vienna. His historical failures had 
damaged America’s position in the world. In his July 25, 1961, speech Kennedy became 
the embodiment of America and reassumed the leadership of the West. Flexible response 
offered a clear strategy that the Western bloc could rally around. It also was an appealing 
strategy to Third World neutral countries because it was not just a diatribe against 
communism, but a global strategy that had the potential to ease tensions and protect 
freedom.  
Kennedy used the civil defense portion of his speech to build consensus among 
the American people for his policies. According to Tatalovich and Daynes (1979), the 
power of the presidency rests in the ability to gain public support. By offering every 
citizen protection, Kennedy provided his American audience material rewards for their 
support. 
The civil defense section of the speech seems out of place, but had its roots in 
Acheson’s national emergency plan. Acheson wanted to call a national emergency to 
raise awareness in America about the seriousness of the Soviet threat. Acheson reasoned 
that a large program of air raid shelter construction would galvanize the population and 
prepare them psychologically for the test of wills (Kempe, 2011). The national 
emergency failed, but Kennedy did outline the dire consequences of following the road to 
war in the civil defense section. While the risk of nuclear war was always present, most 
American politicians rarely addressed the issue. However, Kennedy directly addressed 
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the issue in this portion of the speech. The American people had never heard an 
American president speak so directly and chillingly about nuclear war (Beschloss, 1991). 
Kennedy warned the American public “To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in 
the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should 
go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility” (Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy 
continued, 
In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a 
nuclear blast and fire can still be saved – if they can be warned to take 
shelter and if that shelter is available…In contrast to our friends in Europe, 
the need for this kind of protection is new to our shores…I hope to let 
every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect his 
family in case of attack. I know that you will want to do no less (Kennedy, 
1961). 
 
 Kennedy decided to raise the issue of civil defense as a way to dissuade a Soviet attack 
on America by influencing the Soviet estimates of inflicted damage and carnage on 
America (Beschloss, 1991). American territory in 1961, with the exclusion of Pearl 
Harbor, was rarely the scene of attack by outside powers.  
 The average American was unaccustomed to thinking America was vulnerable to 
attack. Along with provoking fear, Kennedy’s discourse promoted new awareness and 
preventive measures.3Kennedy used a strategy of fear by speaking so forthright about the 
dangers of nuclear war, but his candid discourse gained him the support of his American 
audience. Kennedy’s flexible response policy seemed to be a reasonable and rational 
                                                 
3
 After July 25, the American people received the benefit of federal funding for the civil defense of the 
country. Reports predicted that between 35 million and 40 million lives that could be saved by the program, 
but there still would be a cost of some 140 million lives lost (Freedman, 2000). Plans were developed to 
build public fallout shelters, with food, medicine and water. Over the next year land was surveyed and 
plans were for the creation of 54 million fallout shelters over the next four years. While the program was 
initially financed it soon got caught up in the dispute over our national ability to survive a nuclear war. The 
majority of people quickly realized there was no real defense in the event of a nuclear war; only the 
prevention of nuclear war could save lives (Freedman, 2000). Kennedy’s civil defense policy eventually 
lost steam.  
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policy that slowed the nuclear option, especially in comparison to the humiliation or 
holocaust policy of Eisenhower. Kennedy positioned himself as a Cold War moderate 
with a slow escalation policy and his temperate offer to negotiate with the Soviets. 
Kennedy received support from all sides, though Republicans and some letters received 
at the White House argued that Kennedy should have increased taxes or cut social 
programs to pay for his spending, but for the most part the overall response was 
supportive; some went so far as to suggest assassinating Khrushchev (Beschloss, 1991). 
Personal Influences 
 John F. Kennedy has been characterized as a charismatic president and orator 
(Nieburg & Nieburg, 1991). Kennedy’s charismatic style can be attributed to his delivery, 
which provided “assurance even as he talked of ‘grave trouble to come;’ projecting a 
sense of ‘mystery, sex appeal, to-the-manner-born confidence’ that audiences viewed as 
leadership” (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1995a, p. 14). Flaws in Kennedy’s early 
speeches were detectable in his quick pace or the strain in his vocal cords, but when he 
remembered to pace himself appropriately Kennedy employed “a conversational tone 
which was at once engaging and persuasive” (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1995a, p. 14). 
 Studies by Bostdorff (1994), Zarefsky (2008), and James Barber and Hugh Blair 
(Bostdorff, 1994) all found connections between discourse and the personal style or 
orientation of the rhetor. Kennedy’s July 25, 1961 Radio and Television address offered 
insight into Kennedy’s character and personal values. The rehearsal of Kennedy’s 
worldview discussed previously will factor into his style in this current speech and the 
two later speeches that I will analyze. Other characteristics of personal rhetorical style 
identified by Bostdorff and Goldzwig (1994) on Kennedy’s blending of idealism and 
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pragmatism and Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos (1995b) with Kennedy’s action-oriented 
leadership style can be seen in these three speeches. 
 In foreign policy, Kennedy mixed arrows and olive branches when delivering 
major speeches. The dual propositions of war and peace negotiations were products of 
Kennedy’s pragmatic realist approach to foreign policy, and his realization that foreign 
affairs are often complex. Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos (1995a) also note that Kennedy’s 
addresses presented a stark dualism between the free world and the communist world, 
contesting freedom versus tyranny, and West versus East. Another of Kennedy’s dualistic 
approaches was his willingness to negotiate, but also maintain a strong military in case of 
war. Kennedy’s statement, “In short, while we are ready to defend our interests, we shall 
also be ready to search for peace- in quiet exploratory talks, in formal or informal 
meetings” (Kennedy, 1961), best highlights his dualistic approaches on peace and war. 
Kennedy used juxtaposition of contrasting terms or phrases to draw meaning from 
conflicting phrases (Dean, 1991). In the preceding line, Kennedy juxtaposed a military 
threat with a peace offering. This juxtaposition represents Kennedy’s ambivalence toward 
communism. On one hand, Kennedy stood firmly against this system of beliefs and its 
ambitions in the world. This view stemmed from Kennedy’s idealistic side. On the other 
hand, Kennedy greatly feared nuclear war, was opposed to communism not because of its 
ideology, but because of its actions in the world (Sorensen, 1965) and because his 
pragmatic side rationalized consistent threats toward Khrushchev increased tensions and 
decreased global security. 
 Another example of Kennedy’s ambivalence and fear of war was manifest in his 
conclusion. Here Kennedy referenced the two world wars, “In each case serious 
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misjudgments were made on both sides of the intentions of others, which brought about 
great devastation. Now, in the thermonuclear age, any misjudgment on either side” 
(Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy stressed his fear of misjudgment, which echoed his fear of 
miscalculation in superpower relations discussed with Khrushchev at Vienna, to which 
Khrushchev “went berserk” according to Kennedy (Smyser, 2009, p. 65). But, this is an 
example of Kennedy’s personal beliefs influencing his rhetoric. These personal beliefs 
were influenced by the historical events of Kennedy’s lifetime, the world wars, 
Khrushchev’s belligerence at Vienna, and the crisis over Berlin. While Kennedy the 
idealist wanted a free world, Kennedy the pragmatist understood that cooperation with 
the Soviets was the best policy to achieve peace first, and then work towards changing 
the East. This distinction can be seen in the many instances of Kennedy’s juxtaposition of 
threats and peaceful negotiations. 
Zarefsky (Henry et al., 2008) maintains that whoever can set the terms of the 
debate is in better position to win the debate. Kennedy’s remarks about the Soviets being 
the source of the Berlin crisis, both at Vienna and at his July 19 press conference, shaped 
the structure of the debate and put the Soviets on the defensive. Kennedy had set the 
terms of the debate, accusing the Soviets of creating the Berlin Crisis and in this speech 
he would further develop this framework by placing the Soviets on the defensive for their 
actions. Kennedy begins his speech by listing the offensive actions Khrushchev and his 
associates had undertaken over the last few weeks including various threats and an 
increase in the Soviet military budget. Khrushchev’s biggest threat was to end the 
Western presence in Berlin, something Kennedy said he “cannot permit” (Kennedy, 
1961). Kennedy reminded his audience “It is the Soviets who have stirred up this crisis 
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and are trying to force a change. It is they who have opposed free elections. It is they who 
have rejected an all-German peace treaty, and ruling of international law” (Kennedy, 
1961). The blame for the current crisis is “Moscow, not Berlin. And if war begins, it will 
have begun in Moscow and not Berlin” (Kennedy, 1961).  
Kennedy’s statements were targeted to convince the Soviets that they were to 
blame and that America was not willing to be pushed out of Berlin. Yet, despite the tough 
talk, the president held out hope for useful negotiations:  
we shall always be prepared to discuss international problems with any 
and all nations that are willing to talk—and listen—with reason. If they 
have proposals—not demands—we shall hear them…We have previously 
indicated our readiness to remove any actual irritants in West Berlin, but 
the freedom of that city is not negotiable (Kennedy, 1961). 
 
This is yet another example of Kennedy’s willingness to enter into negotiations and 
juxtapose a threat with accusations. He was aiming to set the terms for future 
negotiations, along with strengthening the position of America at the negotiating table. 
By implying the Soviets negotiated in bad faith, he wanted to shift world opinion toward 
the American position that the Soviets started the Berlin Crisis framing the debate in 
favor of the American position. 
  “Nothing creates unity like a perfected victim” (Dean, 1991, p. 537), Kenneth 
Burke reminds us. Burke indicates that when employing a rhetoric of victimage, a rhetor 
tries to unify an audience by identifying a common villain. The rhetor can then blame the 
evils in society or the world on that specified villain (Dean, 1991). Kennedy’s 
identification of the Soviets as the perpetrators of evil, and West Berliners as the victims 
of Soviet aggression juxtaposes helpless Berliners against Soviet aggressors. This helps 
unite the various Western audiences. Audience members in the West identify themselves 
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with Kennedy’s ideals of freedom, and distance themselves from the tyranny of 
Communism. The Western audience can identify with the President’s causes and 
purposes, and can rally around the democratic principles of the Western Alliance (Dean, 
1991).  
One of the pervading beliefs in Moscow and East Berlin was the eventuality of 
the GDR surpassing the FRG economically and culturally. Kennedy goes on the attack 
against this impression of socialism’s superiority: “If anyone doubts the extent to which 
our presence is desired by the people of West Berlin, compared to East Germany feelings 
about their regime, we are ready to have that question submitted to a free vote in Berlin, 
and if possible…And let us hear at that time from the two and one-half million refugees 
who have fled the Communist regime in East Germany-voting for Western-type freedom 
with their feet” (Kennedy, 1961). The East could not respond to Kennedy’s attack on the 
refugee situation because historical fact supported Kennedy, the flow of refugees from 
East to West was crippling the East’s economy and was bringing the regime perilously 
close to implosion. The strength of socialism paled compared to the robust West German 
economy, highlighting the systemic problems with communism. 
Kennedy’s belief in the inherent flaws in democracy manifested itself rhetorically 
in the creation of challenges to his audiences. Gaddis (2005b) remarks that “It was as if 
Kennedy had accepted Dulles’s old argument that challenges were desirable, even 
necessary, to bring out the best in the American people” (p. 232). Dulles’s maxim fits 
perfectly with Kennedy’s belief in the short term flaws of democracy. Kennedy’s July 25 
address to the nation is filled with challenges to the audience.  Kennedy (1961) cited 
challenges in “Berlin,” “Southeast Asia,” and “our own hemisphere.” To combat these 
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challenges to U.S. and Western prestige and power in the world, Kennedy challenged 
America and the Atlantic community to continue to assist developing nations, educate 
children, work towards disarmament, and to prevent the slowdown of the economy 
(Kennedy, 1961). The path to a prosperous and safer world is to practice the discipline of 
meeting and overcoming challenges. Challenges provide a platform for Kennedy to 
demonstrate his leadership and unify his audience. Offering a solution to the challenge, in 
this case flexible response, Kennedy fostered a shared vision among Western countries 
and the American people providing him a solid communal base that supported his vision.  
Nieburg and Nieburg’s (1991) study on Presidential power reveals that 
charismatic leaders, like Kennedy, are effective during crisis situations in persuading the 
audience or audiences to see the world from a particular perspective. This was most 
evident when Congress passed the needed legislation to implement flexible response 
(Silvestri, 2000). However, JFK’s charismatic character was on minimal display in the 
July 25 speech due to its somber tone. Sorensen (1965) maintained that the speech was 
hampered by an “overcrowded, overheated office” (p. 591). Still, Kennedy was able to 
gain support for his Berlin policy. Kennedy’s belief that democracy needed a crisis to 
spur sacrifice for the short term so that the long term benefits would materialize was 
evident. As Kennedy noted, the costs of flexible response “will require sacrifice on the 
part of many of our citizens” (Kennedy, 1961). Indeed, he went to great lengths to 
describe the shared burden the new policy would require: 
I am well aware of the fact that many American families will bear the 
burden of these requests. Studies or careers interrupted; husbands and sons 
will be called away; incomes in some cases will be reduced. But these are 
burdens which must be borne if freedom is to be defended—Americans 
have willing borne them before—and they will not flinch from the task 
now (Kennedy, 1961). 
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Kennedy used the Berlin Crisis to change U.S. foreign policy and turn America in a 
direction that will be beneficial in the long term. Kennedy’s policy would increase the 
combat ready number of Army divisions from 11 to 16, which was estimated to be able to 
handle with major wars in Europe and Asia and a “minor” crisis elsewhere. Kennedy 
believed this new turn helped in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis leaving Khrushchev with 
no choice but to withdraw (Gaddis, 2005b). Kennedy asked for the nation’s patience and 
cautioned that “there is no quick and easy solution” (Kennedy, 1961). 
 Influenced by Kennedy’s action-oriented style of leadership, which stressed 
personal responsibility, Kennedy used the “I” pronoun and a conversational tone in his 
July 25, 1961 address. Kennedy’s conversational tone was employed at the beginning of 
the speech when Kennedy used the phrase “I want to talk frankly with you tonight…” 
(Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy sets a personal tone throughout the speech using the first and 
second person voice with “I” or “we” which assists the audience to imagine Kennedy 
talking directly to them. These pronouns reinforce the immediacy of Kennedy’s televised 
image. Kennedy took responsibility for America’s actions in Berlin: “I shall bear this 
responsibility under our Constitution for the next three and one-half years” (Kennedy, 
1961). Kennedy’s assumption of responsibility can be traced back to his worldview of 
believing the leader needs to be strong and assume responsibility in a crisis, and reaches 
back to Kennedy’s analysis of Baldwin who had failed to motivate his country. Kennedy 
renounced any interpretation that he would be an idle figure while the communists “drive 
us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force” (Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy used his 
charisma and personal beliefs heavily in this speech to inspire Americans to action; this 
was most apparent in his closing remarks. 
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Kennedy’s closing remarks were a late addition to his speech, but as Sorensen 
noted, those closing personal remarks created an exchange between the president and 
audience that strengthened his appeal (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy asked his secretary 
Evelyn Lincoln to record the closing of his speech beginning with the words “Finally, I 
would like…” (Kempe, 2011, p. 308). As Kennedy spoke these words to Lincoln, she 
could hear the pain in his voice, the halting words of a man carrying a burden. Kennedy 
asked her to type up the conclusion. Lincoln could not remember a time when Kennedy 
added so much to the end of a speech a couple hours before its delivery (Kempe, 2011). 
Kennedy concluded, “I ask for your help, and your advice. I ask for your suggestions, 
when you think we could do better. All of us, I know, love our country, and we shall all 
do our best to serve it” (Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy’s identification with his audience’s 
fear helped create the bond between the American people and himself.  
Sorensen (1965) recalled Kennedy wanting to end the speech on a personal note. 
Kennedy’s ending was quite somber, “more somber, in fact, than the American people 
were accustomed to accept, more somber than any previous Presidential speech in the age 
of mutual nuclear capabilities” (Sorensen, 1965, p. 592). Though Kennedy’s speech was 
somber, that tone helped create a bond with the audience because Kennedy’s words were 
forthright. The president clearly defined how the U.S. was confronted with a dangerous 
situation, and his discussion of bomb shelters and the need for civil defense exemplified 
the danger.    
 
Reaction: Words and the Berlin Wall 
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 Zarefsky (2008), Windt Jr. (1986) and Bostdorff (1994) all suggest that the 
audience reaction to discourse is a crucial part of rhetorical criticism. Zarefsky (2008) 
explains that discourse is polysemic and can have different meanings to different 
audiences. I will now examine the polysemy of Kennedy’s discourse by looking at the 
reaction of the Americans, Western Allies, West Germans and Berliners and Soviets, as 
well as the historical fallout from Kennedy’s speech. I will offer a critique on how 
successful Kennedy was at building community and inspiring his targeted audiences at 
achieving some of the goals he proposed.  
 After the speech, Kennedy walked out of the Oval Office without a word to 
anyone. He went back to his personal quarters alone (Beschloss, 1991). In retrospect, 
Sorensen (1965) felt the weakest part of the speech was in JFK’s call for negotiation over 
West Berlin. The Western Alliance’s lack of unity over negotiations tempered any 
success for such an appeal. France was unwilling to negotiate, the British were against 
risking war without negotiations, and the Germans were against both the French and 
British positions, while Kennedy favored negotiations. Sorensen (1965) also recognized 
that the delivery was hampered by an overcrowded and sweltering office, and noted that 
the discussion of domestic civil defense was out of place and unduly alarming. But, the 
speech’s other chords were strong, and were even considered belligerent by Khrushchev 
(Sorensen, 1965). At the time, these reservations were not shared by the rest of the 
American public or other officials. 
 Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s Vice President, remarked “That boy is cool,” and 
Richard Nixon remarked “If he has to press that button, he will…He’s tough. I know. He 
beat me!” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 261). Reports from around the country portrayed the 
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difficulty of being a great leader of a troubled nation, “yet he conveyed the impression 
that he was the most troubled citizen of all” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 261); while the 
Indianapolis News praised Kennedy’s rhetoric, “America had been waiting for that kind 
of talk from the White House” (Beschloss, 1991, p.261). Media outlets across the nation 
supported Kennedy, but the crucial support needed to be won in Congress, which would 
fund the flexible response initiative. 
The immediate reaction by Congress to Kennedy’s address was positive. 
Following Kennedy’s address, Congress communicated its willingness to increase the 
funding Kennedy had requested (Silvestri, 2000). Kennedy helped ensure Congressional 
support by using the “we” persona when discussing action America would take. Kennedy 
also stated multiple times: “I asked from the Congress” or “I shall not hesitate to ask the 
Congress” and told the nation that the specific details of his requests “will be presented to 
the Congress tomorrow” (Kennedy, 1961). Calling for Congressional action had two 
main benefits. First, Kennedy included Congress in the decision making process making 
them equals in foreign policy and responsible for the defense of Berlin and the world 
from communism. Being an action-oriented leader, Kennedy’s speech demonstrated to 
the American public he was active in fighting communism. He now left it to Congress to 
follow his lead and pass his requests. Second, it displayed unity within the U.S. 
government, there was no dissension in the U.S. ranks, an idea Khrushchev had 
eschewed. After the speech, Khrushchev was forced to recalculate. Either he would be 
faced with a united moderate government or, more likely, he now feared that the 
militarists had taken over and nuclear war could start at any moment. Either way, 
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Kennedy had reestablished American threat in the minds of the Soviets and gained 
Congressional and public approval for his policies. 
 Kennedy’s biggest success was gaining the support of the American people-- the 
audience he called upon to make the largest economic sacrifices to fund flexible 
response. Harkening back to his inaugural address, Kennedy argued “that every 
American wants to pay his fair share, and not leave the burden of defending freedom 
entirely to those who bear arms…we cannot fail to meet our responsibilities” (Kennedy, 
1961). America will bear any burden for freedom in the world. Kennedy included himself 
in the sacrifice in his closing remarks,  
I shall bear this responsibility under our Constitution for the next three and 
one-half years, but I am sure that we all, regardless of our occupations, 
will do our very best for our country, and for our cause. For all of us want 
to see our children grow up in a country at peace, and in a world where 
freedom endures (Kennedy, 1961). 
 
This passage from the speech portrayed Kennedy as being the most disturbed American 
citizen. It also helped create a bond with the American audience because he was one of 
them, an ordinary citizen who shared the same burden they did. They were able to 
identify with Kennedy’s concern. Kennedy was able to recognize their fears and 
successfully channel those fears to create identity with his audience. The sacrifice by 
Americans will be difficult, but Kennedy succeeded in pointing Americans toward a 
common goal; America must face and surpass this challenge because the fate of the free 
world relies on the American character and will. The reward for Americans sacrificing 
and overcoming the crisis is creating a world where “Freedom can prevail—and peace 
can endure” (Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy was successful in strengthening the American 
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community by identifying himself as one of them and his Cold War strategy offered a 
vision that many Americans could support.4 
Kennedy’s second audience in his July 25, 1961, speech was the Western 
Alliance. He needed to reassert his leadership following the disaster in Cuba at the Bay of 
Pigs and Kennedy’s waffling on support in Laos. Western leaders were privately 
questioning Kennedy’s ability to lead the alliance against the Soviets (Pucci Jr., 1994). 
While Europe could never stray too far away from the American nuclear shield, a 
disharmonious Western Alliance was exactly what Khrushchev was hoping to achieve. 
This would help make Soviet advances against the West easier. Kennedy wanted to 
reestablish his presidential ethos and reassume firm command of the Western Alliance. 
Early in his speech, Kennedy states “The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover 
West Berlin” and that “The United States is there [Berlin]; the United Kingdom and 
France are there; the pledge of NATO is there—and the people of Berlin are there” 
(Kennedy, 1961). This is a reassurance of America’s commitment to both NATO and its 
allies that America is not leaving Europe in a lurch, but that America is ready to lead the 
alliance. Kennedy ends his call to the nations to step up to the challenge of communism 
by telling every nation, 
It is a challenge to every nation which asserts its sovereignty under a 
system of liberty. It is a challenge to all those who want a world of free 
choice. It is a special challenge to the Atlantic Community—the heartland 
of human freedom. We in the West must move together to in building 
military strength. We must consult one another more closely than ever 
before. We must together design our proposals for peace, and labor 
together as they are pressed at the conference table. And together we must 
share the burdens and risks of this effort (Kennedy, 1961) 
                                                 
4
 In the days following the speech, thousands of telegrams reached the White House running twenty to one 
in favor of Kennedy; a Gallup Poll showed 85 percent of Americans were ready to risk war to keep U.S. 
troops in Berlin (Freedman, 2000, p. 71). Another 85 percent believed America should remain in Berlin, 
and a White House poll found 75 percent approved of the use of troops to defend Berlin (Pucci Jr., 1994). 
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Kennedy warns that “if there is one path above all others to war, it is the path of 
weakness and disunity” (Kennedy, 1961). Kennedy offered the Western Alliance a clear 
vision of how he would lead them in the Cold War. It was up to those nations to accept or 
reject his vision. He had already established a common history and shared values in his 
speech, but the West was more worried about his lack of vision and apparent haphazard 
approach to world affairs. His vision in his Radio and Television address allayed many of 
these fears. 
By demonstrating resolve, Kennedy seemed presidential and portrayed himself as 
an indispensible head of state. In the wake of the July 25 address, the Allied response to 
Germany was positive. Britain began calling up reservists, and the Laborite Daily Herald 
said, “President Kennedy has made it clear there will be no surrender to Russian threats” 
(Silvestri, 2000, p. 185). Britain and France were especially supportive of Kennedy’s 
stand and praised him for balancing military firmness with a willingness to negotiate 
(Pucci Jr., 1994). Italy and India were a bit more wary, believing that tensions were rising 
as they had in 1939 (Silvestri, 2000). The Berlin crisis helped Kennedy reestablish 
America’s sphere of influence in global affairs and reasserted Kennedy’s presidential 
ethos (Pucci Jr., 1994). Kennedy regained the confidence of Western leadership, which 
he lost during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, through stressing the strength and unity of the 
Western Alliance. 
Kennedy’s speech was received differently on the other side of the Iron Curtain. 
Coming out of Vienna, Khrushchev was fairly certain that the Americans would not go to 
war over Berlin; but after Kennedy’s speech, Khrushchev was given pause. One of 
Kennedy’s hopes in delivering the speech was to reduce the chance Khrushchev could 
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quickly and easily take West Berlin. The other purpose was to convince Khrushchev that 
the U.S. might go nuclear to prevent humiliation (Beschloss, 1991). Khrushchev’s 
comments to Italian premier Amintore Fanfani highlighted Khrushchev’s primary 
concern, “the possibility that Kennedy would respond to unilateral measures in West 
Berlin with conventional weapons under the false assumption that he would be able to 
keep the conflict at a controllable level” (Lunak, 2003, p. 75). This was a scary prospect 
to the Soviet premiere. Kennedy’s speech seemed to have influenced Khrushchev in a 
manner that corresponded with U.S. aims. 
 Khrushchev’s immediate reaction to Kennedy’s address was that “Kennedy had 
declared preliminary war on the Soviet Union” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 377). 
Kennedy’s speech was more belligerent than previous addresses. While Khrushchev may 
have worried that the militarists had taken over the U.S. government, and he might also 
have felt he must act before a U.S. attack (Freedman, 2000). Most American newspapers 
had missed Kennedy’s call for negotiations, instead focusing on the defense buildup and 
fallout shelter preparations (Beschloss, 1991). The following day Khrushchev called 
GDR leader Walter Ulbricht, telling him “we have to use the tension in international 
relations now to circle Berlin in an iron ring. This must be done before concluding a 
peace treaty” (Fursenko, 2006, p. 377). John McCloy was invited to fly from Moscow to 
Pitsunda by Khrushchev. McCloy reports Khrushchev used bellicose language, warning 
that “if war broke out, Kennedy would be the last President of the United States. The next 
war would be decided by the biggest rockets. These were under the Soviet Union’s 
command” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 263). The Soviets were ready to respond to all 
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provocations and may have been legitimately worried about U.S. intentions (Freedman, 
2000). Circles inside the U.S. agreed with Khrushchev’s initial reading of the speech.  
Berlin was used as a rallying point for expanding the arms race, baptizing the 
flexible response doctrine, and setting the superpowers on a more dangerous course with 
the road to negotiation being significantly narrowed (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1995a). 
Supporters of Kennedy believed the press did not pay attention to the peace offerings; 
something Khrushchev originally had missed as well (Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 
1995a). The bellicose tone did have positive effects for Kennedy in future Soviet 
relations. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party in the 1980s, 
complained privately that Khrushchev had pushed Kennedy into an arms race with the 
Soviet Union which it could not afford and could not win (Smyser, 2009). Khrushchev’s 
view of American intent also changed. Two months before he was sure the Americans 
would not go to war over Berlin. Attending a conference of the Warsaw Pact in August, 
Khrushchev stated, “War is possible. In view of the fact that the Americans were not 
risking as much as the Europeans, the Americans could start it” (Lunak, 2003, p. 74). 
Once again, Khrushchev blamed this change on the militarists whom he believed had 
gained the upper hand in the U.S. government. A more reasonable assumption could be 
he misjudged Kennedy (Lunak, 2003). Kennedy could not allow himself to be portrayed 
as giving way under pressure and the fate of U.S. prestige was now tied to the freedom of 
West Berlin. Khrushchev began to worry whether or not he had read Kennedy right at 
Vienna (Smyser, 2009). Khrushchev would need to scour over Kennedy’s speech a few 
more times before identifying the options Kennedy had actually provided. 
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A closer reading by Khrushchev of Kennedy’s words revealed that Kennedy had 
actually implied that America would not intervene in East Berlin. Within the speech 
Kennedy often referred to the defense of “West Berlin” or “West Germany,” which 
marked a stark contrast from previous American presidents who always spoke of Berlin 
as a whole. According to Frederick Kempe (2011) there were seventeen “West” qualifiers 
in front of Berlin. This distinction insinuated that the Soviets and GDR that they could act 
how they pleased in East Berlin, as long as they did not interfere with Western legal 
rights. Kennedy’s address laid out exactly what Khrushchev could and could not do in 
Berlin (Smyser, 2009). Anonymous sources leaked that Kennedy was willing to negotiate 
and might be flexible on certain issues, now that American resolve had been established 
and the peace overtures had initially been overlooked (Beschloss, 1991). It was 
Kennedy’s insistence on a free West Berlin, and Allied rights to East Berlin that had 
driven Khrushchev’s primary attention. Kennedy never maintained that East Berlin had to 
be free. As Kennedy later admitted to adviser Walt Rostow, Khrushchev could build a 
wall, “And we won’t be able to prevent it. I can hold the alliance together to defend West 
Berlin, but I cannot act to keep East Berlin open” (Smyser, 2009, p. 89). Khrushchev 
would come to realize that he had been given an opening. JFK provided a tacit signal to 
Khrushchev that he could stem the tide of refugees, extricate both superpowers from a 
dangerous situation, and save Soviet prestige. Khrushchev would order Ulbricht to build 
a wall to divide the city.  
After the meetings in August with the British, Americans, French and West 
Germans, Kennedy moved ahead on his own to settle the German issue. He continued 
exploratory talks with Soviet ministers and representatives at meetings in New York, 
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Washington and Moscow. Khrushchev and Kennedy began to use back channels, rather 
than employ traditional diplomacy. Kennedy reached out to Khrushchev’s son-in-law, 
Aleksei Adzhubei, who was editor of Izvestia and gave him an interview (Silvestri, 
2000). The July 25 speech had mixed reviews in the Soviet Union. Negotiations and 
communication channels were kept open, but the Soviets remained wary of Kennedy’s 
militant rhetoric and were unsure what to make of his peace offerings. 
  The West Germans, for their part, picked up immediately the careful 
specification of West Berlin as the vital center of interest, a theme that largely 
overshadowed the quadripartite agreement reached at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 
(Freedman, 2000). Instead Kennedy referred to the free access between East and West 
guaranteed at Potsdam, the “endangered frontier of freedom runs through divided 
Berlin…The Soviets government alone can convert Berlin’s frontier of peace into a 
pretext for war” (Kennedy, 1961). Referring to the boundary as a “frontier of peace” 
hardly suggested disapproval of a wall, but McGeorge Bundy years later observed that 
the speech may have given Khrushchev the encouragement to close the border to lessen 
tensions. According to Bundy, “Kennedy could have spoken more vaguely, more of 
Berlin and less of West Berlin…the speech thus revised might have been more broadly 
deterrent to Khrushchev” but “distinctly less persuasive to Americans,” who were being 
asked to make painful sacrifices (Beschloss, 1991, p. 279).  
 The use of “West” Berlin reinforced Kennedy’s message from Vienna, the GDR 
and Soviets could do what they liked in East Berlin. Sorensen proudly showed a draft of 
the speech to James O’Donnell, an official in the U.S. Information Agency, who after 
closely reading the speech worried about Kennedy’s reference to “West” Berlin and the 
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recognition of Soviet historical concerns. O’Donnell wondered if Kennedy was buying 
into Russian fears of resurgent German militarism and if he was forever ceding Eastern 
Europe (Kempe, 2011). Sorensen was upset that O’Donnell was missing the hard-line 
approach Kennedy was taking and he argued that the speech was only recognizing reality. 
O’Donnell suggested removing the qualifier “West,” a simple solution, but after an hour 
of argument Sorensen protested: “I can’t monkey around anymore with the text of this 
speech…this speech has been churned through the mills of six branches of government. 
We have had copies back and forth for ten days. This is the final version. This is the 
policy line” (Kempe, 2011, p. 315). Sorensen left his lunch with O’Donnell in a huff. 
Sorensen had beat off other attacks on the speech from the Berlin Mafia, the group of 
senior officials who had followed Berlin and fought for the defense of the city (Kempe, 
2011). 
Another reason Kennedy may have referred only to West Berlin was that he and 
his administration had come to the conclusion that there would be two Germanys 
presently and probably for foreseeable future. The administration determined that 
“neither the peace treaty nor the substitution of East Germans for Russians along the 
Autobahn [was] a fighting matter” (Schake, 2002, p. 34). This decision partially explains 
the reason Kennedy referred to only West Berlin and not all of Berlin. 
When Kennedy’s words were heard by Berliners and Germans, they all had the 
same reaction. Kennedy was willing to protect U.S. rights in West Berlin, but he would 
not object if Khrushchev stopped the refugee problem. Egon Bahr, the assistant to Berlin 
Mayor Willy Brandt, commented, “This is almost an invitation for the Soviets to do what 
they want with the Eastern sector” (Smyser, 2009, p. 89). Few in the Kennedy 
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administration expected the speech to solve anything. In early August, Rusk met with 
representatives from Britain, France and West Germany and they could not agree on 
either the timing or substance of a proposal to Moscow to end the “abnormal” situation in 
Berlin (Freedman, 2000).  
 German chancellor Adenauer was confused by Kennedy’s remarks. He initially 
wrote Kennedy a letter of support a day after the speech endorsing his call for a military 
buildup. Adenauer told Kennedy, “It is good to know that in times such as these the 
United States assumes the leadership in the NATO Alliance, in the conflict between the 
free world and the Communist world” (Mayer, 1996, p. 37). After learning of the whole 
proposal and outline and how that would affect West Germany, Adenauer opposed 
Kennedy’s speech. He questioned why America would emphasize a military buildup, 
while simultaneously emphasizing negotiation. Adenauer saw this as sending mixed 
messages to the Allies and encouraging the Soviets to act to split the Western Alliance 
(Kastner, 2002). Adenauer had also recognized Kennedy’s reference to only West 
Germany or Berlin, and this was of great concern to him. The omission of the shared 
U.S.-German goal of German reunification undercut fifteen years of U.S.-German policy. 
Kennedy’s qualifier of “West” Berlin had undercut his community building remarks 
when he spoke of West Berlin as a “beacon of hope” and insinuated that Berlin was the 
same as an American city, it was, but only West Berlin. To many Berliners, this was 
disheartening because they did not see a West and East Berlin, but a common city, with a 
common history and a community of people. Many Berliners and Germans worried how 
this might embolden Ulbricht and Khrushchev. 
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Why July 25, 1961 Matters 
 Kennedy’s Radio and Television address introduced a military strategy to what 
Kennedy viewed as a military crisis. Khrushchev’s bellicose tone at Vienna and his July 
1961 announcement of raising Soviet military expenditures all signaled a military 
confrontation in Berlin. Kennedy, in turn responded with a military strategy, flexible 
response that called for the slow build up of military forces, the growth of the military 
budget and civil defense expenditures for the American people. Kennedy was reacting to 
the historical circumstances that confronted him in 1961. He appeared weak after Vienna 
which hampered his negotiating position with the Soviets. Kennedy believed the only 
way to right the situation was to reassert American military strength. He achieved success 
in building up the American military, but as we will see Kennedy’s words on July 25 had 
lasting historical effects in Berlin and the world, and the military buildup did not solve 
the issue of Berlin. His speech also created a new problem, a crisis of confidence and a 
fracturing of his West German audience from the Western Alliance. West Berliners and 
Germans felt betrayed by Kennedy’s speech and the U.S.-German relationship was at its 
lowest point since immediately after World War II. Kennedy now had to respond to this 
crisis and in the two years between his Radio and Television address and his trip to 
Germany, he and Khrushchev would bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. 
The Fallout: The Berlin Wall  
 Zarefsky (2008) observes that one of the main principles of rhetorical criticism is 
to “address the question of the actual response of a specific audience and the degree to 
which that response can be attributed to the rhetorical work” (p. 633). The following 
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history of the Berlin Wall will portray how Kennedy’s speech on July 25, 1961, 
influenced the historical events surrounding the erection of the Wall. 
 The increase in refugees flowing out of East Berlin demonstrated that East 
Berliners interpreted Kennedy’s remarks in the same way that Khrushchev, Bahr, and 
Ulbricht would, that the U.S. would do nothing to stop a solution to the refugee problem. 
East Germans interpreted Kennedy’s speech as a sign that if they wanted to leave, the 
sooner the better (Smyser, 2009). East Germans were now more fearful than ever that the 
open border and escape hatch to the West might now be closing. Beginning with 
Khrushchev’s July 8 speech indicating a rise in Soviet defense expenditures, 26,000 
people left what Macmillan called the Marxist Heaven of East Germany for a Capitalist 
Hell or at the least purgatory of West Berlin (Beschloss, 1991). A week after Kennedy’s 
July 25, 1961 speech, Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem., AR) commented:  
The truth of the matter is, I think, the Russians have the power to close it 
in any case…if they chose to close their borders, they could, without 
violating any treaty. I don’t understand why the East Germans don’t close 
their border because I think they have the right to close it (Beschloss, 
1991, p. 264). 
 
Kennedy never repudiated Fulbright and McGeorge Bundy reported favorably to 
Kennedy about Fulbright’s comments (Kempe, 2011). Diplomat Llewellyn Thompson 
cabled Kennedy from Moscow telling Kennedy that he expected the Germans to “seal off 
the sector boundary in order to stop what they must consider intolerable continuation of 
the refugee flow through Berlin” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 265). Kennedy told Rostow 
Khrushchev is losing East Germany. He cannot let that happen. If East 
Germany goes, so will Poland and all of Eastern Europe. He will have to 
do something to stop the flow of refugees. Perhaps a wall. And we won’t 
be able to prevent it. I can hold the Alliance together to defend West 
Berlin, but I cannot act to keep East Berlin open (Beschloss, 1991, p. 265). 
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Kennedy knew that Macmillan wanted no commitments in East Berlin and de Gaulle did 
not state what he would do in any contingency. Kennedy wanted to be precise and limited 
in his remarks and that was what he accomplished (Smyser, 2009). With that, the fate of 
East Berlin was sealed. Within a couple of weeks, the East Germans and Walter Ulbricht 
would construct one of the most dehumanizing markers of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall. 
 Ulbricht told Khrushchev a day after Fulbright’s comments that he could close the 
air corridors and all access routes between West Berlin and West Germany in order to 
stop refugees from leaving. Khrushchev agreed that something needed to be done to stop 
the refugee problem, but the closing of air corridors was too risky and might precipitate 
war (Smyser, 2009). The solution settled upon was a wall that closed the border between 
the two Berlins. 
 Three factors that led Khrushchev to give the go ahead and build the Wall were 
Ulbricht’s insistence that the refugee problem needed to end, Kennedy’s July 25 speech, 
which implied that the East they could do what they wanted in East Berlin, and West 
Germany’s threat of an embargo if a treaty was signed (Smyser, 2009). Khrushchev 
would later admit the wall was “a hateful thing,” but “[w]hat should I have done? More 
than 30,000 people, in fact the best and most qualified people from the GDR, left the 
country in July…[T]he East German economy would have collapsed if we hadn’t done 
something soon against the mass flight…So the Wall was the only option” (Gaddis, 
2005a, p.115).  
 On August 7, Ulbricht informed the Poltiburo that the plan with approval from 
Moscow was to close the border on Sunday August 13 which became known as 
Stacheldrahtsonntag, Barbed Wire Sunday (Taylor, 2007). In the week leading up to the 
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border closing, 9,869 refugees left East Germany for the West. If this number continued 
for a year, over half a million people would have left the East for the West dwarfing the 
number in 1953. The flow of refugees reinforced Kennedy’s sentiment, expressed in his 
July 25 address, that East Berliners “who have fled the Communist regime in East 
Germany [were] voting for Western-type freedom with their feet” (Kennedy, 1961). 
Operation Rose went into effect at one minute past midnight on August 13, 1961. The 
East announced that traffic between the two Berlins would be halted until further notice. 
People were standing in the subways waiting for trains in a mix of bewilderment and 
desperation. When dawn broke at five o’clock in the morning, East German construction 
brigades and their armed escorts were already at work. Berlin had been caught by 
surprise (Taylor, 2007). At first the wall was just a barbed wire barrier, but then it 
became a twelve foot high concrete barrier almost a hundred miles long. Along the entire 
span of the wall were guard towers, minefields, police dogs and orders to shoot to kill 
anyone who passed it (Gaddis, 2005a). The wall was intended to prevent the impending 
capitalist invasion from the West, but with the Kampfgruppen standing with their backs 
to the wall and pointing their guns inward, the clear impression was the Wall was a 
prison to keep East Germans in, not to keep the West out (Ross, 2004).  
 The Western response to the Wall displayed marked indifference. President 
Kennedy was at Hyannis Port with his family and other members of his administration 
were out or at home on that Sunday. When Dean Rusk first learned about the erection of 
the Berlin Wall, he decided not to call the president until harder information came into 
the office. Rusk concluded, “Western powers had never considered East Berlin in itself 
an issue over which they were willing to go to war. However much they should deplore 
132 
 
the partitioning, they should not think of changing the lines of demarcation by force” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 272). Kennedy received a message from Washington disclosing that 
the wall had been erected in the afternoon. He immediately called Rusk and asked “What 
the hell is this? How long have you known? Was there any warning in the last two or 
three days?” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 272-73). Rusk said he could not be certain but perhaps 
the Russians were trying to end, not just control the refugee flow. There was no need for 
Kennedy to rush back to Washington in Rusk’s mind. Kennedy told Rusk to issue a 
statement saying that the “violations of existing agreements will be the subject of 
vigorous protest through appropriate channels” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 273). Kennedy told 
Rusk to go the ballgame he intended on attending and Kennedy continued his plans for 
sailing. 
 Macmillan was hundreds of miles away from London that weekend hunting 
grouse with his nephew. When Macmillan was informed of the erection of the wall, his 
reaction, much like Kennedy’s, was indifference. He, too, continued his weekend 
vacation. The British ambassador to West Germany, Sir Christopher Steel, commented, 
“I must stay that I personally have always wondered that the East Germans have waited 
so long to seal this boundary” (Taylor, 2007, p. 45). Steel’s main concern was that the 
U.S. maintained a rational approach. He sought to meet with the Americans to work on a 
common strategy. French leader Charles De Gaulle was at his country home in 
Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises and was so relaxed about the Berlin issue that he did not 
return to Paris until August 17 (Taylor, 2007). De Gaulle saw the Wall as “physical proof 
that the Kremlin has given up hope of frightening the Americans, the British and the 
French into allowing them to lay hands on the city” (Smyser, 2009, p. 120). 
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From the global perspective, the Wall was not necessarily the catastrophe it first 
appeared. NATO feared that the increased rhetoric from Moscow toward Turkey and 
Greece, along with the intensification of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers in August 
1961, was a sign that the Berlin Wall was not purely defensive. The NATO assessment 
overlooked the influence of the East German government on Soviet policy making in the 
episode (Hatzivassiliou, 2009). The U.S. outlook and response was truer to the Soviet’s 
true intentions. The official response by the U.S., formulated by both Kennedy and Rusk, 
was as follows: 
Available information indicates that measures taken thus far are aimed at 
residents of East Berlin and East Germany and not at the Allied position in 
West Berlin or access thereto. However limitation on travel within Berlin 
is a violation of the four-power status of Berlin and a flagrant violation of 
the right of free circulation throughout the city…These violations of 
existing agreements will be the subject of vigorous protest through 
appropriate channels (Gelb, 1987, p. 184). 
 
The bland response by the U.S. was intended to steer clear of any flame of revolt 
remotely similar to the 1953 East German uprising and the 1956 Hungarian rebellion 
(Beschloss, 1991). Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Foy Kohler 
commented, “The East Germans have done us a favor” (Smyser, 2009, p. 105). For 
anyone to assume the Wall was a sign of Eastern strength, rather than weakness, was 
counter to conventional thinking at that time (Ross, 2004). The Wall was perceived as a 
negative symbol of communism, but the West Germans still wanted a response from the 
West. 
Adenauer’s biggest concern after the erection of the Wall turned to Berlin and the 
prevention of an uprising on the scale of 1953. The lesson of 1953 with Soviet tanks 
rolling into Berlin and the untold number of civilian deaths was fresh in his mind. 
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Previous border closings by the GDR caused Adenauer to stay out of Berlin. Instead, he 
opted to work on his election campaign. He believed that if he rushed off to Berlin it 
would only raise the sense of crisis in the city. Also, with Berlin being in four-power 
control there was little Adenauer could realistically accomplish (Kastner, 2002). In an 
interview in 1963, Adenauer recalled the West’s reticence to act: 
After the Berlin Wall began to go up…absolutely nothing yet 
happened…even though the Russians had broken their treaties and erected 
the wall, the Americans put up with it…The Americans even tried to tell 
us that it was a good thing because the flow of refugees was stopped 
(Mayer, 1994, p. 88). 
 
Adenauer continued with his campaign because he believed it was the best way to combat 
the ultimate Soviet and East German aims (Kastner, 2002). Even in these dire 
circumstances, Kennedy was hoping to negotiate with the Soviets. Bundy believed that 
“while closing off the East Berlin border was a most serious matter…in realistic terms, it 
would make a Berlin settlement easier” (Mayer, 1994, p. 89). Negotiations with the 
Soviets were tough to swallow for the FRG and Adenauer because Kennedy had also 
considered negotiating with the GDR.  
The FRG believed any negotiations with the GDR would make the separation of 
Germany more permanent (Mathiopoulos, 1985). Adenauer reacted critically and bitterly 
to Kennedy’s reconfiguration of U.S. prerogatives in Germany without consultation. The 
Wall made reunification, Adenauer’s main foreign policy goal, seem impossible. The 
Americans were more concerned over Western access to East Berlin than reunification. 
As such, the touchstone of U.S.-Soviet relations was no longer centered on the 
reunification of Berlin and Germany (Lang, 1995).  
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The biggest change that would occur with Adenauer over the next two years was 
his mindset. While always believing that the FRG’s most reliable ally had been America, 
he slowly came to see America as unreliable and not having the best interests of Germany 
in mind. Adenauer slowly began to orient his policy toward France. The chancellor came 
to see de Gaulle as the more trustworthy ally (Kastner, 2002). Berlin Mayor Willy 
Brandt, who initially irritated Kennedy, would become one of the staunchest supporters 
of U.S. policy and presented a stark contrast to Adenauer. 
Brandt, like Kennedy, was a young politician who was charismatic and 
rhetorically gifted. Brandt gave a speech on August 16 in reaction to the presence of a 
barrier that was to erase all hope for reunification of the two Berlins (Passey, 1973). In 
his address, he tried to temper the anger in West Berlin by telling its citizens to accept the 
new situation as the allies had asked and to avoid incidents that might provoke retaliation 
or an uprising. Nevertheless, he seemed to also call for a vigorous response, “Berlin 
expects more than protests. Berlin expects political action” (Smyser, 2009, p. 112).  
Comparing the wall and the West’s inaction to Munich, a reference to the Western 
failure to stop Hitler, Brandt lamented, “Our countrymen in the Soviet Sector and the 
Soviet Zone now carry the heaviest burden” (Gelb, 1987, p. 218). Brandt warned of the 
consequences of failure 
The illegal sovereignty of the government of East Berlin has been 
recognized…I consider this a serious turning point in the postwar history 
of the city, such as has not been experienced since the blockade. This 
development has not altered the will to resist of the population of West 
Berlin, but it has succeeded in casting doubt upon the capability and 
determination of the Three Powers to react…The Soviet Union has used 
the [East German] People’s Army to achieve half of its proposals for a 
“free city.” Act Two is only a question of time. After Act Two we would 
find a Berlin which resembles a ghetto. Having lost…the symbol of hope 
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for reunification, it will also be cut off from the free section of Germany 
(Gelb, 1987, p. 219). 
 
He informed the assembly that he wrote a letter to Kennedy in which he pleaded for 
American action and warned of a crisis of confidence in Berlin. He asked Kennedy to 
reinforce the Berlin garrison and to consider declaring Berlin a three-power city. Brandt 
even suggested bringing the issue to the United Nations (Smyser, 2009). Brandt’s own 
disappointment in the West is reflected in his declaration that “Kennedy cooked our 
goose” (Passey, 1973, p. 121).  
Brandt was able to read the temperament of his audience and gave them courage 
and confidence in the face of difficult times for many Berliners. He inspired them with 
idealistic lines such as: “Here it is no longer a concern for the rights of the Western 
powers, but rather that the rights of men be restored” (Passey, 1973, p. 122-23).  
The Wall, however, would figure prominently in Brandt’s Ostpolitik. With the 
Wall’s erection, the GDR gained 16 million hostages and cut off 2 million West 
Berliners. The Wall created a humanitarian need on both sides, which Brandt would try to 
address. Ostpolitik’s stroke of brilliance was its recognition that the Wall could not be 
removed, so the next best step was to make it transparent (Hofmann, 2007). However, 
acceptance of the Wall and humanitarian work remained a few years in the future. Anger 
in Berlin arose from the wait-and-see approach being taken in Washington, but Brandt 
emerged as “the voice for the feelings of betrayal over the slow reaction of the West” 
(Passey, 1973, p. 121). Brandt’s public disclosure of his letter to Kennedy brought 
international pressure on the United States to act. 
 Kennedy was furious over Brandt’s public disclosure of the letter and its contents. 
When Kennedy heard of Brandt’s remarks, he responded by saying “Who does he think 
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he is?” (Smyser, 2009, p. 112). The president felt Brandt had overstepped his position 
greatly (Daum, 2008). Kennedy did take some of Brandt’s comments to heart (Smyser, 
2009). But the publication of the letter redirected anger at the Wall away from those 
responsible and back toward the Western powers, which irritated Kennedy (Daum, 2008). 
Kennedy began to worry about the crisis of confidence facing West Berlin. General Clay 
called General Maxwell Taylor and told Taylor to tell Kennedy that he could not ignore 
what had happened. Kennedy respected Clay who was not only a hero in Berlin, but a 
leading figure in the Republican Party. The president was also unhappy that the word 
appeasement was attached to his acceptance of the Wall (Smyser, 2009). As a 
demonstration of strength and commitment, Kennedy chose to send Vice President 
Lyndon Johnson and Berlin Blockade hero, Lucius Clay to Berlin along with a contingent 
of 1,500 troops. Kennedy believed Berlin needed a morale boost. By sending the vice 
president and a symbolic hero, the president hoped to rally the spirits of Berliners and 
stave off some of the ill effects of the Wall. 
 Clay and Johnson arrived in Berlin on August 19 and stayed until August 20. 
Johnson and Clay were overwhelmed by Berliners who demonstrated their support for 
their actions. Johnson’s reception of the troop contingent sent a clear message that the 
Americans had the courage to act in Berlin even though they accepted the Wall (Smyser, 
2009). The trip by Clay and Johnson helped create solidarity between America and Berlin 
and helped regenerate public trust in the United States  on the part of the West Germans 
(Daum, 2008). The symbolic act of solidarity was also an opportunity for Kennedy to 
discipline Brandt, as Kennedy told Johnson to speak with him and “to make clear to him 
that he should cease criticism of the United States” (Daum, 2008, p. 29). The decision by 
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Kennedy also marked an evolution in his presidency, as it was the first time he opted to 
go against his top military advisers, as well as Charles Bohlen, the leading Soviet expert 
and a towering figure in politics (Smyser, 2009). The trip helped erase doubts in the 
minds of West Germans and Brandt believed the U.S. troop reinforcements “made a deep 
impression on the Russians – and when they are impressed they are less likely to take 
risks” (Passey, 1973, p. 125). Opinion polls from Germany revealed that 83 percent of 
West Berliners and 67 percent of West Germans approved of Johnson’s trip, and 63 
percent of West Berliners and 39 percent of West Germans believed the trip was a sign of 
the seriousness of America’s commitment in Berlin (Daum, 2008). After reaching the 
lowest point in U.S.-German relations with the erection of the Berlin Wall, Kennedy’s 
decision to send Clay and Johnson helped put the U.S.-German relationship on more 
solid ground. 
 The Berlin Wall was supposed to establish a new power structure in East Berlin 
by depriving ordinary East German citizens with the “trump card” of emigrating west. 
The Wall, much to the GDR’s surprise, did not solve the problem, but merely 
reconfigured it (Ross, 2004). Indeed, with the hindsight of history, the initial belief that 
the Wall solved the problems of the East and was a victory for Moscow was proven 
wrong (May, 1998). The chronic labor shortage and lack of productivity incentives were 
inherent traits of the planned economy and remained problems in the GDR whether or not 
there was an open border. The Wall locked in a frozen, rigid social structure and the 
border closure helped foster a rapid decline in social mobility in the GDR. Citizens could 
no longer earn higher wages in the West and return and be “rich” in the East. The 
growing dissatisfaction in the East forced residents to accept certain amounts of Western 
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culture to make up for the loss of social mobility. Although there was an increase in 
living standards after 1961, there was little progress on the development of a popular 
political consciousness associated with the East German regime (Ross, 2004). Partial 
control of the city was no substitute for controlling the entire city for Eastern leaders 
(May, 1998).  While the economic benefits increased, East Germans still lagged behind 
the West. With the Wall’s presence, the juxtaposition of two Berlins put a sharp focus on 
the success of the West and the dismal failure of the East (May, 1998). 
 Heading into September 1961, Kennedy had decided to enter into negotiations 
with the Soviets. De Gaulle was against the negotiations, but Kennedy indicated he 
would move forward. He told Adenauer that he was seeking talks “over Berlin only 
because public opinion and the sheer logic of thermonuclear war demand such a course of 
action” (Mayer, 1994, p. 90). Kennedy warned Adenauer to protect against government 
leaks because they were grave threats to the talks (Mayer, 1994). Moscow interpreted the 
call for negotiations as a simple matter with a simple rationale: “[T]he Americans are 
looking for ways to come to an agreement with us, because the West has recognized de 
facto that an unacceptable state of affairs will come into effect after we conclude a peace 
treaty with the GDR” (Lunak, 2003, p. 77). When talks continued with Rusk, and he 
offered a non-nuclear zone in Central Europe or a non-aggression pact between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev withdrew his deadline of agreeing to a Peace Treaty 
before the end of 1961 (Lunak, 2003). 
September 1961-October 1962: ‘We Did Not Send Him to See the Opera in East Berlin’ 
 Kennedy was grappling with the Berlin issue when he asked the CIA to reappraise 
the emergency assessment they issued in June. The CIA reported that their June estimate 
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of Soviet capability was too high, and in fact, the Soviets had thirty-five operational 
ICBMs. One week later, General Lemnitzer lowered the figure to ten to twenty-five, and 
unlike America’s missiles that were in hardened silos, the Soviet missiles were not in 
silos and cumbersome to launch (Beschloss, 1991). The CIA also had all the locations of 
the missiles thanks to satellite imagery from the Pentagon. This information basically 
dropped the value of a first strike Soviet attack to limited value and almost none for a 
second strike. As State Department intelligence chief Roger Hilsman recalled, “The 
whole Soviet ICBM system was suddenly obsolescent” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 328). In late 
October, Kennedy had McNamara’s deputy Roswell Gilpatric speak to the Business 
Council in Hot Springs about the superiority of the U.S. position. Kennedy was wary of 
telling the Soviets about the large missile gap favoring the Americans because he feared 
Khrushchev would speed up the Soviet ICBM program, but Kennedy sanctioned the 
speech. The president reasoned that if Khrushchev believed he still had nuclear 
superiority, he might bring the world close to war (Beschloss, 1991). The speech was 
about to coincide with a challenge by American forces in Berlin over access rights to East 
Berlin, which caused Khrushchev to react harshly as he felt Kennedy was trying to 
embarrass him on the international stage. To make the situation more tense, General Clay 
challenged the Soviets and the GDR in Berlin. 
General Clay had been sent to Berlin to help boost the morale after the Berlin 
Wall. Kennedy kept Clay on in Berlin as his personal representative.  Soon American 
military forces would find themselves in a frightening standoff with Soviet forces. The 
incident began when Allan Lightner, the senior American civilian in West Berlin, crossed 
into East Germany and was stopped by East German Vopos, People’s Police, who 
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demanded to see identification. American license plates had always been relied upon to 
enter East Berlin. Lightner refused because the U.S. did not recognize East German 
authority. He demanded to see a Soviet official, but the Vopos refused (Beschloss, 1991). 
Lightner referred the matter to Clay. 
 Clay decided to test the East again and the next morning he sent an American 
civilian with U.S. military number plates through the checkpoint. He was refused and 
asked to see a Soviet officer, again no one appeared. About an hour later Clay sent ten 
American tanks within 50 to 60 meters of the checkpoint with the two front tanks 
mounted with bulldozer blades (Taylor, 2008). Clay was testing the delineation of powers 
between the Soviets and the GDR, a concept not firmly established in the GDR’s 
founding, unlike the clear definition of power between the FRG and the Western Powers. 
Back in Moscow, Khrushchev was wondering if Lightner was the harbinger of a 
new belligerent policy. Little did Khrushchev or the East know, it was Clay, not 
Kennedy, who was responsible for this new provocation. When Kennedy found out, he 
complained “We didn’t send him over there to go to the opera in East Berlin.” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 333). The East replied, with Soviet approval, that only Allied 
personnel in uniform would be allowed to enter (Beschloss, 1991). Clay kept sending 
vehicles with American military personnel across the border a few hundred yards and 
having them return as a show of U.S. strength and will. On October 25, Clay ordered 10 
M-48 Patton tanks to the crossing point. By evening, 30 Soviet tanks were making their 
way towards the Friedrichstrasse. Clay asked if he could make a raid into the East, 
tearing down bits of the Wall on the way back. Rusk denied this request (Trauschweizer, 
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2006). Clay continued to play his theatrical game, trying to send civilians over with 
American military personnel. 
 On October 26, three jeeploads of soldiers wearing bullet-proof vests with 
bayonets fixed escorted a Ford Taunus into East Berlin. The East Germans bellowed, 
“This is the worst example of international impudence the world has ever known,” to 
which a man from the provost-marshal’s staff replied, “You seem to have forgotten that 
we do not recognize you, and God forbid we ever should” (Taylor, 2008, p. 281). On 
October 27, the Soviets brought up their tanks which they disguised by putting mud on 
the insignia of the tanks because Russian tanks would have called into question GDR 
sovereignty (Smyser, 2009). U.S. officials monitoring the radio waves found out the 
crews were speaking Russian, not German. Clay immediately called a press conference 
and claimed the harassment was not by the GDR, but by the Soviets (Smyser, 2009 & 
Taylor, 2008). Marshal Konev who was in Berlin attending a conference was the senior 
Soviet military adviser in Berlin. He ordered the Soviet tanks to block the American 
tanks because he was worried what Ulbricht might do in the tense situation (Smyser, 
2009). When American tanks arrived in the morning, the two superpowers directly 
squared off with armed forces for the first and only time during the Cold War. The scene 
made for dramatic photographs; it was a tense situation for all involved (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006).  
Khrushchev was in constant contact with Konev because he did not want the 
situation to get out of control (Smyser, 2009). Kennedy directed his brother, Robert, to 
work on a solution to the standoff. Robert had contacted Georgi Bolshakov, a KGB 
officer working in D.C. as a press attaché (Taylor, 2008). JFK asked RFK to relay this 
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message to Bolshakov: “The situation in Berlin has become more difficult,” RFK 
explained. “Today our ambassador met with Soviet Foreign minister Gromyko, who 
refused our declaration regarding the recent incidents that have occurred in Berlin. It is 
our opinion that such an attitude is not helpful at a time when efforts are being made to 
find a way to resolve this problem” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 404). RFK asked for a 
four to six week period for the U.S. and its allies to work out its stance on Berlin. He 
asked for calm and for increased efforts to keep Berlin out of the headlines (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006). The U.S. expressed its willingness to be flexible in talks with the Soviets 
over Berlin, if Khrushchev would remove his tanks within 24 hours (Mayer, 1996). 
Sometime before 11:30 P.M., Moscow time, Khrushchev decided to remove his 
tanks. As he later explained, “I knew Kennedy was looking for a way to back down. I 
decided therefore that if I removed my tanks first, then he would follow suit; [and] he 
did” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 404). The next day Khrushchev gave orders to remove 
the Soviet tanks from Berlin, and within twenty-four hours Kennedy ordered the same. 
The standoff was over (Trauschweizer, 2006). The superpowers were not about to go to 
war over one man’s refusal to present identification at the checkpoint. 
 With the resolution of the Checkpoint Charlie incident, the next year was 
relatively calm. Kennedy was able to get Adenauer to accede to negotiations with the 
Soviets over Berlin as long as Western rights were preserved; he also accepted an 
expansion of Bonn’s forces in NATO from eight to twelve divisions. In return, Kennedy 
pledged not to bargain over the Oder-Neisse Line, recognize the GDR or neutralize 
Central Europe. Kennedy rejected Adenauer’s request to have a share in NATO decision 
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making (Beschloss, 1991). Kennedy publically shared Soviet concern over West 
Germany if they gained nuclear power. JFK observed: 
As long as German forces are integrated into NATO…there is security for 
all…Now, if the situation changed, if Germany develops an atomic 
capability of its own, if it developed missiles or a strong national army that 
threatened war, then I would understand your concern, and I would share 
it. After all, we have had two wars in Europe, as well as you (Mayer, 
1994, p. 92). 
 
Kennedy was not going to allow Germany to gain a nuclear capability. The CDU 
newspaper in Germany Christ Und Welt reported, “No American president for many 
years has expressed such a deep distrust of Germany so clearly” (Mayer, 1996, p. 62). 
Kennedy was irritated again that the German press castigated him for weakness on Berlin 
when he had taken so many risks to ensure the safety of the city. Kennedy had increased 
his military budget to protect Berlin and he had forced Khrushchev to stand down less 
than a year ago. He was even more irritated that the French were seen as heroes, even 
though they were the ones stirring the pot about America’s commitment to Europe and 
questioning what America’s role should be on the continent (Freedman, 2000). 
Khrushchev was looking for away to rebalance the power between the two 
superpowers. As Kennedy noted, “Power…was as much a function of perceptions as of 
hardware, position, or will” (Gaddis, 2005b, p. 200). Gilpatric’s speech had reasserted 
America’s dominance and suggested that global power had shifted, even though it was 
merely a perception, for in reality the U.S. had always had nuclear superiority. Kennedy 
sanctioned Gilpatric’s speech because he wanted to end Khrushchev’s grandiose dreams 
of Soviet dominance, suggest to the Third World and non-aligned states that the U.S. was 
the true superpower and, ultimately, gain the upper hand in negotiations (Beschloss, 
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1991). Khrushchev now looked for a quick and cheap way to restore the perception of 
power in the world. 
 Kennedy’s toughness on Berlin and the Gilpatric speech had undermined 
Khrushchev’s position at home. Khrushchev was in denial about U.S. strength. He 
publically rejected “the notion that a few nuclear weapons were all a nation needed to 
deter aggression” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 380). Unfortunately for Khrushchev, by his own 
logic, the more nuclear weapons a nation had the more military and political power the 
nation had. His failure to drive out the Americans after four years of bluster was turning 
him into a target for criticism among the Soviet leadership and people. By his own 
standards, the Soviet Union was in deep trouble since the U.S. might be planning a first 
strike (Beschloss, 1991). Khrushchev’s threats failed against superior U.S. firepower and 
Kennedy’s refusal to back down. 
 By January 1962, Khrushchev was asking Kennedy if they should initiate private 
bilateral talks on the Berlin and German issue. Kennedy was amenable because he had a 
new idea for access routes to Berlin. Kennedy wanted to propose a thirteen-member 
“International Access Authority” to control ground and air routes to West Berlin. The 
members would include the USSR, the GDR, two more Eastern states, the three Western 
powers, the FRG and West Berlin with three neutral states being Sweden, Switzerland 
and Austria (Smyser, 2009). The possibility of East German participation in the IAA, 
which amounted to tacit recognition, was an issue that could separate Adenauer and 
Kennedy. The U.S.’s prescription came to be known as the “Principles Paper.”  
Unfortunately, its release would create more suspicion on the part of the German 
Chancellor, who read the document as yet another cause for concern. 
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 Prior to the leak of the Principles Paper in the spring, Robert Kennedy had visited 
Berlin in February. RFK’s speech was important for two reasons. First, he urged his 
audience to accept and embrace the idea of peaceful coexistence between East and West. 
Second, Brandt was very much impressed by the president’s brother and RFK, for his 
part, was impressed by Berlin. In RFK, Brandt found an important contact in the White 
House (Hofmann, 2007). The Principles Paper outlined JFK’s negotiation strategy with 
the Russians in the coming months. In spring 1962, the papers were leaked to the press. 
The Papers included provisions on 
1. The establishment of mixed West and East German technical 
commissions to oversee cultural and technical contacts, and promote 
mutually beneficial economic exchanges; 
2. The development of policies regarding nondiffusion of nuclear 
weapons; and 
3. A suitable declaration regarding nonaggression between NATO and 
Warsaw Pact powers (Mayer, 1996, p. 68-69). 
 
In April, Adenauer responded rather icily:   
Up to now the repeated attempts to open negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on Berlin have failed. The latest proposals of the Department of 
State compromise decisive elements concerning not only Berlin but also 
the German question, which exceed all previous offers made to the Soviet 
Union. I have considerable objections against some of these proposals and 
I would urgently request you, my dear Mr. President, to consider 
interrupting, for the time being, the negotiations and using this time to 
reexamine all problems concerning Berlin (Mayer, 1994, p. 94). 
 
Kennedy was surprised that Adenauer found anything startlingly new and decisive since 
he believed all relevant issues were discussed between Adenauer and Rusk in March. By 
May, Adenauer was publically questioning Kennedy’s efforts to negotiate with the 
Russians over Berlin (Mayer, 1994). The “Principles Papers” had soured U.S. relations 
with Bonn and drove Adenauer even closer to de Gaulle. 
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 Brandt followed the break between Bonn and Washington closely. Brandt had 
toyed with the idea of internationalizing the communication lines between East and West 
Berlin in 1958 under U.N. guarantees and in 1960 Bahr suggested to Brandt an 
“international or exterritorial corridor of whatever technical kind” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 
53). Brandt had learned that the GDR would participate in the IAA, but not control the 
corridors. The negotiations between the West and the USSR on broader topics were 
hindered by the lack of Western maneuver on Berlin. America was “determined to 
broaden the basis of negotiations by marking congruent interests in questions of 
European security in a ‘new approach’ in order to obtain ‘barter objects’, which can be 
brought into the Berlin discussion” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 53). The barter objects included 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-aggression pact between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact and declarations of reunification of force, much of which was unsavory to 
traditional West German positions. Brandt was not Adenauer, Berlin was not Bonn and 
his position was aligning with the American position (Hofmann, 2007). Kennedy’s long 
held position that the Germans were going to have to solve some of their own issues was 
becoming more prominent in his policy development on Berlin. 
 By late June 1962, Brandt and Rusk met. Brandt was ready to launch his main 
project: “the necessity to take some action to create holes in the wall by political means’ 
and suggested no less than six ways of going about this, including the German-German 
technical commissions envisioned in the draft principles” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 59). As an 
internal memo in the Kennedy administration stated “The Germans clearly have to carry 
the ball…we might be able to come up with means for facilitating continuous East and 
West German contacts which could be useful to us politically” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 59). 
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Rusk was convinced of Brandt’s potential. He believed that Berlin had fewer illusions 
than the FRG and would go farther in opening up inter-German discussions (Hofmann, 
2007). In early October 1962, Brandt delivered a guest lecture at Harvard. Carl Kaysen, 
Kennedy’s Deputy National Security Advisor, noted that Brandt’s lectures had two 
themes. First, progress toward reunification could only be made by some kind of détente 
with the Soviet bloc. Second, Brandt believed Berlin could only be dealt with in the 
larger context of the Cold War (Hofmann, 2007). Brandt’s views were now consistent 
with Kennedy’s and were useful in exemplifying German support for Kennedy’s policies. 
Before Kennedy had a chance to continue his détente strategy between the two 
Germanys, the Cuban Missile Crisis would bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. 
Cuban Missile Crisis: ‘I Think the Other Guy Blinked’ 
 Khrushchev saw his policies in Berlin as failing and he needed to restore the 
balance of power in the world. He saw Cuba as an opportunity to both restore the balance 
between the two superpowers and as a way to gain some concessions on Berlin. 
Khrushchev firmly believed that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent and inevitable 
(Beschloss, 1991). Khrushchev continued to believe the imperialists were gaining control 
of the Kennedy administration and influencing his actions (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). 
His solution was to send nuclear missiles to Cuba to act as a deterrent. He would notify 
Kennedy of their presence by a personal letter. The U.S. intelligence agencies would not 
know about the missiles for eight weeks. Khrushchev believed Kennedy would conceal 
the embarrassing information, as he did with the Bay of Pigs and Berlin, from the public 
until after the elections in November. Khrushchev even thought Kennedy might view the 
missile installations as solely defensive. Khrushchev believed the missiles were defensive 
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and likened them to American missiles in Turkey and Italy (Beschloss, 1991). 
Khrushchev’s belief that Kennedy would silently accept missiles less than 90 miles from 
America was, of course, quite misguided. 
 Khrushchev firmly believed that placing missiles in Cuba would restore the 
balance of power between the two superpowers. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita’s son, 
remembers the nuclear imbalance “naturally tormented our leadership a great deal” 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 385). Mikoyan, who originally questioned Khrushchev’s strategy at 
Vienna, again questioned his logic on the Cuban missiles. He predicted the Americans 
would never accept missiles so close to their homeland, but believed Khrushchev had 
only two thoughts on his mind “Defend Cuba and repair the imbalance. But defending 
Cuba was his first thought” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 385). Andrei Gromyko, a leading Soviet 
Minister, cautioned, “I must say frankly that putting our missiles in Cuba would cause a 
political explosion in the United States. I am absolutely certain of that, and this should be 
taken into account” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 387). Khrushchev hoped Kennedy would react 
as he had to the Berlin Wall—act surprised, send a formal protest, and then tell the 
American people this was not an issue the U.S. was willing to go to war over. 
Khrushchev‘s view may have been formed by William Fulbright’s claim that U.S. 
national existence would not “be in substantially greater danger than is the case today” if 
missiles were in Cuba (Beschloss, 1991, p. 392). Khrushchev may have thought Fulbright 
was speaking for Kennedy. 
 Khrushchev also noted that America used other countries around the globe for 
staging grounds, so why should this be any different for the Soviet Union. Khrushchev 
crowed: “It was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and 
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her own people threatened” and he was ready to give America “a little taste of their own 
medicine” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 393). Khrushchev firmly believed that missiles would 
make Cuba safer. Most experts advising Castro believed the missiles would make Cuba a 
target for the U.S. (May, 1998). Khrushchev thought the Americans would merely make 
a rhetorical fuss over missiles placed in Cuba. Khrushchev thought he might be able to go 
to New York and make a moderate speech proposing U.N. police in place of Western 
soldiers in West Berlin. With the threat of nuclear war in play over missiles in Cuba, the 
U.N. might find his proposal reasonable and accede. Kennedy would have been hard 
pressed to oppose it (Smyser, 2009). The scenario did not play out as the premier had 
hoped. 
 Kennedy received the news of the Cuban missiles from Bundy on the morning of 
October 16, 1962, around 9 A.M. (Sorensen, 1965). He was taking in his morning papers 
in his bedroom when Bundy told him the news. Kennedy, though angry at Khrushchev’s 
efforts to deceive him, received the news calmly and immediately recognized the danger 
of the situation. Kennedy’s experts believed this sort of precipitous action was wholly 
uncharacteristic of Soviet policy (Sorensen, 1965). Dean Rusk warned Kennedy that 
Khrushchev’s move in Cuba could be merely diversionary with his true aim being Berlin 
(Beschloss, 1991). Regardless of Khrushchev’s aims, Kennedy initially had six options to 
choose from: do nothing, bring diplomatic pressures to bear on the Soviets, undertake 
missions to Castro to divide Cuba and Russia, use indirect military action such as a 
blockade on Cuba, conduct an air strike or launch an invasion (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy 
rejected options one and two based on the shift in global power they would create. Talks 
with Castro or Khrushchev were also set aside (Sorensen, 1965). Some thought that 
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Khrushchev might want to trade Cuba for Berlin: “This ought to be brought to Castro’s 
attention. It ought to be said to Castro that…the time has now come when he must take 
the interests of the Cuban people—must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, 
prevent this missile base from becoming operational” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 432). An 
invasion of Cuba had very few supporters (Sorensen, 1965). The administration was now 
left to choose between a blockade and an air strike. 
 Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, was afraid of accidental 
nuclear war. He warned that someone might somehow get his thumb on the button 
against the wishes of the Kremlin: “We don’t know what kinds of communications the 
Soviets have with those sites. We don’t know what kinds of control they have over the 
warheads” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 434). Around the same time Mikoyan worried about the 
same concerns in discussions inside the Kremlin. He criticized Khrushchev who wanted 
to hand over control to the Cubans. He reasoned, “If the Americans were to understand 
the missiles are under our control, they would proceed from the assumption that we 
would not attempt some kind of [nuclear] adventure since we know what the 
consequences would be” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 472). Mikoyan believed that if the 
U.S. knew Castro had his finger on the button, the U.S. might take some sort of action 
against the island. Mikoyan was successful in persuading Khrushchev to “keep the 
missiles as Soviet property under our exclusive control” (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006, p. 
472). Back in Washington, Rusk brought up one of Khrushchev’s major dilemmas --the 
fact that the U.S. does not have to live under “fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent 
that he has to live under fear of ours. Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby—in Turkey 
and places like that” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 434). At the time there were fifteen Jupiter 
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IRBMs in Turkey (Beschloss, 1991). In Rusk’s advice, Kennedy may have found his 
answer to the Cuban Crisis, but there was still the question of Berlin and its relationship 
to the Cuban Crisis. 
 Rusk believed that “Berlin is very much involved in this. For the first time, I’m 
beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about 
Berlin” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 434). Other evidence supporting the Cuba-Berlin link was 
the construction of an aboveground oil pipeline across East Germany to fuel Soviet troop 
deployments in West Berlin. This was an unmistakable message to Kennedy from 
Khrushchev that he was willing to go to war over Berlin and “if Russian blood were shed 
in Cuba, American blood would surely be shed in Germany” (Kempe, 2011, p. 494) 
However, historian Tony Judt (2005) has argued that Khrushchev was entirely rational on 
Berlin during the missile crisis. The Soviets could have taken Berlin at any time with 
their superior conventional forces, but with U.S. prestige and nuclear armory attached to 
West Berlin, Khrushchev had no intention of invading West Berlin or risking nuclear war 
in Germany. For Judt, the problem with Kennedy and the Americans was that they 
believed all Soviet moves led back to Berlin and overestimated all of Khrushchev’s 
moves (Judt, 2005). Whatever Khrushchev’s motives in Cuba were, Kennedy’s personal 
beliefs and inability to accept inaction in times of crisis prodded him to act. 
 The administration’s immediate assumption was that it was going to take the 
missiles out of Cuba either by force or diplomacy. This assumption seemed to contradict 
Kennedy’s remarks in March that there was not “a significant difference between a 
nuclear warhead stationed in this area and one five thousand miles away” (Beschloss, 
1991, p. 447). Khrushchev took cognizance of JFK’s remark and that may have helped 
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him decide to place missiles in Cuba. McNamara also believed that missiles in Cuba may 
have increased the speed and accuracy of a Soviet first strike, but the Soviets still could 
not match the American advantage (Beschloss, 1991).The blockade option was chosen as 
the best way to rid Cuba of the missiles. It was originally downplayed for its drawbacks. 
A blockade had been associated with Berlin. Another drawback was if Soviet ships 
ignored it, the U.S. would be forced to fire the first shot, and the administration did not 
even know if the blockade route was open to implementation. The biggest drawback was 
that the blockade took time and prolonged the crisis (Sorensen, 1965). One faction in the 
Kennedy administration, including Acheson, Nitze, McCone and Dillon, came to power 
when the U.S. held a strong nuclear superiority and believed America’s nuclear 
advantage would carry the day as it did in Berlin. The other faction comprised of 
McNamara, Thompson, RFK and Sorensen had come to power when there was nuclear 
parity between the U.S. and Soviets. This latter faction thought an air strike was 
dangerous and that Kennedy’s use of gradual force in Berlin should again be employed in 
Cuba (Beschloss, 1991). 
 By October 20, Kennedy was leaning towards a blockade because it was a 
limited, low-key military action rather than a direct air strike. A blockade offered 
Khrushchev the choice of avoiding conflict by keeping his ships away. This option 
allowed the administration a more controlled escalation (Sorensen, 1965). McNamara 
argued an air strike would cause retaliation somewhere else in the world, probably Berlin. 
In endorsing the blockade, he felt that quarantine was the only military course compatible 
with American leadership of the free world (Beschloss, 1991).  As long as the Pentagon 
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could not be sure that all missiles would be destroyed in an air strike, a blockade was “far 
less likely to provoke a nuclear response” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 479).  
Kennedy went with the blockade because he wanted options, but also to give 
Khrushchev options too, as he had done in Berlin. He wanted to stay away from the 
dreaded humiliation or holocaust scenario. He hoped the blockade would slow down 
escalation and prevent a nuclear war. Kennedy was also reminded that a first strike 
surprise attack was how Japan attacked the U.S. at Pearl Harbor and how his generation 
abhorred that type of treachery (Sorensen, 1965). The Organization of American States 
(OAS), made up of the countries on the North American continent, needed to approve the 
blockade. While Sorensen and others fretted that the OAS could take a long time to act, 
the OAS approval for a blockade came on October 23 and the world waited to see what 
would happen next. 
 On October 22, the day before the OAS agreed to the blockade, Kennedy gave a 
televised speech to the nation briefing them on the state of affairs in Cuba. A 
Congressional leader called after the speech congratulating Kennedy and expressing how 
much better he understood and supported Kennedy’s policy. According to Sorensen, 
some Americans panicked, but most Americans felt pride (Sorensen, 1965). For most 
Americans, a major crisis over nuclear weapons seemed imminent and the nation 
shuddered as it contemplated potential nuclear annihilation. Kennedy warned against any 
“hostile move” where the U.S. was committed—especially against “the brave people of 
West Berlin” (Beschloss, 485). The president also cautioned that the crisis might last 
months and require the sacrifice of American citizens. JFK said that his goal was “not the 
victory of might, but the vindication of right” (Sorensen, 1965, p 704). Khrushchev was 
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furious and initially thought of storming the blockade. He told the Soviet people that 
Kennedy was placing Cuba under blockade and that Khrushchev was putting all forces in 
combat readiness. The premier failed to tell the Soviet people that Kennedy’s actions 
were precipitated by his sending nuclear warheads to Cuba. Moscow portrayed 
Kennedy’s actions as pure aggression (Beschloss, 1991). Khrushchev ultimately chose 
not to heat up the crisis. Radio Moscow noted the illegality of American action, but 
promised that “not a single nuclear bomb will hit the United States unless aggression is 
committed” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 489). 
 Khrushchev had decided not to test the blockade for two reasons. He wanted to 
avoid escalating the confrontation and he did not want any Soviet technology to fall into 
the hands of the Americans (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). By October 24, all Soviet surface 
ships had either stopped or received orders to reverse course. The threat of American 
naval blockade seemed to be working. Ex-COMM, Kennedy’s group of advisers during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, was informed that twenty ships nearest the barrier had stopped 
or turned backed. Kennedy gave the orders to allow them to do so, “Get in direct touch 
with the Essex and tell them not to do anything but give the Russian vessels an 
opportunity to turn back” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 498). 
The mood in the Kremlin was somber on October 25. Khrushchev wanted to take 
the initiative before events in Cuba spiraled out of control. He wanted tactical flexibility 
and would be willing to remove the missiles if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. 
Khrushchev tried to explain the retreat in the best possible light, but he clearly took a 
credibility hit (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Khrushchev believed that by getting this 
pledge from Kennedy his gamble would at least gain future security for Cuba. 
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 On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy his offer to dismantle the Soviet 
missile bases under UN supervision, Castro would promise never to accept offensive 
weapons of any kind. In return the U.S. would pledge not to invade Cuba (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006). Either late on October 26 or early on October 27 Khrushchev was given 
Walter Lippmann’s article discussing the idea of removing the Turkish missiles in 
exchange for the Cuban missiles. Khrushchev wondered if Kennedy was trying to send 
him another signal (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). The Soviet ruling apparatus allowed 
Khrushchev to send another letter asking for the removal of the Turkish missiles. 
 When Kennedy received the letter, members of his administration wondered why 
Khrushchev made this new demand. Kennedy was left wondering if hard liners force him 
into this position (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). The idea of removing the Turkish missiles 
had come up early in the crisis by an adviser who served in the Eisenhower 
administration. This adviser told Kennedy the missiles in Turkey and Italy were nearly 
obsolescent and of little military value, and they were forced upon their host countries. 
Other officials sharply criticized him and he backed down (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy 
and his administration ignored the call to remove the missiles in Turkey believing it was 
a propaganda ploy and focused on Khrushchev’s first letter. He had Robert Kennedy and 
Ted Sorensen help him compose a reply in which Kennedy called for the cessation of 
work in Cuba on nuclear sites in return for a pledge for the U.S. not to invade Cuba. 
Kennedy sent his brother to deliver this message to the Soviet Ambassador with a verbal 
message that the point of escalation was at hand, either there was going to be peace and 
disarmament or overwhelming retaliatory action unless the President received immediate 
notice the missiles were to be withdrawn (Sorensen, 1965).  Khrushchev responded 
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immediately. Kennedy’s terms were accepted, inspection would be permitted and the 
confrontation was over (Sorensen, 1965).  
As for the Turkish missiles, the two super powers arranged a secret agreement. As 
Kennedy saw it, the U.S. could be in an “unsupportable position if it rejected 
Khrushchev’s new demand to remove Turkish missiles” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 527). 
Kennedy had tried to get the missiles out the year before because they were not militarily 
useful. The president felt that giving up the “Turkish missiles would look like a fair 
trade” to any rational man (Beschloss, 1991, p. 527). If the U.S. did not give them up, 
Kennedy would have a hard time explaining military action in Cuba (Beschloss, 1991). 
Kennedy told RFK to let Khrushchev know that the U.S. was “glad to discuss” Turkish 
missiles with him—“once we get a positive indication that they’ve ceased their work in 
Cuba” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 527). RFK told Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, that “If 
that was the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlier, then the 
president doesn’t see any insurmountable difficulties in resolving the issue” (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006, p. 489). RFK added it would take four to five months because “the greatest 
difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey” (Fursenko & 
Naftali, 2006, p. 489). The Russians received and accepted the message. The Turkish deal 
would remain secret. The Cuban Crisis was over. 
 Khrushchev now had to break the news to the Soviet people who were stunned to 
hear the gravity of the situation. The entire week the Soviet media downplayed the event, 
never letting on how close the world was to nuclear war over Cuba. Now they learned 
that Khrushchev was withdrawing missiles from Cuba when all week they were told the 
missiles were an American fabrication (Beschloss, 1991). Khrushchev’s gamble did not 
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improve the nuclear imbalance, and most of the world saw his retreat as a humiliation. 
The premier’s nuclear blackmail policy had proved to be too risky. It gave his military 
opponents a great victory and left Moscow leaders wondering whether their brilliant but 
impulsive leader might now be more of a liability than an asset (Beschloss, 1991; Taylor, 
2008). The people in the Soviet Union remained unaware that Khrushchev had succeeded 
in getting the missiles out of Turkey; they were not told because of the compact between 
the two superpowers.  
What was not known until Soviet archives were opened was that Khrushchev had 
already accepted the first proposal, without the Turkish missiles, as his concession letter 
stated. It was only after hearing from Robert Kennedy that he felt relieved that America 
had slightly backed down (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). Khrushchev later claimed the 
entire crisis was created to get the U.S. to pledge that they would not invade Cuba: “for 
the first time in history the American imperialist beast was forced to swallow a hedgehog, 
quills and all. And that hedgehog is still in its stomach undigested…I’m proud of what 
we did” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 562). Khrushchev also did not achieve his aims in West 
Berlin. What he really wanted was a free city. Kennedy acquired additional presidential 
ethos in Berlin; he would be seen as the man who stood up to Khrushchev and protected 
Berliner’s rights in the darkest days of the Cold War. 
 Kennedy had stood eye to eye with Khrushchev and had not blinked, but it was an 
exceedingly close call. Khrushchev thought he had Kennedy after he did not oppose the 
Berlin Wall, but Kennedy faced him down on Cuba and finally proved his mettle in 
tangling with the Communist leader (Taylor, 2008).  
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European Split: Gaullists vs. Atlanticists 
 One of the main principles of American diplomacy in Europe since 1947 had been 
European integration. Removing the constant antagonism between France and Germany 
would boost the long term health of Europe. The Marshall Plan, the European Defense 
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market were all 
efforts by the U.S. and other European countries to strengthen their ties to each other. De 
Gaulle’s election to power in France was welcomed by Eisenhower, but soon Ike and 
Kennedy would discover de Gaulle’s opposition to a plan for Europe (Mayer, 1996). 
Beginning in the summer of 1962, de Gaulle and Adenauer exchanged official visits and 
a friendship bloomed. De Gaulle called Germans “ein grosses Volk (a great people)” 
something the Germans had not heard for a long time, even from German leaders 
(Smyser, 2009, p. 206). De Gaulle stressed the idea that Germany and France had an 
obligation to build a common Europe together. De Gaulle’s no negotiation policy with 
Russia specified no deal on Berlin and no negotiations until Khrushchev proved himself 
ready to seriously negotiate. This was music to Adenauer’s ears. Kennedy and the British 
were willing to negotiate with the Soviets on any topic, which remained a constant 
concern for Adenauer (Smyser, 2009). In de Gaulle, Adenauer found a friend and ally 
who was unwilling to throw away German priorities for larger Cold War interests. 
 De Gaulle needed Germany to fulfill his vision of Europe. He wanted to see the 
states of Western Europe cooperate “in the political, economic, and cultural sphere, as 
well as that of defense” (Mayer, 1996, p. 81). This new Europe would coordinate the 
governments of the Western continental Europe so they would act in concert with each 
other and rely on Paris as its capital (Mayer, 1996). What de Gaulle was really aiming for 
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was an unbreakable French-German bond and a Europe that was independent of both 
Russia and America. With France anchoring Europe, both France and Germany would be 
secure and Europe could recover its greatness. Adenauer had less lofty aims, but he 
needed a trustworthy ally to help protect his state.  
 On January 22, 1963, the rapprochement between Germany and France reached 
its zenith in the Élysée Treaty signed in Paris. Adenauer signed the treaty because he did 
not want to have to choose between France and the United States, as he saw both nations 
as indispensible partners (Mayer, 1996). Adenauer did not want to break off his alliance 
with the United States and embrace de Gaulle’s version of Europe decoupled from the 
U.S.; he just wanted to secure friendship with France (Daum, 2008). As Adenauer’s State 
Secretary, Karl Carstens explained, “If Germany did not complete this process of 
cooperation with France, the resulting insecurity and tension would only strengthen 
Soviet Russia” (Mayer, 1996, p. 93). Adenauer identified common interests between the 
Germans and French that were not always present in relations with America. An 
interview with Adenauer in March 1963 revealed that Adenauer’s two great ambitions in 
political life were to tie Germany firmly to France and to tie Germany firmly to the 
United States. The U.S. was already firmly established, and with the Élysée Treaty he had 
accomplished his second goal (Smyser, 2009). What resulted from the Élysée Treaty was 
Kennedy’s trip to Germany and the split in the German government between Gaullists 
and Atlanticists. 
 Gaullists became known as supporters of de Gaulle’s vision of a French 
dominated Europe that was almost entirely independent from America and Russia. 
Atlanticists became a pro-American sect, especially in Germany, and were recruited from 
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all political parties in Germany that supported strong relations with America. They 
worked to thwart the plans of the Gaullists. Thanks to their efforts the Élysée Treaty was 
not ratified until May 1963, with an added preamble that underscored Germany’s 
allegiance to the United States and the North Atlantic community (Daum, 2008).  
 Kennedy reacted in horror to the treaty between France and West Germany. What 
was worse was a week before the Élysée Treaty, de Gaulle vetoed British application for 
the European Economic Community (EEC). De Gaulle did not believe the British had the 
best interests of Europe in mind. He always saw the British and the Americans as the 
dreaded “Anglo-Saxons” who shared little with the traditions or interests of continental 
Europe (Smyser, 2009). Kennedy feared that the new Franco-German bond could 
possibly be extended to Moscow and that the Western Alliance might come unglued. 
Kennedy had given an address in July 1962 calling for closer American, British and 
European contacts and community, what would be known as his dumbbell plans for the 
trans-Atlantic alliance (Smyser, 2009). Kennedy may have never intended to share that 
power given his overbearing style of alliance politics, but it was offered nonetheless 
(Hofmann, 2007). Kennedy was not alone in his outrage, Acheson called the treaty “one 
of the darkest days of the postwar period” (Daum, 2008, p. 35). American High 
Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy complained that he was “more deeply 
disturbed about the turn of events [in Europe] than I have been since the end of the war” 
(Daum, 2008, p. 35). Furthermore, “many Americans who…see in Berlin a symbol of the 
common destiny of Germany and the United States are now disquieted” (Daum, 2008, p. 
35). George Ball stated, “I can hardly overestimate the shock produced in Washington by 
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this action or the speculation that followed” (Mayer, 1996, p. 91). Even after the added 
preamble, Kennedy would now favor Brandt and Bahr in Berlin over Adenauer in Bonn. 
 Brandt was becoming more important to Kennedy. His undivided support of 
Kennedy’s policies during 1962, including his support of Kennedy’s European policy and 
Cuban policy earned him high regard. More importantly, with a split in Germany 
between Gaullists and Atlanticists, Brandt was an Atlanticist of the first order. He 
disagreed with de Gaulle on almost every position, though he did pay him personal 
respect. Brandt favored British participation in the EEC; he believed in American 
leadership and nuclear deterrent over French guarantees. Brandt joked to the U.S. mission 
about the choice between “the US nuclear deterrent and French military bands” 
(Hofmann, 2007, p. 77). In Germany, Brandt rallied against the treaty and worked with 
the Atlanticists to craft the preamble’s support for the North Atlantic community. Abroad 
he curried American support writing Kennedy “I can not speak for the German 
Government. However, I do want to let you know, with these personal lines, that in 
Berlin we never forget the friends who protect us, and who in critical times would have 
stood by us alone” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 78). It was a blatant attempt by Brandt to get on 
board with the Americans as their German advocate, and it worked. However, Kennedy 
needed something to boost his image in Germany and Europe. He decided upon a 
European trip in the early summer 1963. 
Kennedy’s European Trip 
 West Germany extended an invitation to Kennedy before the Élysée Treaty, but 
with the warming relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle, Kennedy saw a trip as 
both a challenge and opportunity. The trip could reinforce why the U.S. presence was 
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necessary in Europe and deflect the danger posed by the possibility of a West German-
French alliance. Khrushchev traveled to East Berlin a few times, but de Gaulle’s never 
traveled there. A trip by Kennedy to Berlin would present a chance to one-up de Gaulle 
and score points in the East-West political alignment. Most importantly, when de Gaulle 
went to West Germany in 1962, in the exchange of trips between Adenauer and himself, 
he fostered positive feelings toward the German-Franco relationship. Kennedy wanted to 
reassert the German-American relationship and as much as the administration did not 
want to admit it, the trip could easily be interpreted as a “popularity contest with de 
Gaulle” (Daum, 2008, p 65). Kennedy hoped his trip would create an iconic image of 
presidential leadership similar to what the meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle 
accomplished at the Reims cathedral. 
 Kennedy had three main objectives in his trip to Europe. He wanted to bypass de 
Gaulle and demonstrate the trans-Atlantic community was under firm American 
leadership. The demonstration was meant to be both for the Western allies and the Soviet 
Union. Washington hoped to use Kennedy’s personal charisma to shine a positive light 
on the U.S. and to win a vote of confidence for America over de Gaulle. Kennedy’s next 
objective was to win Western Europeans over to the idea of peaceful coexistence with 
antagonistic political blocs (Daum, 2008). These two goals worked in concert with each 
other as the first was to demonstrate Kennedy was not going to make secret deals behind 
his allies’ backs, while the second showed his allies the administration’s global strategy 
concerning the Soviet Union. Kennedy’s last objective was economic, with the hopes of 
reducing its balance-of-payments deficit and to advocate cuts in the tariffs between 
Europe and America (Daum, 2008). 
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 Weeks before Kennedy left for Europe, he gave an important Cold War 
commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963. The American 
University speech was one of Kennedy’s most pragmatic and calculated. In it, he sought 
to build public support for his test ban treaty, mollify Khrushchev after a 
misunderstanding about inspections, and overcome Soviet skepticism that he was willing 
to jeopardize his domestic position to push a controversial agreement through the Senate 
(Beschloss, 1991). Kennedy broke with long standing Cold War assumptions in creating 
what he called a “strategy of peace” (Daum, 2008). At American University, JFK linked 
what had been scattered ideas in his administration into a cohesive plan for peace. 
Kennedy denied aspirations to a Pax Americana in the world, instead appealing for a 
global and genuine peace that would make “life on earth worth living” and a peace 
enjoyed by all nations (Daum, 2008, p. 82). Kennedy told Americans that they would 
need to reevaluate their attitudes toward the Soviet Union and communism. He wanted to 
reach out with concrete actions and enforceable agreements with the communists to 
overcome ideological deadlock. The president warned against condemning the Soviets 
and their people, instead asking Americans to focus on their sacrifices and achievements. 
Kennedy believed that the two superpowers have joint interests in survival in the nuclear 
age. The time had come to abandon the reigning bi-polar mentality and seek new 
strategies to solve conflict (Daum, 2008). The essence of Kennedy’s speech was the 
pursuit of détente through direct negotiations with the Soviets (Mathiopoulos, 1985). 
These words could not have found a more willing accomplice than Willy Brandt. 
 Egon Bahr wrote to Brandt that Kennedy’s American University speech was “a 
gift from heaven” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 80). Brandt had read Kennedy correctly; President 
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Kennedy was fully committed to détente. Brandt praised the speech when he was in New 
York only a few days later and when he returned to Germany he began quoting it in 
support of his Ostpolitik policy (Hofmann, 2007). Brandt did not get a chance to meet 
with Kennedy in early June after the speech because Kennedy was coming to Berlin a 
few weeks later. What a left-wing French newspaper called “Kennedy’s seduction 
voyage” was about to begin and Kennedy’s image in Germany would be changed forever 
(Beschloss, 1991, p. 603). 
Kennedy in Germany 
  Kennedy arrived in Bonn on June 23 and was set to tour Germany for three days, 
ending in Berlin on June 26. Adenauer met Kennedy at the airport. Adenauer used the 
opportunity to address the media and remind Kennedy in his welcoming remarks about 
his promise in his American University speech regarding no deals with the Soviet Union 
at the expense of other nations (Beschloss, 1991). Kennedy was not perturbed by 
Adenauer’s reminder, since he had come to expect West Germany’s constant need of 
reinforcement over American support. Kennedy used his opportunity at the airport to 
reassure Adenauer of U.S. commitment stating “Your safety is our safety, your liberty is 
our liberty, and any attack on your soil is an attack upon our own” (Daum, 2008, p. 84). 
From the Cologne-Bonn airport, Kennedy rode in an open car with Adenauer, exposing 
himself to the public in what Daum (2008) described as a communal event between the 
people of Germany and Kennedy. As the car reached the outskirts of Cologne, thousands 
of people were gathering, chanting “Ken-Ne-Dy! Ken-Ne-Dy!” (Daum, 2008, p. 85).  
The president was overwhelmed by the outpouring of support from the people of West 
Germany; he gave a brief speech in Cologne and attended mass at the Cologne cathedral. 
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 The public saw far less of Kennedy on his second day in Germany. The president 
spent most of June 24 talking with Adenauer and meeting West German president, 
Heinrich Lubke.  Adenauer and Kennedy discussed German-Franco and German-
American relations. Kennedy seemed to feel better about the state of U.S-German 
relations after his meetings with Adenauer, especially after the recent German purchase 
of arms and increased support of the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) (Daum, 2008). 
Adenauer admitted that for domestic reasons he could not publically accept Poland’s 
western border as depicted in the Oder-Neisse line, but in practice he accepted it (Daum, 
2008). In his dinner toast that evening, Adenauer did not call for German reunification 
and Kennedy responded in kind by simply stating how moved he had been by the 
“opportunity to come face to face” with the German people (Daum, 2008, p. 91). The 
meetings and dinner helped thaw the icy relationship the two had in the past, but it was 
Kennedy who took the lead. By praising the outgoing Chancellor in his public addresses, 
the president not only warmed the often strained relationship but set the tone for the rest 
of his visit to Germany. 
 Kennedy traveled to Frankfurt on June 25, one day before he went to Berlin. An 
estimated one million people assembled at the Frankfurt City Hall, all of them chanting 
“Ken-Ne-Dy! Ken-Ne-Dy!” Kennedy again made a short speech, like the many he made 
previously. The president discussed the historical relationship between Germany and 
America. JFK’s most symbolic gesture before Berlin came during the speech he delivered 
at the Frankfurt Paulskirche, the church where German delegates met in 1848 through 
1849 before being forcibly disbanded in May 1849 (Daum, 2008). The delegates met to 
discuss German unity and democracy in the face of the authoritarian government that was 
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currently in place during the European 1848 revolutions. By speaking there, Kennedy 
associated himself with the tradition of liberalism and democracy in Germany. Frankfurt 
was known as the cradle of German liberty (Silvestri, 2000). His presence sent a message 
to the world to accept West Germany as a free and democratic nation (Daum, 2008). 
Kennedy’s Frankfurt City Hall address espoused three main ideas: the Atlantic 
partnership, the establishment of a free trade zone in the Atlantic community and an 
Atlantic partnership involved in creating an integrated and strong Europe that could 
defuse Cold War tensions (Daum, 2008). William Tyler, from the Department of State, 
remarked that the President’s popularity “went far beyond anything that could be 
accounted for by any act…Something about him…just seemed to echo in the hearts and 
voices of all the people when they greeted him” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 604).  
Kennedy finished the day by attending a reception in Wiesbaden. As he entered 
Wiesbaden, which had a large American population, Kennedy passed a sign that read 
“Ask Not What You Can Do for Your Ford Dealer, Ask What Your Ford Dealer Can Do 
for You” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 604). At Wiesbaden, the president led a toast and issued a 
rave review of his first three days in Germany, remarking that upon leaving office he 
would leave an envelope with the instructions “Go visit Germany” to the next president 
when things do not seem to be going his way (Daum, 2008). The next morning Kennedy 
traveled to Berlin. 
It had been 18 years since Berlin had hosted an Allied head of government from 
the West. At that time, the Allied leaders had met at Potsdam in 1945 at the end of World 
War II. Back then, Berlin was a desolate and bombed out city, but in 1963 the city had 
been rebuilt and the topography and symbolic landscape was quite different than what 
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Truman had experienced in 1945. Kennedy’s objective once reaching Berlin was to see, 
to be seen, and to publicize his activities for global consumption (Daum, 2008). He 
would mix with Berlin’s people, visit its urban hubs, and bring attention to the division 
the Wall represented, both symbolic and real. At the Wall, JFK would peer into the East, 
but did not cross the border, even though he retained the legal right to do so. The 
spectacle attracted some 1,500 journalists both local and foreign and over 100 
Washington based White House correspondents (Daum, 2008).  
At 9:40 in the morning on June 26, 1963, Kennedy landed in Berlin in the French 
sector. Lucius Clay was worried about Kennedy’s safety during his Berlin trip, but 
Kennedy shrugged it off. When Clay found out Kennedy was unfazed, he told him “You 
haven’t had any reception yet. You just wait until you get to Berlin. You’re going to see 
something you’ve never really seen before” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 605). Kennedy was 
greeted by Adenauer, Brandt and Otto Bach, the president of the Berlin parliament. 
Along his 33 mile drive through West Berlin he was joined by Adenauer and Brandt. 
More than one million or 60 percent of the adult population in West Berlin would greet 
the president on the road way, roof tops or hanging off the lamp posts (Hofmann, 2007). 
The speeches at the airport were kept short. Kennedy was greeted with “Hail to the 
Chief” and reviewed the honor guard, but there were no national anthems. The Berlin 
Kennedy saw before him was very different than the one he visited in 1939 as a stopover 
on his way to Prague and the one he saw as a press correspondent in 1945. Kennedy got 
into his car and as the drive began the now-famous chorus chants of “Ken-Ne-Dy! Ken-
Ne-Dy!” commenced once again (Daum, 2008). As Kennedy drove through West Berlin, 
he was showered with colored paper and balloons. The confetti and balloons gave the 
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impression of an American election campaign or tickertape parade, impressing some 
observers with the notion that West Berliners were more American than West Germans 
(Daum, 2008). 
Kennedy was driven around West Berlin and strategically shown landmarks that 
helped disassociate the city with its Nazi past. Kennedy entered the Hansa Quarter, which 
had buildings erected by several internationally renowned architects who represented 
West Germany and West Berlin’s new architectural internationalism. The architecture 
helped reconnect Germany with its pre-1933 architectural past that had been shown in the 
Amerika zu Hause. From the Hansa Quarter, Kennedy passed a modern style business 
building in Ernest Reuter Platz, the Amerika Hause and then went down Joachimstaler 
Strasse and crossed the Kurfurstendamm—the long shopping street that Berliners think of 
as their Broadway. This portion of the tour included the revitalized capitalism in 
Germany and the connection to America with the Amerika Hause, the U.S. information 
center in Berlin (Daum 2008). Kennedy also drove past the Victory Column, a Prussian 
military monument as he arrived at the Congress Hall to give a short speech. 
At Congress Hall, the president would appear before the sixth national Congress 
of Industrial Trade Union of Construction Workers. It was the first time a Western head 
of government had ever officially visited a German labor Congress. Kennedy’s 
attendance connected him to the special relationship between the German and American 
labor movements. One line from his speech resonated strongly with the audience, “West 
Berlin is my country” (Daum, 2008, p. 131). Kennedy referenced a longer quote by 
Benjamin Franklin that was on display in Congress Hall, his message symbolized the 
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repeated sentiment that West Berlin is America’s Berlin (Daum, 2008).  After the speech, 
Kennedy’s motorcade then continued. 
Kennedy’s motorcade traveled behind the Soviet War Memorial and past the 
Reichstag. His next stop was at the Brandenburg Gate where he tried to look across into 
East Berlin, but the GDR had hung banners between the columns limiting the president’s 
view. Kennedy’s reaction to the Wall was mixed. Some described Kennedy as having his 
normal aloofness, while others describe him as deadly serious. Time reporter Hugh Sidey 
observed, that Kennedy “looks like a man who just glimpsed Hell” (Kempe, 2011, p. 
499). Kennedy, Brandt and Adenauer got out at Checkpoint Charlie and were led up a 
new staircase by General James H. Polk, the U.S. commander. They gazed to the East 
and saw a sign that read “We welcome Kennedy also on behalf of East Berliners” (Daum, 
2008, p. 134). Also, a small group of East Berliners waved to the president. As Kennedy 
looked out, he was reminded of the extensive and vigorous building projects in West 
Berlin. When he gazed upon the East, JFK was reminded of the desolation of his trip 
through Berlin in 1945 (Silvestri, 2000).  
At the Wall, Kennedy’s radiant smile reportedly had disappeared and he seemed a 
changed man, his lips firmly shut and pressed together. An NBC report stated, “Kennedy 
was not smiling as he left the Wall…It seemed obvious that the president had been 
emotionally aroused by what he had seen” (Daum, 2008, p. 135). Many observers felt 
that the Wall had “moved him deeply” (Daum, 2008, p. 135). The Wall marked the 
physical and emotional limitations of Kennedy’s New Frontier vision and policies. 
As Kennedy approached Schöneberg City Hall, he passed two other architectural 
symbols of U.S. support for Berlin: the American Memorial Library and the Airlift 
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Memorial. When the motorcade arrived at Dudenstrasse, the crowd could no longer be 
contained. Homemade confetti began falling down upon the motorcade and one television 
reporter commented, “Just like New York” (Daum, 2008, p. 135). Finally, Kennedy 
reached the back of Schöneberg City Hall, where he was to give one of his two major 
speeches that day (Silvestri, 2000). Estimates put the number of West Berliners from four 
hundred thousand to a million and a half waiting for Kennedy outside Schöneberg Hall 
chanting “Ken-Ne-Dy! Ken-Ne-Dy! (Bruner, 1989; Silvestri, 2000). After his speech at 
Rudolph Wilde Platz, Kennedy traveled to the Free University to give his second address.  
As will become evident, the two speeches were very different in tone, style and message. 
Analysis of Kennedy’s Remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin 
The Berlin Effect: A City Embraces a President 
 
 Kennedy’s reception in Berlin was unlike any other he received in his presidency. 
However, his reception in 1963 was very different than if he would have visited Berlin in 
1961 or 1962. Berliners wanted to thank Kennedy and demonstrate their gratitude for his 
leadership during the trying Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises (Smyser, 2009). Over a 
million of them came out to cheer his motorcade and at least half that number attended 
his first address at Rudolph Wilde Platz. 
The physical setting of Berlin prompted Kennedy to focus upon the differences 
between the communist system and the democratic system. He used the rhetorical tactic 
of juxtaposition in his Rudolph Wilde Platz speech to demonstrate and accentuate these 
differences. Kennedy’s thirty-three mile motorcade throughout the city was designed to 
establish West Berlin’s separation from its Nazi past and display the international and 
American influences on its architecture (Daum, 2008). Relations between the two 
countries were remarkably poor after World War II, with America instituting a policy of 
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denazification and non-fraternization. The West forced upon Germany the concept of 
collective guilt for another world war. The Marshall Plan and Western cultural exports, 
including the Amerika zu Hause, in the 1950s improved relations. The architectural 
exports of this era were now on display for Kennedy’s visit, which created a stark 
contrast between East and West Berlin. Kennedy’s peek over the Berlin Wall revealed a 
drab and dour city that neither resembled the city he saw before the war nor the vibrant 
new West Berlin. Without Kennedy’s physical presence and tour of the city, he would 
never have been able to fully identify the stark differences. 
 The scenic environment is reinforced by JFK’s continual references to the city 
throughout the speech including his refrain “Let them come to Berlin” (Kennedy, 1963a). 
Kennedy used the repetition of the phrase to drive home the point rhetorically that 
communism and democracy, East and West are different physically, mentally and 
culturally and Berlin presented the starkest example of these differences. Kennedy’s 
boast was emotionally driven by his experiences throughout the day and his emotions 
carried him beyond what he had planned to say, but the message he spoke carried more 
weight in Berlin than a lecture on Berlin’s past (Beschloss, 1991). Unlike his report on 
the Berlin Crisis in 1961, where the global Cold War landscape influenced his speech and 
policy decisions, Kennedy’s remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz were derived from Berlin, 
both from its people and from the passions of the moment.  
 Kennedy’s embrace of the moment is evident throughout his speech. The first half 
of Kennedy’s speech is largely extemporaneous, off-the-cuff and certainly not part of the 
planned remarks (Daum, 2008). Kennedy returned to the planned remarks beginning with 
a paragraph that began “What is true of this city…” and Kennedy stayed true to the 
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manuscript until he ad libbed his last remark reemphasizing his commitment to the city 
(Kennedy, 1963a). According to the original text, Kennedy was to discuss the dramatic 
postwar history of Berlin: the Berlin Blockade, the 1953 uprising, Khrushchev’s 1958 
ultimatum and the Berlin Wall. He was then supposed to reiterate the U.S. position on 
Berlin since 1961 and the American essentials regarding West Berlin (Daum, 2008). 
Instead, caught up in the moment, Kennedy went on the attack criticizing the Soviets and 
the failures of the communist system.  
 Kennedy dropped the cautionary phrases “hard journey” ahead or the Wall would 
fall “sooner or later” and instead used transcendence in expressing his hope for a better 
future “where this city will be joined as one” (Smyser, 2009, p. 224 & Kennedy, 1963a). 
The most lasting and memorable phrase, “Ich bin ein Berliner,” is not in any of the 
original manuscripts for Kennedy’s speech (Daum, 2008). He inserted his German 
phrases mentally on his drive through the city that morning and wrote them down on note 
cards in the moments leading up to the speech in Willy Brandt’s office (Smyser, 2009 & 
Daum, 2008). Kennedy’s attempts at German in this instance were rather botched 
because “Ich bin ein Berliner” translated literally means “I am a jelly doughnut.” He 
should have said “Ich bin Berliner,” “ein Berliner” was a jelly doughnut (Silvestri, 2000).  
It turns out Kennedy and his two tutors debated the grammar of the phrase. The tutors 
advised him to use the article “ein” because without it he would be suggesting he was 
born in Berlin, perhaps, confusing his audience and losing the emphasis of his point 
(Kempe, 2011).  
As Bundy later recalled, Kennedy “had no feeling for any foreign language. So 
there we were on the goddamn airplane coming down on Berlin while he repeated the 
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phrase over and over again…and it worked. God, how it worked!” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 
605). Even with Kennedy’s grammatical mistake, the crowd roared. No matter the true 
origin of the phrase, it is one of the memorable moments in rhetorical history and it 
cemented Kennedy’s legend in the city. 
The rhetorical strategy of “Ich bin ein Berliner” was to create identity with the 
West German audience. Historically, Kennedy gave his American University address a 
few weeks prior on U.S.-Soviet coexistence and now he was trying to gain West German 
and Berlin support for this policy which required increased inter-German relations. At 
Rudolph Wilde Platz, Kennedy attempted the art of “building community” and “inspiring 
people to achieve collective goals” (Zarefsky, 2008, p. 638). As contrary as it may seem, 
with Kennedy’s attacks on communism at Rudolph Wilde Platz, his strategy was 
succeeding. Kennedy was building support for his leadership position, before building 
support for his policy. This was a two-step approach. At Rudolph Wilde Platz, with his 
attacks on communism and inspirational rhetoric Kennedy bonded with West Berliners 
and Germans. At the Free University, Kennedy would garner support for his détente 
policy, which would gain acceptance as historical events will illuminate. 
Kennedy used “Ich bin ein Berliner” or “I am a Berliner” to cement the communal 
bonding between himself and the West Berliners. His motorcade through the city where 
Berliners could see Kennedy and he could see them, a strategy of visibility, began the 
communal experience. Now, rhetorically Kennedy was reinforcing their bond by stating 
that he was a Berliner. Kennedy stayed away from telling Berliners “America” or the 
“West” commits to your defense; he staked his own prestige on Berlin’s freedom. By 
coming to Berlin and declaring himself a citizen of Berlin, Kennedy and America’s 
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prestige were now publically entwined more tightly with the embattled city than ever 
before. 
By referring to himself as a Berliner, he tapped into Berlin’s past and made   
Berlin’s struggle against communism his struggle against communism. The historical 
constraints that Kennedy wanted to ignore when it came to Berlin, the strong U.S. 
commitment that forced him to support Berlin no matter what and German unification, 
were now embraced. By physically being in Berlin and experiencing the warmth of its 
citizens, the president embraced the common history of: the Marshall Plan, the Berlin 
Blockade, creation of the FRG and survival through the 1961 Berlin Crisis and 1962 
Cuban Crisis and finally the German desire for reunification. He understood these events 
from the Berlin perspective and how American support in each event influenced U.S.-
German relations.  
Kennedy’s closing statement had made all the difference: “All free men, wherever 
they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the 
words “Ich bin ein Berliner” (Kennedy, 1963a). No other line in the speech associated 
Kennedy with Berlin more than that statement.  This statement helped Kennedy 
transform himself rhetorically from an American bystander watching and reacting to 
Berlin from afar, to a Berliner who stands on the frontline of this Cold War struggle. This 
statement carried more weight and resonated more strongly, than his similar but less 
personal and less eloquent statement “West Berlin is my country,” that had been 
addressed to the trade union that morning (Smyser, 2009, p.224). Kennedy’s similar 
phrasing supports Windt, Jr.’s. (2003) claim that Kennedy reviewed his speeches to 
maintain consistency in his policy. Kennedy underscored Berlin’s pivotal role in the 
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struggle for liberty, “You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part of the 
main.” Kennedy’s conclusion makes all free people citizens of Berlin and Berliner’s part 
of the larger global democratic community.  
To a city and a people that found themselves the lone outpost of democracy in a 
communist country constantly being harassed and threatened, this identification with the 
larger global community and Kennedy’s identification with Berlin could not have meant 
more. As Gerhard Wessel, Adenauer’s military intelligence chief said years later of 
Kennedy’s statement, “Never underestimate the psychological influence of this one 
sentence…With the Germans, it was the decisive sentence that changed the feeling, made 
them feel that Kennedy was a great President and a friend of the Germans” (Beschloss, 
1991, p. 606). Kennedy identified with the West Berliners, with their struggle for 
freedom, and with their hopes for reunification and a better future. 
Kennedy used the physical separation of East and West by the Wall to portray the 
divisions in Berlin and the differences between the free world and communist world. In 
his off-the-cuff remarks telling people to come to Berlin, Kennedy used juxtaposition to 
drive home the differences between the two systems. Many of the sympathetic sentiments 
people in the West had toward communism, e.g., “communism is the wave of the future” 
or “communism is an evil system, but it permits us to make economic progress” 
(Kennedy, 1963a), was rebuffed by Kennedy’s insistence for them to come to Berlin. 
Kennedy’s tour of Berlin reinforced this juxtaposition because before arriving in Berlin 
Kennedy did not fully and personally understand the differences between the two Berlins 
until he visited the city. He came to believe that others could not understand this 
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difference unless they too came to Berlin where the eighteen years of history, since the 
last time the city was united, provided a clear demonstration of the differences. 
Kennedy stood alongside Adenauer, Brandt and Clay, three of the most recent 
towering historical figures in the city giving him another level of identification and 
community with the Berliners; a physical display of solidarity. Adenauer was the 
Chancellor of Germany and considered to be the “Father of the Federal Republic” 
(Bruner, 1989). Clay was the hero of the Berlin Airlift and was a staunch supporter of 
Berlin’s rights as evident in the Checkpoint Charlie showdown. Brandt was a link to the 
present in Berlin and represented the future direction of the city and the country (Bruner, 
1989). The physical presence of all three men standing with Kennedy gave him another 
level of identification and solidarity with Berlin visually reinforcing his identification 
with the German community. Kennedy had presided over a symbolically charged 
persuasive event. 
Sorensen and Bundy did not realize how far the president would deviate from his 
script (Smyser, 2009). Sorensen (1965) later noted that Kennedy told him how the trip 
made him understand the necessity of ultimate reunification and that moved him to 
extemporaneous eloquence. The scene called for inspiration and off-the-cuff remarks by 
Kennedy, who, for one rare instance, allowed the emotion and pageantry of the day to 
sway his remarks. His moving visit to the Berlin Wall and infectious cheers and 
enthusiasm from the crowd carried the day. Berlin was inspired and the young president 
had been deeply moved. 
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Kennedy on the Attack: Accusations of Failure 
Kennedy’s remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz had a much different tone than his 
American University speech a few weeks earlier where he preached coexistence and 
détente. Near the beginning of his speech, Kennedy previews his intent to contrast two 
very different systems of government, “Today, in the world of freedom,” he intones, 
drawing the line of division between democracy and communism (Kennedy, 1963a). 
Next, Kennedy uses the juxtaposition of a divided city that is part communist and part 
democratic to further reinforce the differences between the two systems. The 
juxtaposition receives heavy emphasis in his interpretive remarks about the ongoing Cold 
War conflict: 
There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say 
they don’t, what is the great issue between the free world and the 
Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that 
communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there 
are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the 
Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say 
that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits us to make 
economic progress. Lass’ sic nach Berlin kommen. Let them come to 
Berlin (Kennedy, 1963a). 
 
Setting the two different systems apart allows Kennedy to employ an accusatorial tone 
toward the Soviet Union. Kennedy flatly denied the equality between the two systems. 
He clearly portrayed democracy as the ideal government for advancing freedom. Instead 
of taking the opportunity to ease East-West relations at one of its most critical physical 
locations, Kennedy uses the speech to ramp up the idealistic language, confront 
communism, and attack the Soviet system. 
Kennedy’s most pronounced condemnation of the Soviet system, and perhaps the 
most damning line in the speech is cast and hardened in the following words: “we have 
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never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us…the 
most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures of the Communist system, for all 
the world to see…it is…an offense not only against history but an offense against 
humanity” (Kennedy, 1963a). In pointing to the Wall as the ultimate symbol of the failure 
of the communist system, Kennedy’s discourse veers from the approach he had adopted 
since the beginning of his presidency, which was to work with the Soviets, even during 
the construction of the Berlin Wall. It certainly contradicted the thrust of the American 
University address. Nevertheless, for his immediate audience, the president’s presence in 
Berlin and visit to the Wall allowed him to embody his testimony in a unique and 
compelling way, which helped him powerfully legitimate his claims. 
These attacks against the communist system allowed Kennedy to use historical 
events from the preceding eighteen years to condemn the Soviet policy in East Germany 
and Berlin. The failure of the Soviets to establish the GDR’s legitimacy was finally 
rhetorically proclaimed. The illegitimacy of the GDR included the chaos of the postwar 
years when Soviet troops raped and pillaged Germans on a massive scale, the crushing of 
freedom movements in 1953 East Germany and 1956 Hungary and the failure to provide 
basic commodities to its citizens were finally annunciated as failures of the communist 
system. The refugee problem was at the heart of the Berlin Wall. The Wall’s construction 
had its roots in these historical events, but up until this day no president had criticized the 
Soviets publically in the condemning tone that Kennedy took. All presidents, even 
Kennedy, commented privately on the atrocities of Soviet troops in 1945, the suppression 
of rights behind the Iron Curtain and ragged state of the GDR. These historic failures 
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influenced Kennedy’s rhetoric and emotions, while simultaneously providing the basis 
for Kennedy’s anti-communist rhetoric. 
 Kennedy’s remarks about the Berlin Wall symbolized communism’s failure on 
the world stage. But those remarks were also unique because besides the discussion of the 
Wall at Rudolph Wilde Platz and three quick references to it later in his tour, Kennedy 
never mentioned the Berlin Wall publically again (Beschloss, 1991). Kennedy focused 
his public remarks on the Soviet failure to work toward détente, keep their promises or he 
questioned their true interest in negotiating, but he never publically called the Soviets out 
on their political, cultural and humanistic failure regarding the Berlin Wall. His criticism 
of the Wall as “an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, 
separating families” was his most blatant attack on the communist system of government. 
It was the hallmark of JFK’s juxtaposition of democracy and communism. Kennedy 
gained credibility in his critical stance on communism because of his pragmatic stance 
toward democracy. He stated “Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not 
perfect” (Kennedy, 1963a). But even with its imperfections, it far outweighs the 
dehumanizing effects of communism. 
Kennedy’s other idealistic juxtaposition explored the concept of freedom. He 
remarked, “Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free” 
(Kennedy, 1963a). Here again Kennedy overtly denies the concept of peaceful 
coexistence because by Kennedy’s own account the people in East Berlin are living under 
communist systems and are not free. Their freedom can neither be divided nor 
rationalized. When government is forced upon people and they are forcibly detained, they 
suffer the fate of the unfree. Here again, Kennedy was critical of the GDR’s legitimacy, 
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this time not based on legal or historical grounds, but based on a moral argument. The 
legitimacy of the GDR is undercut, not because of its political ideology, but because it 
lacked the support of its citizenry. The people of East Berlin and East Germany did not 
choose the GDR or its officials, the way West Germans chose the FRG and Adenauer; 
Ulbricht was forced upon East Germans. The Soviet’s imposed the regime on their zone 
so it would not be absorbed into a free, democratic and capitalist West. The Soviet 
reaction was directly correlates to their historic fears of being attacked from the West and 
their fear of German revanchism. This lack of popular sovereignty in East Germany made 
East Germans unfree because they lacked a voice in how they were governed.  
The Wall symbolized that communism was to blame for the separation of 
families, division of husbands and wives, brothers and sisters and a tear in the national 
fabric. It was not the free choice of Germans or Berliners to be separated, but it was a 
forced separation imposed by the communists on Germany, on Europe and on the world. 
In failing to work with capitalists and democratic nations, the Soviets are made to stand 
for the enslavement of people around the globe. When criticizing the Soviets for failing 
to negotiate in good faith, Kennedy retained his credibility because since his inauguration 
he had consistently maintained a willingness to negotiate. 
Reunification: The Many Sides of Kennedy 
It is Kennedy’s high-minded personal style that made his call “to lift your eyes 
beyond the dangers of today, to the hope of tomorrow” compelling (Kennedy, 1963a). 
His nod to the ultimate goal of reunification was part of the ultimate goal of freedom 
(Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy’s uses the ideal and universalistic principles of freedom, hope 
and determination as a rhetorical means of keeping Berlin an “outpost for democracy” 
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amid communism. Kennedy praises Berliners still living with “vitality and ... force, and . 
. . hope and the determination” as residents of West Berlin (Kennedy, 1963a). The trials 
Berliners have gone through should afford them the right “to make a free choice. In 18 
years of peace and good faith, this generation of Germans has earned the right to be free” 
(Kennedy, 1963a). The greatest means of making the world free from tyranny and 
oppression lies not in conventional or nuclear arms, but in the hearts and wills of free 
people everywhere. West Berlin was not able to have a military or send soldiers to NATO 
because of the four-power agreement, but by indicating that Berlin has been on the front 
lines for almost two decades and that the weapons for victory are not merely material but 
metaphysical and moral, Kennedy identifies West Berlin’s crucial role in defending 
freedom. Kennedy pointed Berliners’ role in the larger struggle. Instead of being cut off 
from the world or unable to influence the larger Cold War contest, Berliners armed with 
determination and faith in freedom could impact the future of Germany and Europe. 
The reward for these years of patience and strength in fighting the Cold War was 
reunification. Kennedy told his audience, “When all are free, we can look forward to that 
day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of 
Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe” (Kennedy, 1963a). Kennedy rewarded his 
audience for their faith and patience in him by setting reunification as an ultimate goal. 
This clear goal that was so desired by many Germans helped Kennedy persuade his 
audience to support his policy. Between Kennedy identifying himself as a Berliner and 
setting the goal of reunification, he strengthened the U.S.-German relationship through 
his personal diplomacy. 
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However, Kennedy’s call for German reunification was an objective that would 
be realized years in the future. In his closing, he remarked  
What is true of this city is true of Germany-real, lasting peace in Europe 
can never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the 
elementary rights of free men…So let me ask you, as I close, to lift your 
eyes beyond the dangers of today, to the hopes of tomorrow, beyond the 
freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the 
advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to the day of peace with 
justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind (Kennedy, 
1963a). 
 
Kennedy’s pragmatism was on display as he advances his idealistic hope of a free 
Germany, Europe and world. Even as he looks toward a time “beyond the wall to the day 
of peace and justice,” Kennedy (1963a) does not guarantee an immediate communist 
retreat or reunification tomorrow. Rather, this is a long term goal requiring common 
effort. Kennedy needed to temper his audience’s expectation because he knew the 
challenges of reunification were going to be difficult. First, there was the difficulty in 
uniting the GDR and FRG politically because of the Cold War atmosphere. While this 
was a difficult problem, the physical separation was an easier problem to solve than the 
mental separation created by the Wall with two opposing systems and histories being 
created. The physical division created different histories and values between the East and 
West, even though on both sides of the Wall they were ethnically German. This uniting 
of people with different ways of living into a complete whole would produce growing 
pains and would need time and patience to succeed. Second, Kennedy was well aware of 
the 1953 uprisings and he did not want to include any rhetoric that could set off riots in 
the West against the Wall. He instilled hope for the future, but tempered enthusiasm for 
any immediate action against the GDR.  
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 Kennedy’s pragmatic challenge to the West Berliners and Germans is reminiscent 
of his July 25, 1961 speech, to Americans. He called for patience and faith in his vision. 
His remark about Berlin being besieged is linked to his historical allusion to Bastogne in 
1961. He offered the challenge of remaining patient, strong and vigilant as a way to 
prepare his audience for his forthcoming détente policy, originally announced at the 
American University, but soon to be reiterated to the Germans at the Free University. The 
challenge consisted of working with the GDR to open up holes in the Wall and opening 
up the people of the East to Western influence. This policy would be emphasized more in 
his Free University speech. 
Kennedy Goes Roman: Civis Romanus Sum 
One of the trademarks in a Kennedy speech is his references to history. In his July 
1961 speech, Kennedy referred to Bastogne, Stalingrad and recounts Berlin’s postwar 
history. Robert Kennedy urged his brother to say something in German when he spoke in 
Berlin. On his way to Germany, Bundy came up with a few phrases for Kennedy to use. 
Kennedy wanted to know what the proudest boast was for the Romans to use, which was 
civis Romanus sum or I am a Roman citizen (Beschloss, 1991). In his remarks at 
Rudolph Wilde Platz, Kennedy chose to use Bundy’s suggested Latin boast the Romans 
used, “civis Romanus sum” and its German equivalent “Ich bin ein Berliner” (Kennedy, 
1963a). The references continued to build community between America and Berlin. The 
phrases identified America and Berlin with one of the original free societies and 
republics, Rome. America had long associated itself with Ancient Rome and Greece, the 
birth places of democracy and republicanism, with its association of free rights and a 
political system established in the constitution. By adding in the historical reference to 
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Rome, Kennedy was integrating German history with the universalistic ideals of freedom 
espoused by America, Rome and Greece. 
Kennedy’s use of the historical Civis Romanus sum was an appeal to the German 
population and he used it to identify himself as a German. The roots of the phrase that 
helped form ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ are important for the rights and ideals it transmitted. 
Civis Romanus sum was a declaration of Roman citizenship to claim the rights, privileges 
and protection Roman citizenship carried. It is most cited and memorialized by Marcus 
Tullius Cicero. Besides the legal protection the phrase offered, it was also used to identify 
with one’s community and create a sense of community (Daum, 2008). Kennedy had 
once used the metaphor in a speech in New Orleans in 1962. At one point in the speech, 
Kennedy boasts “Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was to say, ‘I am a citizen 
of Rome.’ Today, I believe, in 1962 the proudest boast is to say, ‘I am a citizen of the 
United States’” (Daum, 2008, p. 152). The speech writers for Kennedy left out the 
phrase, but Kennedy’s trip to the Berlin Wall stirred up his emotions and as he departed 
from his planned speech. He fell back on this line from his New Orleans speech (Daum, 
2008). This shows not only his excellent memory, but a classic characteristic of Kennedy 
as a speech maker; he always studied his previous public statements. Kennedy believed, 
“[e]very speech put his career on the line, reflecting choices for which he would be 
praised or blamed” (Windt Jr., 2003, p. 96). Kennedy directed his speechwriters to go 
back and look at his speeches to make sure he achieved unity and consistency (Windt Jr., 
2003).  
By linking Berlin to Rome, he pays the Berliners a double compliment. Berliners 
are placed on equal footing of the new “Romans” in America and that makes them equal 
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partners in the new “Pax Americana” (Daum, 2008). Kennedy’s historical metaphors are 
used to transcend time and place and link idealistic principles to support all freedom 
seekers and protectors. The main historical metaphor at Rudolph Wilde Platz is the link 
between Rome, America and Berlin. Through this historical metaphor Kennedy was 
transformed into a Berliner and Berliners into Americans and Romans. The shared values 
of freedom and republican democracy are transferred from Ancient Rome to Berlin 
through this American president. In the process, Kennedy increased Berliners’ and 
Germany’s national and international prestige. This goes a long way in repairing their 
image that just eighteen years ago was tarnished by Nazism. Kennedy used the historical 
metaphor to help rehabilitate the German image internationally and to inspire pride 
among its citizens. 
Identificational Appeals: Rudolph Wilde Platz  
Despite Ulbricht’s instructions to keep East Germans away from the Wall and 
prevent them from viewing the Kennedy motorcade, they could still follow the visit on 
Western radio or television signals broadcast over the Wall. Most East Germans and 
Berliners were able to listen to Kennedy’s speech, even though they were not able to 
partake in the historic event (Smyser, 2009). Kennedy’s long diatribe about the 
differences between communism and democracy, the free and unfree, implicates all 
citizens of Berlin, not just those living in the Western sector. Kennedy remarked, “one 
German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men” which is followed quickly 
by a call for German unification (Kennedy, 1963a). The East German audience who may 
hear the speech over the Wall or on the radio broadcast from West Berlin could take heart 
in the knowledge that Kennedy was also calling for their freedom. Even those who were 
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supposed to support the East German regime, like the wife of a Politburo member of the 
GDR Communist Party, telephoned a friend and described the speech as “fabulous.” Her 
friend agreed (Smyser, 2009, p. 226). This showed the far reaching and inspirational 
effects of Kennedy’s rhetoric not only on West Berliners, but East Berliners too.  
While East Berliner’s cheered privately, West Berliners roared publically. 
Kennedy received the most overwhelming reception of his entire political career in 
Berlin—from his motorcade to his speech in front of Schöneberg Hall (Sorensen, 1965). 
In attendance that day was Horst Teltschik, who helped Helmut Kohl negotiate German 
reunification with Mikhail Gorbachev. Along with a dozen university friends, Teltschik 
went to the square at 8 A.M. to get a good spot and had to lock elbows to keep from 
being separated and crushed. Like Klaus Scharioth, later German ambassador to 
Washington, Teltschik never forgot the speech. For many Berliners, Kennedy’s speech 
remained one of the greatest experiences of their lives (Smyser, 2009).The interruption of 
Kennedy’s speech with chants of “Ken-Ne-Dy!” and roars of support were to be 
expected, but it was the crowd’s final reaction at the end of Brandt’s speech, which 
followed Kennedy’s, that was not expected (Daum, 2008). 
Brandt was the new American choice to lead Germany into the era of détente, 
initially in Berlin alone, but eventually the chancellorship. On this day though, Brandt 
was nervous. Kennedy’s speech had just exploded the idea of détente. Brandt was most 
affected by Kennedy’s impromptu attacks on Communism. Since the erection of the 
Berlin Wall he was the one German politician to defend the American position of détente, 
as evident in his remarks at Harvard in 1962. Brandt was also wary during Kennedy’s 
speech because in three weeks his press secretary Egon Bahr would be attending a 
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conference at the Evangelische Akademic Tutzing, a conference for politicians and 
intellectuals. At this conference, Bahr was going to unveil Brandt’s version of détente 
between the two Germanys, Ostpolitik, in an effort to ease East-West tensions (Daum, 
2008). Thus Brandt stood and watched nervously as his plans for Ostpolitik seemed to 
have been threatened. 
As Brandt finished his speech, the crowd called for Kennedy again. Adenauer 
encouraged the president to step forward. Kennedy came to “Old Man” Adenauer’s side, 
and this time the two stood together smiling and waving at the crowd. The crowd began 
to chant for Adenauer, a man who had been distant and detached from the city as 
Chancellor of West Germany, a man who remained nonchalant when the wall was built 
and a man who had hesitated to go to West Berlin a few days before. The crowd chanted 
“Konny, Konny” embracing the chancellor with an American-sounding nickname. The 
American sounding version of Konrad was a double triumph for Adenauer since the 
American nickname also symbolized West Berliners celebrating themselves as American 
Berliners, different than other West Germans. Adenauer’s unexpected inclusion made 
him part of this new shared experience in U.S.-German relations (Daum, 2008). The 
day’s celebration and communal experience with Kennedy created a new identity for 
Berliners. No longer were they merely Germans, but Westerners and Americans. 
Kennedy’s identification as a Berliner raised the status of Berlin to the equal of an 
American city. Though, Kennedy may have expressed these sentiments in 1961, it was 
not until Kennedy arrived in Berlin and had shared a communal experience with the 
Berliners did they fully understand the seriousness of America’s commitment and 
perhaps only then did Kennedy fully realize Germany’s yen for reunification. 
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West Berliners and Germans were elated at Kennedy’s words and in general the 
majority of Americans responded positively, but Kennedy’s advisers, especially Bundy 
and Sorensen were not particularly thrilled with Kennedy’s impromptu sections. Both 
Bundy and Sorensen were in attendance and looked on uncomfortably; they believed the 
tone failed to promote negotiations with the Soviets (Smyser, 2009). Not only did the 
speech seem to undo Kennedy’s peace speech at American University, but it raised his 
advisers’ worst fears. The speech seemed to directly refute even the possibility of 
coexistence with the Soviets, which was exemplified most sharply with the stinging 
rebuke: “there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the 
Communists. Let them come to Berlin” (Kennedy, 1963a). Bundy, who favored the more 
diplomatic earlier text, told Kennedy in a classic understatement: “I think you went a 
little far” (Smyser, 2009, p. 226).  
 American diplomats throughout Europe told their host government that Kennedy 
did not literally mean that the West could not work with communism; his words were 
idealistic rather than strict prescriptive guidelines for diplomacy (Beschloss, 1991). 
Kennedy however disagreed with his advisers’ assessment and the worried diplomats. 
Kennedy now believed he understood German desire for unification and he now saw 
Berlin as a place to build his legacy, not merely a place he inherited and had to defend. 
Kennedy was a new president and redefined the U.S.-German relationship (Kempe, 
2011). While Kennedy did make some changes to his upcoming Free University speech, 
leaving the door open for Khrushchev over arms control, he did not believe he had gone 
too far at Rudolph Wilde Platz.  
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The one audience that was most likely to receive the speech as hostile was the one 
audience that overlooked the speech. Khrushchev focused on Kennedy’s American 
University address and his calls for peace there. If Khrushchev had taken Kennedy’s 
remarks at city hall literally, the world may have inched closer to war again (Beschloss, 
1991). Fortunately for Kennedy, Khrushchev wrote off Kennedy’s speech as rabble-
rousing Cold war rhetoric. Khrushchev wisely quipped two weeks later 
If one reads what he said in West Germany, especially in West Berlin, and 
compares this with the speech at the American University, one would 
think that the speeches were made by two different Presidents…[Kennedy 
was] competing with the President of France in courting the old West 
German widow. Both try to win her heart, which has already grown cold 
and which often prompts its possessor to utterly unconstructive thoughts. 
And if this widow is courted the way these two wooers woo her…the 
widow can become conceited and think that the solution of world 
problems really depends on her (Beschloss, 1991, p. 608n.) 
 
Khrushchev’s ambitions in Berlin had been curtailed, he chose to focus on commending 
the American University speech as “the best statement made by any President since 
Roosevelt” (Freedman, 2000, p. 269). Khrushchev’s positive attitude towards the speech 
could perhaps be attributed to the ongoing Sino-Soviet split (Freedman, 2000). The 
varied audiences in international affairs heard and took what they were supposed to from 
Kennedy’s remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz. 
 Kennedy’s success in creating a shared vision and community are evident in the 
warmth and the numerous outbursts of cheering during his Rudolph Wilde Platz address 
by the West Berliners. By bringing Adenauer along with him to Berlin, he was able to 
gain a favorable turn in U.S.-West German relations. His rhetoric soared over the Wall 
and broke down the physical barrier standing between the Germans, as the conversation 
of the Politburo wife and her friend demonstrated. He was successful in building 
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consensus among the average German on both sides, though Brandt was a bit alienated 
by Kennedy’s accusations of not being able to work with the communists, but Brandt’s 
fears would soon be allayed. The most divided audience on the speech was Kennedy’s 
own advisors and the president himself. Kennedy held firm that there was nothing to 
worry about, though his advisors greatly worried about the potential political damage. 
Luckily, for them, Khrushchev did not read into the speech a bellicose tone; rather, he 
merely ascribed the tone to a man being carried away by an enthusiastic crowd. Rudolph 
Wild Platz was a success for Kennedy and his legacy in Berlin. 
Why Rudolph Wilde Platz Matters 
 Kennedy typically preferred to stay away from the crowd-baiting demagoguery of 
his political Boston grandfathers, but not on that day (Beschloss, 1991). Kennedy had 
spoken the words his audience wanted to hear like any good politician. The half million 
strong had not come to listen to Kennedy give an academic lecture on the history of the 
two nations or how compromise needed to take place with Khrushchev and Ulbricht. No, 
the Berliners came to listen to the young and energetic president who protected them and 
beat back Khrushchev in 1961 and 1962, at Checkpoint Charlie and in Cuba. They were 
there to be inspired. The overflow of enthusiasm from the audience and Kennedy’s own 
personal emotions overcame his vaunted reason. It was one of the few instances in 
Kennedy’s career when personal emotion overtook his public persona (Silvestri, 2000). 
The personal emotion also extended his charisma. He used nonverbal hand gestures and 
pounded his fists to emphasize his points. Since one of the pre-trip objectives was to see 
and to be seen by Berliners, Kennedy was intent on smiling and enjoying himself in an 
effort to set the right mood (Daum, 2008). 
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 Rhetorically Kennedy’s speech at Rudolph Wilde Platz is important because it 
demonstrated the power and importance of creating a shared vision and communal 
experience with your audience. Kennedy’s identification as a Berliner erased his failures 
of 1961 and cemented his legacy in Germany. He identified with his audience by stating 
he was a Berliner, in their foreign tongue and shared his vision of a free and united 
Germany and Europe. His attacks on communism, while they ran counter to his official 
policy, endeared him to the crowd. Kennedy’s off-the-cuff remarks were dangerous 
politically, but genius rhetorically as he fearlessly stated what every Berliner knew to be 
true and what many in the West turned a blind eye toward. It was the first of a two part 
rhetorical strategy. First, at Rudolph Wilde Platz Kennedy established identification with 
his West German audience. Second, at Free University, he would sell them on his détente 
policy and their part in the policy, opening up of inter-German relations. 
 Analysis of Rudolph Wilde Platz and Kennedy’s historical tour of the city also 
demonstrates the importance of personal diplomacy and physical connection with your 
audience. His physical presence in the city accentuated his remarks, but also allowed him 
to personally grasp the situation and understand a different perspective on the situation. 
Analysis of Rudolph Wilde Platz is important because of Kennedy’s ad lib remarks 
during his speech. As Zarefsky (2008) argued studying rhetoric can “address the question 
of the author’s intention” (p. 633), which in the case of Kennedy’s ad lib remarks makes 
his rhetoric more personal than planned speeches. Kennedy’s personal beliefs had shown 
through clearly: his anger at the Berlin Wall and his seeming failure to act, the failures of 
the communist system are abundant, but military rollback was not the answer indicated 
by his pragmatic temperament on reunification. Idealism, pragmatism and accusatorial 
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tactics are well founded rhetorical strategies expressed in Kennedy addresses, and history 
and its metaphors are ways of building cohesions, creating community and expressing 
ideals. 
Free University: Rudolph Wilde Platz’s Counterbalance 
 The potential political damage Bundy and Sorensen believed Kennedy had 
incurred at Rudolph Wilde Platz was largely repaired at the Free University. The speech 
at Rudolph Wilde Platz may have inspired the public, but it left Brandt and Bahr tentative 
about their future plans for détente. Their fears were soon calmed as Kennedy gave his 
most important address in Berlin at the Free University (Hofmann, 2007). The Free 
University (FU) was firmly entrenched as part of the topography in America’s Berlin. 
The FU was established with direct American support both financially and intellectually. 
The University was spread across an extensive landscape giving it a suburban feel that 
resembled American universities. It was very close to the U.S. ideologically and was well 
known for its hospitality to U.S. professors and openness to American developments in 
the social sciences Assembled from both the Free University and the Technical 
University, some 10,000 to 15,000 professors and students were in attendance for 
Kennedy’s speech. In 1963, there were approximately 13,400 Germans and 800 foreign 
students attending the Free University (Daum, 2008). Sorensen and Bundy pushed 
Kennedy to be more conciliatory toward the Soviets and to make sure Khrushchev 
understood that what Kennedy had said earlier was to rally Berliners (Smyser, 2009). 
At the Free University, Kennedy uses the polysemy of his discourse to reach to 
different audiences, the West Germans and Berliners and the global audience embodied 
in the future leaders and “citizens of the world” present. Kennedy also uses his speech at 
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the Free University to build support for his détente policy. In the next section, I will 
examine how Kennedy used his personal style of juxtaposing idealism and pragmatism to 
achieve a shared vision. I will then examine Kennedy’s peace policy, détente. I will 
conclude with a discussion how Kennedy sought to build community for his policy of 
détente. 
The Challenge Extended: Truth, Justice and Liberty 
 In his closing remarks earlier that afternoon, Kennedy offered a vision of 
Germany’s future where Berliners and Germans “earned the right to be free, including the 
right to unite their families and their nation in lasting peace” (Kennedy, 1963a). At the 
Free University, he discussed what the next generation needed to take their rightful place 
in history The future generations, Kennedy implied, will be able to transcend the past 
twenty years of history of war and confrontation in Europe and work towards a new 
horizon in Europe if they keep in mind three ideals: truth, justice and liberty. Kennedy 
draws attention to the confluence of American ideals with those of the Free University. 
Such ideals will only flourish under a democratic form of governance.  
 Kennedy firmly believed in issuing a challenge to the American people to secure 
their commitment to his vision. The president’s rhetorical treatment of German audiences 
was largely the same. Kennedy offered a set of challenges to the German people to work 
towards a peaceful coexistence and the long-term goal of reunification.   
Kennedy enumerated the three ideals and defines the essence of each. Truth 
forces people to “face the facts as they are, not to involve ourselves in self-deception; to 
refuse to think merely in slogans…let us deal with the realities as they actually are, not as 
they might have been, and not as we wish they were” (Kennedy, 1963b). The second 
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ideal, justice, “requires liberty…[which] requires us to do what we can do in this 
transition period to improve the lot and maintain the hopes of those on the other side” 
(Kennedy, 1963b). The last ideal Kennedy speaks to, liberty, which will manifest itself in 
“A united Berlin in a United Germany, united by self-determination and living in peace. 
This right of free choice is no special privilege claimed by the Germans alone. It is an 
elemental requirement of human justice” (Kennedy, 1963b). In speaking to these three 
ideals, Kennedy used transcendent language in the form of universal principles to create a 
shared vision in his German audience. These are principles that Kennedy believed should 
be accorded to all men and women; principles that can transcend physical barriers. 
 Kennedy’s challenge of reunification through the application of the three ideals 
provides a broad outline and crucial set of principles. However, the Germans would need 
guidance from the past to achieve these lofty goals. In stark contrast to the bellicose 
attacks on communism that were present in the afternoon, Kennedy now espoused 
cooperation with the East as the method to advance a lasting peace and reunification of 
Germany and Europe. 
 Truth, justice, and liberty serve as thematic tools for both organizing Kennedy’s 
Free University speech and providing lynchpins for specific steps toward the ideal of 
reunification. To realize truth in international affairs and inter-German relations, 
Kennedy calls upon the FRG to finally recognize the East: “we all know that a police 
state regime has been imposed on the Eastern sector of this city and country” (Kennedy, 
1963b). The long standing FRG policy of non-recognition of the GDR created tension 
between Bonn and Washington when attempting to coordinate German policy. Kennedy 
does not request or order the FRG to accept the GDR’s social structure or propaganda 
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that East Berlin is a socialist paradise or even democratic, but merely asks his audience to 
accept the reality that the country exists. Kennedy wants a de facto recognition of the 
GDR because pretending the GDR does not exist could harm future reunification efforts.  
 To help bring about truth in relations, Kennedy suggested, “We must first bring 
others to see their own true interests better than they do today” (Kennedy, 1963b). This 
directly supported Kennedy’s claim that the GDR was disillusioned by its own 
propaganda, but a continued policy of ignoring the GDR’s existence by the FRG 
damaged inter-German relations and overall German identity. But, it was also intended 
for his West German audience to examine the truth of their situation and examine the two 
questions of non-recognition: What is the best policy for reunification? and How does 
non-recognition help my German kin in the East? He cautioned, “The peaceful 
reunification of Berlin and Germany will, therefore, not be either quick or easy” 
(Kennedy, 1963b). Truth was only the first step Kennedy proposed. Using truth as a 
measure, Germans and Berliners on both sides of the Wall were to submit to a candid 
appraisal of the situation and fully examine the best courses of action. Kennedy was 
confident the superior Western systems of democracy and capitalism would prevail over 
their Eastern socialist counterparts. 
 The second step, justice, frames an appeal to move beyond the mere recognition 
of the situation in the East and offers practical solutions for West Berliners and Germans 
to adopt. JFK asserted,  
It is important that the people on the quiet streets in the East be kept in 
touch with Western society. Through all the contacts and communication 
that can be established, through all the trade that Western security permits, 
above all the contacts and communication that can be established, above 
all whether they see much or little of the West, what they see must be so 
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bright as to contradict the daily drum beat of distortion from the East 
(Kennedy, 1963b). 
 
Kennedy’s concept was a micro version of détente, daily interactions between East and 
West Germans over mundane and basic tasks, trade, communication and other common 
issues. Détente is not rallies and slogans filled with anger, but taking the time and effort 
to carefully carve out a mutual coexistence that works toward solving problems. The 
strength and benefits of the West will attract East Germans and Europeans so that “when 
the possibilities of reconciliation appear, we in the West will make it clear that we are not 
hostile to any people or system providing they choose their own destiny without 
interfering with the free choice of others” (Kennedy, 1963b). Freedom is not hostile or 
threatening, but welcoming of diversity from the East. Here Kennedy premises the 
success of détente on freedom and negotiation between East and West mitigating his 
threatening tone at Rudolph Wilde Platz. 
 The first two steps of truth and justice offer a pathway to obtain the final goal of 
liberty and reunification. More important than the final goal of reunification, which has 
always existed among Germans, was the course Kennedy had laid out to achieve liberty. 
Tatalovich and Daynes (1979) argue that a president’s power rests in his ability to 
persuade and Zarefsky (2008) noted the importance for a leader to present a clear vision 
to gain support. For Kennedy to be successful at the Free University, he needed to present 
a clear plan that could be accepted by the Germans. Kennedy’s two step plan to gain 
reunification was a logical course and offered Germans a means to gain their desired end.  
The final pillar justice demanded that West Berliners and Germans work together 
on ground level issues to make progress on the larger issue of unification. These 
interactions will demonstrate to Easterners the good intentions of the West and the 
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failures of communism including the inability to provide basic goods and services. West 
Berliners have no higher calling than to stay in Berlin and “to show your neighbors 
democracy at work, a growing and productive city offering freedom and a better life for 
all” (Kennedy, 1963b). Kennedy’s rhetorical success at the Free University was grounded 
in his ability to create a clear vision of how to achieve a common goal, which he, too, 
now supported -- the final goal of reunification. By presenting a challenge and vision to 
achieve this goal, Kennedy built presidential ethos. As Kennedy did in 1961, he provided 
a strategy for achieving peace in the world, not just virulent attacks on communism. The 
leadership and vision present in this speech made Kennedy appear presidential as he 
contributed viable options for peace, reunification of Germany and Europe and ending 
Cold War divisions. In both speeches, he was able to set the terms of debate, direct the 
citizenry toward the important issues that must be solved and became the embodiment of 
the nation. 
Kennedy offered one final challenge is to all who listen and accept his message. 
Kennedy concludes “This is not an easy course. There is no easy course to the 
reunification of Germany, the reconstitution of Europe. But life is never easy. There is 
work to be done and obligations to be met—obligations to truth, to justice, and to liberty” 
(Kennedy, 1963b). The challenge is to be accepted and met by all, Easterner or 
Westerner. Kennedy’s message was directed to all those who can see past the current 
state of division and look forward to a reunified country and reconstituted continent. For 
the person who holds those values and for the person who yearns to be free, the choice is 
easy, but the path will be difficult. History and liberty is on the side of those willing to 
accept the challenge of working with the East and opening up their society to the West.  
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In examining these multiple challenges, three rhetorical strategies  deserve 
attention. First, as discussed already, Kennedy created a shared vision and common goals 
for his audience to rally around so he could gain support for his policies. Second, he used 
the challenge to orient his audience toward a common goal. Kennedy had previously used 
the challenge strategy in 1961 to create community and orient his audience toward a 
common goal. At Free University, the goal remained, but Kennedy used his speech to 
orient his audience toward a particular path to take. Finally, he used the juxtaposition of 
idealism and pragmatism. Each of the three principles were employed as universal terms 
that transcend time and place and could symbolically unify people that were physically 
separated. However, each of these ideal principles was accompanied by pragmatic steps 
that could be taken to reach that ideal state. Kennedy did this not to dampen the mood of 
his audience, but to be realistic about the situation and provide concrete steps for action. 
These two seemingly opposing ideas complemented each other rhetorically. An overly 
idealistic speech would raise the audience’s expectations to unrealistic levels and an 
overly pragmatic speech would lack the inspirational unifying principles for the audience 
to rally around. Kennedy’s blending of idealism and pragmatism served his ends well. 
Accusations and History: Kennedy’s Other Strategy  
 At the Free University, Kennedy’s approach to accusations was largely 
comparative. He focused on the West’s superior economy and popular sovereignty in 
contrast to the East. Kennedy argued that Western culture can “contradict the daily drum 
beat of distortion from the East” (Kennedy, 1963b). Kennedy’s accusations are more 
opaque here and meant to keep the door open for negotiations between the two countries. 
Kennedy wanted to temper his bellicose rhetoric after the afternoon speech, but also to 
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reaffirm his pragmatic belief that only negotiations could improve the Cold War. The idle 
rhetoric and boasting between nations must be abandoned for real and lasting solutions to 
work. The entire tone of the speech is oriented toward the long term success of détente 
and the reunification of the continent, which he believed could be best achieved through 
mutual cooperation. 
 With the exception of maintaining the U.S. commitment to West Berlin and the 
freedom of Western Europe, Kennedy did not make any concrete threats against the 
Soviet Union. Kennedy did not the attack the communist system until he discussed the 
ideal of truth, which meant recognizing “a police state regime has been imposed on the 
Eastern sector of this city and country” (Kennedy, 1963b). Even this accusation makes no 
direct attack on communism nor does it even mention communism as an instigator of 
police state regimes, much less the Soviet Union. Kennedy later refers to the police state 
as “an anachronism,” but again his accusations lack the vitriol of his earlier speech when 
he declared the communist system was a failure. At the Free University, JFK was merely 
comparing the two economic systems (Kennedy, 1963b). His only mention of the Soviet 
Union was “The people of the Soviet Union, even after 45 years of party dictatorship, 
feel the forces of historical evolution. The harsh precepts of Stalinism are officially 
recognized as bankrupt…So history, itself, runs against the Marxist dogma” (Kennedy, 
1963b). Even this accusation fails to indict the Soviet Union as evil or sinister in world 
affairs. Rather, it is a veiled recognition of Khrushchev’s moderate approach and success 
in ending the policies of Stalin.  
 Kennedy had tempered his bellicose rhetoric from earlier in the day at Rudolph 
Wilde Platz. Kennedy returned to the theme of peaceful coexistence and working with 
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each other through negotiations. There was one aspect to Kennedy’s rhetoric that 
remained present at the Free University, his historical allusions and examples. 
 From the Battle of Bastogne reference in his July 1961 speech to Civis Romanus 
Sum a few hours earlier at Rudolph Wilde Platz, Kennedy always used historical 
references to accompany his points. At the Free University, Kennedy employed panoply 
of historical references and discusses the concept of history with a discourse against 
communism. Kennedy’s historical references include such diverse references as the 
foundation of education, Prince Bismarck, the American Revolution and Goethe’s advice 
on international strife. For example, Kennedy quotes Goethe as saying “With sufficient 
learning a scholar forgets national hatreds, stands above nations, and feels the well-being 
or troubles of a neighboring people as if they happened to his own” (Kennedy, 1963b). 
Here Kennedy associates one of Germany’s great writers with his idea of détente. This 
concept is especially poignant to the Germans whose communist neighbors are not 
foreigners, but are Germans. By using Goethe Kennedy is tying Germany’s past ideals as 
an appeal for realizing his present goal, making Germany a part of the détente process. 
 Kennedy’s historical references to great German leaders or visionaries and 
America’s founding fathers and inception is another example of Kennedy identifying 
associations between the two countries through history, either by comparing them 
directly or ordering his speech so that they complemented each other. Similar to 
Kennedy’s interweaving Roman, American and German ideals together earlier in the day, 
the president now links the histories of the two nations together on a deeper level than in 
the past. Previous historical connections mentioned by presidents revolved around the 
major events from 1945-1963, which most of his audience lived through and could 
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connect as shared experience. Kennedy took the historical ties between to the two 
countries to another level. His trip to Frankfurt connected Kennedy to early German 
liberalism in 1848; allusions to Goethe’s international outlook and the founding father’s 
ideals helped reinforce similar values that bonded the two nation’s history together.
 Kennedy uses a historical argument to discredit the communist ideology, which is 
based on a specific idea of history and the progression of history toward a worldwide 
communist revolution where all nations would become communist. From Marx to 
Khrushchev, communist leaders always believed that history was on their side and 
always pointed that out in addresses and attacks on capitalism.  Earlier I noted that 
Kennedy’s description of freedom movements reinforced the ideal of liberty. Such an 
example does double-duty because it also can serve as a contemporary historical 
argument to attack communist predictions of eventual triumph. Recall that Kennedy 
employed examples of historical events to argue against the communist view of the 
march of history. He notes: “Negro citizens of my own country have strengthened their 
demand for equality and opportunity…The pace of decolonization has quickened in 
Africa…The people of Eastern Europe, even after 18 years of oppression, are not 
immune to change” (Kennedy, 1963b). Even “the people of the Soviet Union…feel the 
forces of historical evolution” (Kennedy, 1963b). These examples serve JFK well in 
demonstrating freedom’s march across the globe. The pace of history is slow and is part 
of Kennedy’s pragmatic approach, but his examples demonstrate a progressive evolution 
of thought around the globe—one that is contrary to Communism’s belief because 
“history, itself, runs against the Marxist dogma, not toward it” (Kennedy, 1963b). This is 
a more subtle attack on the communist ideology, at least one that is not as fierce or 
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blatant as his attacks hours earlier, but perhaps more damning because historical fact is 
represented as undermining the foundation of communist ideology. 
 Kennedy declared that “these dogmatic police states are an anachronism. Like the 
division of Germany and of Europe, it is against the tide of history” and the West will 
have to take action to help bring about the change—the steps already outlined above 
(Kennedy, 1963b). Kennedy asserts “The new Europe of the West—dynamic, diverse, 
and democratic—must exert an ever-increasing attraction to the people of the East” 
(Kennedy, 1963b). His call for action follows his action-oriented leadership style, the 
principles of the New Frontier and the strength of the Western system. Instead of merely 
containing or waging a military war against communism, Kennedy proposes to fight 
communism in the market place of ideas, not the battlefield. This change in emphasis, 
from a military strategy to defeat communism to a détente strategy, represents a change 
in Kennedy’s discourse and outlook.  
 Kennedy was able to ground his argument in history by examining communism’s 
failure over the past eighteen years. Communism’s ruthless history stretched back to the 
closing days of World War II, with Soviet atrocities perpetrated against the German 
populace on a massive scale. Communism’s aggressive action against the West in Berlin, 
Korea and Vietnam were three examples Kennedy could have cited as aggression against 
Western values. Interestingly, Communism’s attack against the West was minimal 
compared to the historical failures and destruction waged against its own people. The 
Soviet gulag system and the crushing of the East German uprising and the Polish and 
Hungarian uprisings were small compared to the destructive Cultural Revolution of Mao 
in China; each of which were examples of communism abusing its people either in the 
204 
 
name of control or cultural progress. As Kennedy believed personally and as was 
reiterated to Khrushchev at Vienna, he was not overly concerned with Soviet and Chinese 
doctrines and political beliefs, but rather, what they actually did in the world. It was their 
aggressive actions that caused Kennedy concern and drove him to action.  
 The most evident symbol of failure was the Berlin Wall and its scarring physical 
presence across the Cold War landscape. The Wall symbolized the detainment of people 
against their will to serve communism’s historical agenda. The Wall served to keep out 
the liberalizing effects of the West, which is why Kennedy proposed to use a new 
strategy to transcend the Wall and change communism, détente. 
Détente: The Path Forward 
At the Free University, Kennedy was reasserting the principles developed in his 
American University address. In speaking to the Germans, in their homeland, Kennedy 
asked them to subscribe to the principles of détente. Kennedy’s call to the next generation 
of Germans highlighted his differences with Adenauer who always feared détente and 
negotiations with the Soviets and GDR. Now Kennedy was speaking to a new generation 
about détente.  
Kennedy again recognized that convincing his audience on either side of the Iron 
curtain was not an easy task, “There will be wounds to heal and suspicions to be eased on 
both sides” and to help future integration of the East into the West “The difference[s] in 
living standards will have to be reduced by leveling up, not down” (Kennedy, 1963b). 
Kennedy warns “I do believe in the necessity of great powers working together to 
preserve the human race, or otherwise we can be destroyed” (Kennedy, 1963b). The 
failure of détente and communication leads to misunderstanding and even worse, war. 
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The dark hours of the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and Cuba in 1962 taught Kennedy that 
communication above all was important. Détente maintains the lines of communication 
and works to open societies to each other for the free exchange of ideas. It was a strategy 
Adenauer feared and older generations in both America and Germany had shied away 
from, but Kennedy articulated his belief that a new age was dawning and his generation 
and the next had to be ready to meet the challenge. Buttressing Kennedy’s belief in 
negotiations and the future was his conviction of Western superiority. He felt the 
dynamics of capitalism and democracy would be appealing to those living in the 
downtrodden East. 
Community Building: A Dual Audience 
Kennedy’s remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz, only a few hours before his Free 
University address, were intended for Germans, but there was one line that expanded the 
scene to the global Cold War landscape: “When all are free, then we can look forward to 
that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of 
Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe” (Kennedy, 1963a). Kennedy continued the 
themes of reunification, but expanded them to the larger Cold War landscape at the Free 
University. Kennedy references to Asia, Africa and Latin America are few in number, but 
he bestows the title “citizens of the world” on those attending the Free University; 
including the 800 students in attendance from foreign countries and they too are 
encouraged to play a critical role in the advance of freedom globally. What Kennedy 
began at Rudolph Wild Platz, he would continue at the Free University by stressing to 
these “citizens of the world” the need to educate for and embody the ideal of freedom. 
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After initial remarks, Kennedy addresses his audience directly, “I am talking to 
the future rulers of this country, and also of other free countries, stretching around the 
world, who have sent their sons and daughters to this center of freedom in order to 
understand what the world struggle is all about” (Kennedy, 1963b). This expansion of the 
audience is crucial for Kennedy because he hoped to gain global acceptance for his new 
détente policy, which was originally announced at the American University. Kennedy 
now had a global audience he could address on détente’s importance. At American 
University, he was addressing a U.S. audience and the Soviet leadership. At Free 
University, Kennedy seized the opportunity to expand détente to a global policy by 
influencing the next generation. The “citizen of the world” attempts to “comprehend the 
difficult, sensitive tasks that lie before us as free men and women, and… [is] willing to 
commit [his or her] energies to the advancement of a free society” (Kennedy, 1963b). A 
“citizen of the world” is a man or woman dedicated to the advancement of freedom. Note 
that Kennedy did not use the term “democracy”, but relied upon the freedom of popular 
will signifying a rejection of bi-polar world and the realization that multiple forms of 
government are acceptable, as long as they are chosen by the people and do not infringe 
on others’ basic rights.   
Kennedy’s first two speeches typified his personal responsibility and action-
oriented leadership style in conducting America’s world affairs. At the Free University, 
however, Kennedy spoke to the next generation and outlined his vision of the task at hand 
and how young people can make an impact in the world. Kennedy shifts the onus of 
tomorrow’s politics and geopolitical world onto the future generation and he argues that 
their success is dependent on their education. Kennedy saw the hardening of Cold War 
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tensions in his generation: the Berlin Blockade, the repression of freedom movements in 
the 1950s, the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. He understood that 
détente would be difficult and demanding and while he could begin to thaw relations 
between the superpowers, further progress would be at a slow pace. The success of 
détente would hinge on the upcoming generation, which is why Kennedy spoke to the 
students on the necessity of pursuing his policy. 
Kennedy’s spoke of three ideals: truth, justice and liberty. The ideal of liberty 
helps Kennedy expand his speech to the global landscape, where freedom’s call is 
reverberating on a worldwide scale. Liberty is tied to the freedom movements around the 
globe. Kennedy noted that the freedom movements of the “Negro citizens of my own 
country have strengthened their demand for equality and opportunity…The quick pace of 
decolonization has quickened in Africa…The people of Eastern Europe, even after 18 
years of oppression, are not immune to change. The truth doesn’t die” (Kennedy, 1963b). 
Using these examples of the global liberty movement, Kennedy demonstrated that liberty 
is a goal that transcends race, class and politics. Liberty becomes one pillar of the shared 
vision Kennedy created for his audience.   
While the global citizen references worked toward creating a global vision, 
Kennedy needed to reach a more important audience, the Germans. Kennedy and his 
administration firmly believed that for a successful détente between the U.S. and Russia, 
the Germans needed to work together. Kennedy was not calling for full recognition of the 
GDR by the FRG, but coexistence was needed. For détente to work in Europe, inter-
German problems would need to be solved between the two German states.  
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The expression of justice required the two Germanys to work with one another on 
basic tasks. Kennedy firmly believed and reassured his West German audience that West 
Germany’s strengths would win over the GDR every day; an indicator in Kennedy’s firm 
belief in Western superiority economically, politically and culturally over its Eastern 
competitors. This strengthened his call for candor between the two states, as the FRG had 
nothing to fear because it had “demonstrated [a firm] commitment to the liberty of the 
human mind, the welfare of the community, and to peace among nations” (Kennedy, 
1963b). The GDR’s historic failure to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the world was 
evident: the 1953 uprising, the emigration of two million refugees and the failure at 
Checkpoint Charlie. A de facto recognition of the GDR would help ease tensions, 
improve the lives of Germans on the other side of the Wall and ease eventual 
reunification. Further positive action by the FRG could only enhance its prestige and 
improve relations in the Cold War, especially by helping their neighbors across the 
border. 
 West Germany and West Berlin were said to possess the qualities that are 
consistent with other Western nations and should be welcomed with open arms into the 
Western Alliance as equals. This call, along with Kennedy’s discourse at Rudolph Wilde 
Platz, marked a change in his thinking. West Germany was no longer an allied nation in 
the Cold War, but a major allied nation whose concerns should be accounted for in the 
U.S. Like the Western Alliance in 1961, Kennedy now had to take into account West 
German policies when speaking about or conducting U.S. foreign policy. In 
communicating this sentiment, Kennedy had spoken forcefully to Germans in Germany, 
which served as a significant statement of Germany’s importance to the West. Similar to 
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de Gaulle’s statement about the Germans being a great people, Kennedy’s remarks about 
Germany’s place among nations projected a Germany that had been able to transcend the 
ravages of its dark Nazi past. Kennedy’s stop in Frankfurt, which was the historical 
symbol of liberty in Germany from the 1848 revolutions, and his motorcade through 
Berlin, highlighted the American and Western influence on the city, and reinforced 
Kennedy’s remarks. The U.S. president’s call outweighed de Gaulle’s statement because 
Kennedy was the leader of the free world who signaled Germany’s re-ascension into the 
community of peaceful nations. 
 Through the common struggle of the first Berlin Crisis in 1961 and with his 
attention diverted by the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy had been unable to forge a 
strong emotional and physical bond with West Germans.  Though the image of the 
vengeful Nazi Stormtrooper had faded, a new vision of Germany had escaped Kennedy’s 
grasp until 1963. Only then did Kennedy fully realize the German desire for reunification 
as he personally experienced the warmth of the German people and their resolve to 
participate in and shape a common destiny. The president’s perception of Germany had 
changed, along with his emotional attachment to the city of Berlin. He was a new man 
(Kempe, 2011). Kennedy’s acceptance of Germany into the community of nations and 
powerful discourse to the Germans in Germany solidified the acceptance of a common 
vision for the future, a vision rooted in the principles of truth, justice and liberty, and one 
that defined a common policy of détente that would work for the long term reunification 
of Germany. The success of Kennedy’s speech and the buy-in from the Germans was 
evident in the actions of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr and the success of their Ostpolitik 
policy. 
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The Rise of Brandt and the Dawn of Ostpolitik 
 The American response came mainly from JFK’s advisers, Sorensen and Bundy. 
Kennedy inserted a line by Bundy that was intended to help repair the damage done in his 
first address. Bundy inserted the line “As I said this morning, I am not impressed by the 
opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 84). This 
line and the overall tone of the speech helped to repair the political damage in the eyes of 
Sorensen and Bundy (Hofmann, 2007). Kennedy’s speech at the Free University helped 
him annunciate his détente policy in a way that made the biggest impact in the German 
psyche and ensured the largest buy-in from the population. 
 The Soviets and Khrushchev paid little attention to Kennedy’s remarks at the Free 
University. Though the openings Kennedy initially presented in his American University 
speech were reiterated at the Free University, they were soon echoed by Khrushchev. In a 
matter of a week, in his own address in East Berlin, Khrushchev would be openly 
discussing the idea of a nuclear test ban treaty, a treaty that Kennedy had been working 
for since being elected in 1960. 
 The audience that Kennedy most wanted to reach was the Germans. The tone and 
aim of the speech was aimed at Germans and Berliners. Kennedy’s Free University 
speech had summoned the magic words that attracted both East and West Germans, the 
prospect of German unification (Smyser, 2009). The Germans themselves basked in 
Kennedy’s trip and its aftermath. George McGhee, the American ambassador in Bonn, 
stated “it simply dominated the mass media, and the Germans were speaking of little 
else” (Daum, 2008, p. 169). Brandt would become the biggest beneficiary of the trip, 
especially because of Kennedy’s speech at the Free University. 
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 In the days’ following Kennedy’s visit to Berlin, U.S. diplomats across Europe 
tried to shift the focus from Kennedy’s speech at Rudolph Wilde Platz to the Free 
University speech. Many supporters of détente in the U.S. and Berlin were confused as to 
how détente could work after Kennedy declared that cooperation with the communists 
was impossible at Schöneberg Hall (Daum, 2008). Leading the shift in focus to the Free 
University speech was Willy Brandt who championed Kennedy’s more conciliatory tone. 
Brandt saw Kennedy’s speech as a point-by- point reiteration of his positions on Berlin, 
Germany and détente. The speech at the Free University was a critique of Bonn’s foreign 
policy, an endorsement of Brandt’s own evolving policy of small steps and added 
encouragement to continue this policy further with the blessing of America (Hofmann, 
2007). Brandt and Bahr now went on the offensive campaigning hard for their Ostpolitik 
policy in the weeks after Kennedy’s visit. They had 350,000 color pamphlets made up 
and distributed to every family in Berlin with a full text of Kennedy’s speeches, a preface 
by Brandt, and no less than eight pictures of Brandt and Kennedy together. Over the next 
few months and years, Brandt rarely missed an opportunity to quote Kennedy, especially 
the Free University speech, which provided him with an arsenal of suitable, authoritative 
maxims (Hofmann, 2007).  
One of the lines that found favor in Brandt’s political movement toward 
Ostpolitik was Kennedy’s remark regarding the importance of East-West engagement: “It 
is important that the people on the quiet streets in the East be kept in touch with Western 
society. Through all the contacts and communication that can be established, through all 
the trade that Western security permits” (Kennedy, 1963b). In the five meetings with 
Rusk, Brandt was encouraged to create more contacts between East and West. Kennedy’s 
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discourse helped Brandt advance his policy (Hofmann, 2007). Bahr began to lay out the 
Ostpolitik policy specifics at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing. 
 In mid July, Bahr gave an address that would outline the Ostpolitik policy both he 
and Brandt would implement over the next ten years. In a speech that had Brandt’s 
blessing, Bahr coined the phrases “change through rapprochement” and “overcoming the 
status quo by not changing the status quo at first” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 85). Bahr applied 
these principles to inter-German relations arguing that by working with the East German 
regime, could the West hope to promote peaceful change and transform the regime. 
Bahr’s speech was logical and precise following Kennedy’s tenets and applying them to 
the specific question of inter-German relations (Hofmann, 2007). The most explosive 
portion of Bahr’s speech was his call for de facto recognition in all but name of the 
regime in the East. Bahr did not call for de jure recognition of the GDR as a legitimate 
regime, but he recognized that the changes that needed to take place called for some sort 
of recognition of the present situation. As Kennedy stated at the Free University, “It 
requires us to face the facts as they are, not to involve ourselves in self-deception” 
(Kennedy, 1963b). Bahr was prodding the West Germans and Berliners to recognize the 
division of Germany and to work with their brethren in the East. 
 Brandt recognized Bahr’s address may have breached the public taboo on East 
German relations and that smaller steps would be needed to initiate détente with the 
GDR. Brandt planned to begin with humanitarian aid, but he cautioned that this was only 
the first step. In concert with Kennedy’s Free University address, self-determination was 
the long-term objective (Hofmann, 2007). Later in his career, Brandt recognized that the 
small steps were not necessarily an “automatic path to reunification, but [served] as a 
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value in themselves in so far as one helped the people in the Zone” (Hofmann, 2007). 
Brandt finally grasped the message that Kennedy presented at the Free University; 
reunification would not come in a sweeping movement, but in a series of practical steps. 
Patience and faith were needed to maintain contact with the occasionally hostile regime 
in the East. 
 Bahr’s speech created backlash in Berlin and West Germany. Both the CDU and 
SPD political parties criticized Bahr. The backlash taught Brandt and Bahr a valuable 
lesson, the power of public taboo in recognizing the GDR. Though, they also realized 
what they could say in public, as they discovered, “the CDU cannot fight through to the 
ultimate conclusion if that forces it to admit that it, or important parts of this party, 
basically dislikes the entire direction of the American administration” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 
86). Opposition to Ostpolitik could only criticize Brandt and Bahr so much because their 
thoughts and ideas were linked to American policy. As time passed, the ire over Bahr’s 
speech at Tutzing faded and Brandt used his speech as a reference point for the beginning 
of Ostpolitik (Hofmann, 2007). 
 Brandt and Bahr’s acceptance and embrace of Kennedy’s Free University speech 
equated to a whole-sale buy-in on Kennedy’s détente policy. The power to persuade and 
to induce acceptance of a policy are two critical factors when determining the success of 
a rhetor (Zarefsky, 2008 & Tatalovich and Dynes, 1979). Ostpolitik, touted by Brandt 
and Bahr, became the foreign policy of West Germany from the late 1960s till the end of 
the Cold War, historically indicating the success of Kennedy’s Free University speech. 
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Why Free University Matters 
 The Free University speech can be seen as an extension of Kennedy’s American 
University address. As an extension of his peace policy, Kennedy now specifically 
included the Germans with his calls for inter-German relations. Wander (1984) stated that 
a president should be the embodiment of foreign policy. With his pleas of coexistence 
toward the Russians, Kennedy became a true proponent of détente. By examining 
Kennedy’s three German speeches beginning with his July 1961 speech, I traced the 
evolution of Kennedy’s thought process and policy on Berlin and Germany. Kennedy’s 
1961 speech created a vision and policy of military defense with flexible response. His 
speech at Rudolph Wilde Platz countered his calls for coexistence, but it was a strategy to 
garner the support of the Germans and to build a communal bond with them. At Free 
University, Kennedy shifted gears from a military policy for Germany to a peace policy 
grounded in détente. Kennedy would not shrink away from confrontation, but he was 
more focused on reaching agreements with the Soviet Union over the issues of Berlin, a 
test ban treaty, and other major issues that called for attention. 
 The military buildup and the adversarial nature of the Cold War coaxed Kennedy 
into a military strategy in 1961, even though he personally favored negotiation. His 
personal failures at Laos, the Bay of Pigs and Vienna also influenced his decision 
because he needed to regain the position of strength that he had lost. This militaristic 
rhetoric and outlook took the world to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962, at which 
point Kennedy realized the dangers of this strategy and returned to his favored position of 
negotiations. This evolutionary outlook assisted the president in regaining the negotiating 
position of strength that helped him in 1963. 
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 Kennedy’s outburst of emotion and accusatorial speech at Rudolph Wilde Platz 
represented his visceral reaction to the conditions in East Berlin and the horror of the 
Berlin Wall. His failure to act and his lack of interventional rhetoric over its erection 
factored into his emotional outburst. His basis for attacking communism was well 
founded in the Soviet failures and atrocities from 1945 to 1963. Each failure gave 
credence to his attacks. His emotion and sympathy with West Berlin aims helped create 
the communal bond between the two that had been missing. 
 The Free University address is the culmination of Kennedy’s work in Germany. 
He provided a roadmap for success in inter-German relations, while at the same time 
eliciting the buy-in of the Germans for his détente policy. This speech was a counter to 
Rudolph Wilde Platz as it is more pragmatic and less accusatorial in tone and topic. Free 
University marked the transition from a military strategy that began in 1961 to a peace 
strategy that was slowly taking shape prior to the address, but was fully initiated 
afterward. Kennedy expanded the audience from Germany to the world, creating a global 
vision and policy that could be usefully adapted in a variety of contexts and countries. 
Unlike his first strategy, which was premised on militarism, this new strategy revolved 
around negotiation and worked towards peaceful coexistence. This policy was highly 
attractive to many Third World and neutral countries that feared nuclear annihilation 
between the two superpowers. By framing the Cold War debate in terms of negotiation 
and peace, with the U.S. taking the initiative and offering the olive branches to the Soviet 
Union, Kennedy was able to set the terms for the debate. If the Soviets rejected 
Kennedy’s call for peace, any aggressive action on their part would be more readily 
condemned. Kennedy’s articulation of the evolution of his policy was a masterstroke 
216 
 
rhetorically, always setting the terms of the debate in the U.S.’s favor. Kennedy was able 
to frame the terms for debate and denounce communism’s aggression because the 
historical fact supported his case. Communism’s failures were evident throughout the 
past eighteen years and he was able to amplify those failures to gain the rhetorical edge. 
Chapter IV. Conclusions and Implications 
Epilogue: Kennedy’s Legacy in Germany to Ostpolitik in the 1970s 
 As Kennedy flew to Ireland from Berlin, he was still glowing from the day’s 
events. Kennedy later commented that his visit gave him a far deeper understanding of 
the necessity of ultimate reunification (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy had also finally 
realized that West Berlin could be an asset rather than a hindrance in his global Cold War 
strategy. His speech at Rudolph Wilde Platz marked his final reconciliation with the 
paradox of Berlin, a militarily indefensible city that was politically indispensible (Stern, 
2006). It was a final declaration of independence from any threat made by the Soviets 
carrying his message from Cuba one step further. Kennedy’s Rudolph Wilde Platz 
address became part of his lore and myth as no other Kennedy address is cited as often or 
as proudly (Smyser, 2009). Berlin receded as a flashpoint in the Cold War. The 
occasional harassment by the Soviets over Berlin remained, but nothing teetering on the 
brink of nuclear war. Brandt believed that Kennedy’s personal guarantee made it too 
risky for the Soviets to move on Berlin. Khrushchev recognized the dangers of re-
escalating tensions in Berlin and he told Ulbricht to back off to lessen the threat of 
misunderstanding between the two sides.  
After Kennedy’s visit, Berlin and America became irrevocably linked. No 
American president could back away from the commitments Kennedy words had sealed 
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(Smyser, 2009). Kennedy glowed with the pride of keeping the city free despite all the 
detractors that told him it was too risky. The adulation he received in Germany made him 
feel that the sacrifices made by Americans were recognized and appreciated by Berliners 
and Germans. Kennedy sat there weary, but happy, he told Sorensen, “We’ll never have 
another day like this one as long as we live” (Sorensen, 1965). Kennedy revitalized 
German hopes for reunification and committed Germany to détente. 
 Part of Kennedy’s contentment came from the knowledge that he had bested de 
Gaulle in winning the hearts of the German people. In a radio address to the American 
people on July 5, 1963, Kennedy declared the trip as a success and a “moving 
experience” (Daum, 2008, p. 170). The crowd that saw his motorcade was estimated 
between 1.1 and 1.4 million people or approximately 58 percent of adults and young 
people (Daum, 2008). About 90 percent of the people who saw his motorcade returned 
home to follow the rest of his visit on television. Between 7.5 and 8 million homes in the 
FRG and West Berlin had a television, 60 percent of those tuned into the news on the 
days of Kennedy’s visit (Daum, 2008). Television allowed the Germans to experience an 
American presidential visit as tangible event and “to experience everything so directly,” 
strengthening the communal experience between Kennedy and the Germans (Daum, 
2008, p. 171).  
Opinion polls indicated that the average German was overwhelmingly positive in 
assessing Kennedy’s trip and his rhetorical messages, describing them as “exceptional,” 
“spectacular,” “breathtaking,” and “moving” (Daum, 2008, p. 170). Kennedy’s trip had in 
fact exceeded the expectation of all observers who marveled at the “jubilant enthusiasm 
and heartfelt response on the part of West Berliners” (Daum, 2008, p. 169). The press in 
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Germany also lauded the trip and publicized the warmth and enthusiasm shown by the 
Germans along Kennedy’s stops. The Frankfurter Rundschau reported the West Germans 
had an “exceptional, personal liking for Kennedy” and the Bonner General-Anzeiger 
went further claiming “[the] West Germans’ response to Kennedy indicated their 
preference—should they have to choose—for American Atlanticism over the Gaullist 
vision of a more independent and self-confident Europe” (Daum, 2008, p. 171). The U.S. 
Information Service in Bonn characterized Kennedy’s Berlin trip as having a “record 
after-effect and the largest spontaneous public response to a foreign visitor in German 
history” (Daum, 2008, p. 169).  
 After experiencing the burden of crisis during his first few years as president, 
Kennedy reaped the benefits of a favorable turn in U.S.-German relations. The problems 
between Bonn and Washington still existed, but an increase in loyalty and trust between 
the two capitals fostered improved relations. Kennedy’s decision to bring Adenauer to 
Berlin with him further eased tensions between the two improving relations; “an 
undertone of cordiality never before registered so clearly,” now bonded the two leaders 
(Daum, 2008, p. 175). 
 Kennedy received mixed reviews from the American press. The New York Times 
and newsman Walter Lippmann found little to complain about after the trip, but were 
initially against the venture. Some members of the Republican Party did not approve of 
Kennedy’s trip, warning against misinterpreting his performance. The Chicago Tribune 
and The Wall Street Journal denounced Kennedy’s “ventures in personal diplomacy” 
(Daum, 2008, p. 172). Other press outlets and politicians were relieved by Kennedy’s 
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conciliatory tone at the Free University. Despite the few criticisms, overall, Kennedy’s 
actions were well received at home.  
Kennedy received predictable responses from Rome to Paris. Most leaders were 
relieved that Kennedy downgraded German reunification from an immediate to a long 
term goal. France was mildly upset that Kennedy’s trip stole de Gaulle’s thunder, but 
they praised America’s commitment to Europe. However, the question of America’s 
long-term reliability on the continent remained. Britain praised the Federal Republic as a 
true friend to America, but the Daily Express believed the FRG would only support the 
transatlantic alliance until it acquired nuclear weapons, then the alliance would 
disintegrate (Daum, 2008). French and British criticism seemed to largely stem from 
political ambitions and insecurities. France wanted to create a strong European bloc, led 
by France, to counter America’s influence on the continent. The British Empire, being in 
the throes of decline, grasped harder at the “special relationship” it held with America. 
General impressions across the rest of the West were positive. Kennedy improved 
relations in Germany and further guaranteed American support on the continent. 
 The Soviets and East Germans criticized Kennedy‘s trip as conceding to West 
German revanchism, which benefited the Western capitalist system. They focused on 
Kennedy’s remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz where they believed Kennedy backtracked 
from his peaceful coexistence stance with “vile anticommunist attacks” (Daum, 2008, p. 
172). GDR officials pointed to the contradictions between Kennedy’s American 
University address and his remarks at Rudolph Wilde Platz. However, none of the 
criticism mentioned the phrase “Ich bin ein Berliner,” fearing that East Germans would 
identify with the president. One discrepancy between Eastern and Western reports was 
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Kennedy’s visit to the Brandenburg Gate. Neues Deutschland reported that the visit was 
cut short, only five minutes long, because of the “red flags of the working class, the 
national emblem of the GDR, the protective wall,” and the slogans that disturbed the 
“otherwise so self-assured” president (Daum, 2008, p. 172-173).  
Neues Deutschland’s report contradicted the numerous West German reports from 
Tagesspiegel, Suddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt. These German papers reported 
Kennedy’s cool and calm character became more expressive and human as the visit 
progressed. Kennedy delivered the line ‘Ich bin ein Berliner” humbly and modestly. 
However, the crowd, their enthusiasm, and the emotion from the Wall, caused the 
president to break form and lose control of his emotions. A new Kennedy emerged. As 
the Berliner Morgenpost wrote, West Berliners were said to be most responsible for this 
as their warmth blazed a trail through the “cool and rational view of the world held by 
this man from Boston” (Daum, 2008, p. 176). 
 Two days after Kennedy’s visit, Khrushchev visited East Berlin. Ulbricht and 
Khrushchev tried to recreate a Kennedyesque scene, Soviet style. They rode in an open 
car to the adoration of 600,000 East Berliners chanting “Nikita! Nikita!” but the effect 
was hardly the same. The Eastern celebration lacked the spontaneity and genuine 
affection of West Berlin’s celebration. Khrushchev tried the phrase “Ich liebe die Mauer” 
or “I love the Wall,” but that  poorly chosen phrase simply inspired dread and sadness, as 
East Berliners saw the Wall as a prison more than anything else (Smyser, 2009). 
Khrushchev discussed reunification, but only under the socialist system. He did believe 
that the best option for the superpowers was coexistence using a détente policy (Daum, 
2008). The real purpose of Khrushchev’s trip was to reemphasize to Ulbricht that “An 
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important reason for not pressing ahead with Berlin…is the outcome of the Cuban crisis” 
(Smyser, 2009, p. 233). A CIA report indicated that the Soviets “do not intend to 
reactivate the Berlin issue for a long period” (Smyser, 2009, p. 233). With the removal of 
the Jupiter missiles in late March from Turkey followed by Kennedy’s American 
University speech, Khrushchev decided 1963 was the best time to invest in détente 
(Fursenko & Naftali, 2007). Khrushchev’s decision allowed him to make a bold move in 
early July that accomplished one of Kennedy’s major goals. 
 On July 2, 1963, Khrushchev delivered a speech in East Berlin. He praised the 
“sober appraisal” of Kennedy’s American University speech (Beschloss, 1991). 
Khrushchev announced that he was prepared to accept a partial test ban treaty (Fursenko 
& Naftali, 2007). The limited ban treaty would cover the atmosphere, outer space and 
under water. Combined with signing a nonaggression pact between East and West, the 
treaty would create a “fresh international climate,” stated Khrushchev (Beschloss, 1991, 
p. 618). The West quickly sent negotiators to Moscow to work on the treaty. Kennedy 
told his negotiator, Averell Harriman, to work on keeping China from going nuclear. 
Kennedy had warned that China would be a “great menace in the future to humanity, the 
Free World, and freedom on earth” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 619). The limited test ban treaty 
marked the beginning of détente in the Cold War. The move toward détente helped 
Khrushchev work towards a better climate for the two superpowers to compete, where the 
weapons were ideas, not guns, and the major benefit would be the decline in military 
budgets (Fursenko & Naftali, 2007). 
 Relations between the superpowers steadily improved. By October, they agreed 
on a deal over excess American grain. To gain passage of selling American grain to 
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Russia, Kennedy included the proviso that it must be shipped on American vessels, which 
had one of the highest shipping rates in the world. The Soviets agreed upon what was 
deemed some “damned expensive” wheat (Beschloss, 1991, p. 645). Americans favored 
the agreement by a 60 to 31 percent margin (Beschloss, 1991). The deal almost got 
derailed by Berlin when Rusk and Gromyko met. Rusk told Gromyko that Berlin was still 
the main point of contention between the two superpowers. Gromyko complained of 
Bonn’s obstruction to a peace treaty. Rusk reminded him that the “fever of the situation” 
in Berlin was gone, as the East was no longer bleeding emigrants and GDR trade with the 
FRG was about $5 billion (Beschloss, 1991, p. 645). Rusk also reminded him that 
Khrushchev had said that trade meant peace, and that the U.S. was “no monkey on a 
stick, manipulated by West Germany” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 645). A few days later on 
October 10, Kennedy revealed to Gromyko that he intended to flatten his defense budget, 
unless a crisis developed. Kennedy hoped Khrushchev would do the same. Kennedy also 
hinted at decreasing the number of American soldiers in Europe, hoping the Russians 
would follow suit (Beschloss, 1991). Slow, but substantial progress was being made with 
the Soviets in thawing the Cold War.  
Unfortunately, Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, before he could 
make further progress. Mourning over Kennedy threatened to take on a surreal aspect in 
Germany. Memorial services in the streets sprang up sporadically. Ceremonies often 
adopted the modern tradition of political commemoration (Daum, 2008). Fritz Stern 
(2006) described the scene in Germany after Kennedy’s death: 
People began to cry, others were hushed in horror, and my own feeling 
was one of stunned, disbelieving grief—and fear. What did it mean? I had 
been beguiled by Kennedy’s style and wit, by his team at the New 
Frontier, awed by his (and his brother’s) handling of the Cuban missile 
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crisis, and above all I had cheered his American University speech the 
previous April, when avoiding all American triumphalism he called for 
improved relations with the Soviet Union. I felt this loss incalculable. The 
world was mourning. The murder of Kennedy evoked a universal 
identification with America—especially among Germans, most fervently 
among Berliners (p. 234). 
 
Kennedy now became a mythological fallen hero. The memorial services personified and 
glorified his political achievements, depicting him as a model of virtue for the present. 
Kennedy’s charisma had touched the transatlantic experience by enabling his audience to 
experience first-hand this “extra-ordinary other” (Daum, 2008, p. 188). As the mass 
media reported on Kennedy’s death, and citizens all across Germany tuned in again, as 
they had six months earlier, but this time with grief in their hearts. JFK’s death rivaled 
two other moments of spontaneous occurrences of communal mourning in German 
history, the deaths of Emperor Wilhelm I in 1888 and President Friedrich Ebert in 1925. 
Germans had mourned, but never before for a foreign leader. Candles were placed in the 
windows. Since the end of World War II, candles were used for public mourning and 
collective expectation for political salvation (Daum, 2008). Candles were even seen in 
East Berlin and the GDR. Kennedy brought America and West Germany together one last 
time to share in yet one last communal experience.  
 With his death, the Kennedy myth in Germany and Europe grew. The Kennedy 
myth began with the president of far-off America transforming West Berliners into 
Roman citizens, with Cicero’s help, which brought Germany back into the community of 
nations. The myth stretched back to the Greeks who celebrated with “religious veneration 
in their tragedies” the death of the hero (Daum, 2008, p. 192). Kennedy had become the 
American Prometheus, a titan who moved between the realm of gods and the mortal 
world. He had brought an unusual fire to Europe that had warmed a world gone cold. He 
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was also referred to as a modern day Scipione del Ferro, a Renaissance man who could 
do anything. Kennedy was lauded as a true Republican, in the style of an ancient Roman 
ideal of reaching for the stars. The myth of Camelot also began to arise around this time 
(Daum, 2008). Most non-German Europeans viewed Kennedy as Prometheus or an 
ancient Roman. This perspective surfaced in many Europeans’ conceptions of 
transatlantic politics. The Old World, Europe, transferred its ideals to the New World, 
America. Kennedy rejuvenated America, the myth went, because he had a European soul 
(Daum, 2008). Fritz Stern (2006) received a letter from a young archivist working in 
Merseburg in January 1964, which commented, “The shock here was particularly great 
and persistent because for us America is the symbol of freedom and tolerance” (p. 333). 
Kennedy embodied American ideals that reached both young and old in Germany and 
Europe. 
A memorial service was held in front of Schöneberg City Hall the day Kennedy 
was laid to rest. The service was replete with political, military and religious symbols that 
interwove the two countries (Daum, 2008). On that day, as it was in June, the life of 
Berlin was suspended. Heinrich Albertz, a member of the municipal executive, closed the 
ceremony by proclaiming Kennedy “was a Berliner” (Daum, 2008, p. 196). With 
Kennedy’s death, one of the high points in relations between Berlin and America ended. 
The final tragic act of Kennedy and Berlin was over. 
 Brandt wanted to keep the Kennedy legacy alive after his death. He hurriedly 
wrote Encounters With Kennedy offering numerous Kennedy quotes. An unfavorable 
review of the book criticized Brandt for being more about politicking for himself than 
about Kennedy. Brandt tried to counter this impression. He felt he needed to rekindle the 
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flame of hope that was snuffed out after Kennedy’s untimely death (Hofmann, 2007). 
Brandt was trying to cast himself as Kennedy’s executor in Germany. He received a 
favorable endorsement from Kennedy’s widow, who wrote him that she hoped “that you 
will someday…lead your country as he led his” (Hofmann, 2007, p. 97).  
Brandt began with a small step after Kennedy’s death. He received an offer from 
GDR Council of Ministers, Alexander Abusch, to negotiate Christmas passes for West 
Berliners. They could travel to East Berlin to visit their relatives over the holidays. The 
first pass was signed on December 17, 1963 (Hofmann, 2007).  
The foundation of Ostpolitik started in Berlin and became West Germany’s policy 
when Brandt became Chancellor. The three foundations of Ostpolitik were: Reunification 
is a foreign policy problem that can be solved only with the Soviet Union, not without 
and not against it. The despicable regime in East Germany cannot be destroyed; one must 
work with it. While these thoughts were uncomfortable for many Germans and went 
against their deepest feelings, they seemed unavoidable to Brandt (Smyser, 2009). Brandt 
reversed Adenauer’s policy, which was to put reunification before any deals with the 
East. Brandt believed reunification would come, but that a number of other issues needed 
to be solved   between the two Germanys first (Smyser, 2009). Brandt’s initial détente 
policy attempts from 1963-66 were a start, but did not track what Kennedy had proposed. 
Brandt’s activities from 1970-1973 actually patterned themselves after those Kennedy 
had advanced in his 1963 speeches. In those three years, Brandt accomplished a package 
deal that maintained the status quo that secured Berlin. In this package deal, there was no 
give in the Western position. Kennedy wanted Brandt to find a modus vivendi in Berlin 
or a secure a long range settlement which would allow other issues to be solved. These 
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included: German frontiers, sovereignty of the GDR, prohibition of nuclear weapons for 
both Germanys and a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw powers 
(Hofmann, 2007). A non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw powers was 
originally a Soviet idea, but Kennedy pushed the concept in the West and offered it as a 
way to recognize the status quo in Europe (Hofmann, 2007). Brandt successfully 
negotiated a treaty recognizing the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia, secured 
Berlin, signed the 1970 Moscow Treaty which gave de facto recognition to the GDR and 
the Oder-Neisse line, and improved relations with the GDR, the Soviet Union and other 
Eastern Bloc countries (Smyser, 2009 & Hofmann, 2007) 
 The Kennedy legacy in terms of German relations is complicated. No president 
had treated the Germans so ruthlessly, yet became so popular with them. Kennedy’s 
policy was in direct contradiction to West Germany’s policy, he accepted the Berlin 
Wall, he wanted the West to recognize the GDR and work with them and he stated 
clearly that it was up to Germans to find solutions to inter-German problems (Hofmann, 
2007). Previous American heroes in the German pantheon included Roosevelt for his 
commitment to free Europe from the evils of Nazism, Secretary of State George Marshall 
for fashioning an economic policy to rebuild Germany and President Truman whose 
determination helped end the Berlin Blockade. None of the three have their names on 
bridges or streets in Germany’s largest cities: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne and 
Bonn. Kennedy, did less than his predecessors for German reunification, has a street or 
bridge named after him in all those cities and remains beloved figure to most Germans 
(Mathiopoulos, 1985). 
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 Kennedy initiated détente in U.S.-Soviet relations. Kennedy preferred adding 
options and remaining flexible in situations compared to creating one hard and fast 
policy, even if this meant promoting contradictory courses simultaneously, as he did in 
July 1961 espousing both a military buildup and negotiations (Freedman, 2000). Kennedy 
wanted to reexamine U.S. policy and decision making at every step of a situation or crisis 
before acting. Though this policy may seem infuriating and complicated, Kennedy had 
great fortune of implementing this policy in Berlin. Remnants of Kennedy’s influence in 
policy can be seen long after his death, in both NATO and subsequent U.S. presidential 
decision making (Freedman, 2000). 
 Kennedy’s policy of increasing the military budget and erasing the doubts of the 
missile gap, at least in favor the Soviets, caused the Soviets to damn the consumer and 
throw their economy into overdrive. This caused the arms race that lasted into the mid 
1980s. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union had reached an approximate parity with the U.S. 
in nuclear arms. Khrushchev claimed that the Soviet economy would be the strongest in 
the world by 1980 and the Soviet sports and national defense would be conducted by 
spontaneous initiatives of the masses (Beschloss, 1991). By 1971, the Soviet power was 
so strong in Europe they did not have to threaten war over Berlin to move on other Cold 
War issues. However, 1980 found the Soviet economy in stagnation and rapidly 
crumbling. Kennedy did succeed in diffusing the Berlin flashpoint. Under Brandt’s 
leadership, Ostpolitik had achieved diplomatic success in getting the quadripartite powers 
to proclaim “the frontiers of all states in Europe inviolable” (Beschloss, 1991, p. 702) In 
exchange for this agreement, the Soviet’s promised not to interfere with Western access 
rights in Berlin (Beschloss, 1991).  
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The outcome of the Berlin Crisis showed that the two superpowers had more in 
common, than they originally thought. If the Soviets did not raise the issue of Allied 
rights in Berlin, the Western Allies would accept the reality of two separate Germanys. 
The real benefit to the two superpowers was that they were now free to stop responding 
to every whim of their associated German state. The superpowers were no longer black 
mailed into believing they had to hang tough in Germany, with the fear of losing 
credibility in their German state (Judt, 2005). With the two superpowers free to act, it was 
up to the two German states to work out any remaining inter-German problems. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Studying Kennedy’s three German speeches from 1961 to 1963 exemplifies the 
evolution of a cold war president. Kennedy’s public address on Germany and Berlin had 
the weight of history bearing down on him, as he had to maintain U.S. commitments 
made from the end of World War II to his presidency. The historical events from 1945-
1960 influenced the way the Soviets and the Germans would respond to Kennedy’s 
rhetoric and actions concerning Berlin. The 1961 Kennedy was reeling from consecutive 
foreign policy defeats and a perceived thrashing at the hands of Khrushchev. He was 
determined to show his mettle. To prove his strength and that of the U.S., Kennedy’s July 
25, 1961, address examined the situation in Berlin from a legal and military perspective. 
Kennedy’s legal grounding had roots in the Yalta and Potsdam Accords. Kennedy 
defended American rights based in international law and responded to Khrushchev’s 
threats with a military buildup and new military strategy. German and Berlin unification 
was far from his thought process, what was most important was the Cold War and 
American prestige. When the East Germans erected the Berlin Wall, Kennedy stood by 
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silently. He accepted the basic rationale for the Wall and concluded that a Wall would not 
interfere with Western legal rights.  
By 1963, Kennedy was a changed man.  Seasoned by his early foreign policy 
gaffes, his experiences with Berlin in 1961, and the harrowing confrontation with the 
Soviets over the missiles that had been ominously placed in Cuba, Kennedy was 
determined to search for a middle ground where he would not be forced into 
brinkmanship.  His success in confronting Khrushchev over the Cuban Missile Crisis 
helped solidify his credentials as an effective, courageous and prudent world leader.  
When Kennedy arrived in West Germany in mid 1963, West Germans were 
waiting to cheer the hero that protected them in the dark days of 1962. Though the issues 
between the nations were far from solved, Kennedy was deeply moved by the West 
Germans’ warm welcome and marveled at the elation his visit had stirred. His speeches 
in Berlin on June 26, 1963, marked a turning point in the U.S.-German relationship. The 
need for a new military strategy was over, what remained and what Kennedy recognized 
was the need for a peace strategy. His Rudolph Wilde Platz Address attacked the horrors 
of communism. What Khrushchev called Cold War bluster was real emotion shown by 
the president at the horrors of the Wall and his own inaction in August 1961. His trip to 
Berlin brought home the deep seeded German desire for reunification. Keeping with his 
general rhetorical strategy present in all three speeches, balancing pragmatism and 
idealism, Kennedy addressed the graduating class at the Free University in Berlin. There 
Kennedy outlined practical steps that could be implemented to achieve a breakthrough in 
inter-German affairs. The two June 26 Berlin speeches demonstrate Kennedy’s rhetorical 
duality as both a pragmatist and an idealist; in one speech he attacks communism on 
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idealistic grounds and in the other he calls for East-West cooperation through pragmatic 
action. Kennedy evolved from thinking of the Cold War as a military problem needing a 
military strategy to a peace president focusing on fostering cooperation to lessen the Cold 
War tensions.  
This study has traced the evolution of Kennedy’s Cold War policy concerning 
Germany and Berlin. The use of historical-critical rhetorical methodology has allowed for 
a close description of historical events impacting the U.S.-German relationship, an 
analysis of Kennedy’s presidential rhetoric demonstrating the evolution of his German 
policy, and provided a case study in the expansion of presidential ethos in a rhetorically 
defined presidency. Kennedy used his addresses to fashion words that helped him gain 
support for his policies of flexible response and détente. A longitudinal study of 
presidential rhetoric over a time period can examine a particular president or issue 
showing the evolution or maintenance of a president or policy. 
Kennedy’s rhetoric on Germany reveals the rehabilitation of the German state in 
the world community. As previously noted, France and Britain were not against keeping 
West Germany weaker and this notion was highly supported by Soviet fears of 
revanchism. While the historical record supports West Germany’s importance in the 
Western Alliance, this was not always supported in the West, as evident in Kennedy’s 
July 1961 speech. German goals and aspirations were secondary to other Western 
Alliance members, especially those concerning reunification. From the end of World War 
II on, Germany continued to be shadowed by the specter of Nazism. Kennedy could not 
fully remove this specter, only a deep introspection on the part of Germans could do that, 
but Kennedy could welcome the Germans into the community of nations. Kennedy’s 
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(1963b) statement at the Free University serves as a compelling example: “The Federal 
Republic of Germany…has created a free and dynamic economy from the disasters of 
defeat, and a bulwark of freedom from the ruins of tyranny. West Berlin and West 
Germany have dedicated and demonstrated their commitment to the liberty of the human 
mind, the welfare of the community, and to peace among nations.” With these few short 
lines Kennedy further distanced West Germany from its Nazi past and associated it with 
the democratic freedoms of the West. Included in this revitalization and makeover of 
West Germany were the Amerika zu Hause, the Free University and other architectural 
and cultural imports from the West. Kennedy’s stop in Frankfurt connected early German 
democracy to the postwar government. Kennedy’s entire tour of Berlin and his two 
addresses in 1963 linked Germany with democracy, capitalism and Western ideals. 
Separating West Germany from its Nazi past helped legitimize West Germany’s standing 
among nations and improved the psyche of its population. The burden of collective guilt 
that began in 1945 was lifted throughout the 1960s. 
One of Kennedy’s rhetorical tactics reflected his personal belief that America and 
democracies respond best to challenges (Gaddis, 2005b). Kennedy presented his German 
audiences with a challenge or a task to undertake fostering improvements in the world. 
He was not merely a president who reported on events, blamed others, or waited to see 
how a crisis turned out. He actively sought to meet the challenges America and freedom 
faced. He bore the responsibility for his policies and actions being the first citizen of 
democracy. Through his rhetoric he was to unite an audience towards a common goal 
moving them to action. The aura and myth of Kennedy derived from his vision of a better 
future, which is evident in all three German speeches. This brighter tomorrow required 
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him to ask his audience to overcome and persevere through dangerous times, but his 
charismatic personality and personal acceptance of this same burden lessened the 
negative impact of his call for sacrifice. His success can be measured in part by the 
outpouring of love in America and Germany that was displayed after his assassination. 
The ability for a president to set a goal and to meet that goal affords the president 
credibility and bestows a credible image of leadership we often label “being 
presidential.” Such an image also boosted Kennedy’s standing among other leaders 
aiding him in international negotiations. Kennedy’s tough stance with Khrushchev helped 
him gain the nuclear test ban treaty and peace in Berlin. Kennedy stumbled early in his 
term, but he emerged as a confident presidential leader through his inspiring rhetoric and 
steely action in the hostile Cold War landscape. Words became deeds. 
Two other common Kennedy rhetorical tactics that deserve mention are his global 
appeal and his sense of history. Kennedy’s three speeches were intended to reach a 
particular audience. The July 1961 address was intended first and foremost for his 
domestic American audience; his Berlin speeches privileged the German audience. 
However, Kennedy included global themes that spoke to all nations and peoples. He used 
idealistic rhetoric to transcend place and time as he pressed the theme of freedom on the 
global agenda. His charisma allowed those listening to freely join him. Flexible response 
was a global policy protecting people from Southeast Asia to Berlin to America. In 
Berlin, he calls upon all free people to travel to Berlin and speaks to “citizens of the 
world” about universal principles of truth, justice and liberty. In contrast to his idealistic 
principles, Kennedy wanted to implement these high ideals using pragmatic steps. 
Kennedy commanded the historical metaphor to both inspire and to propose caution 
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against extremes. His awareness of the global landscape and history prevented him from 
overreaching on his idealistic goals. Instead, Kennedy proposed basic and attainable steps 
that helped assure that meeting his goals would proceed gradually, but at a steady pace. 
He knew history could not be rushed, nor does it provide much evidence for people intent 
on recording daily change. For Kennedy, prudence would suggest that history is a slow 
process that evolves over time. Flexible response was an intermediary choice between 
holocaust and humiliation. The president refrained from asking Berliners to tear down the 
wall at Rudolph Wilde Platz, and at the Free University Kennedy spoke of the small 
actions needed to bring about rapprochement and unification between the two Germanys.  
Examining Kennedy’s rhetoric on Germany from a historical rhetorical 
perspective provides one last lesson: the importance of clear and open communication 
channels during the Cold War. After Kennedy’s July 25, 1961, speech, Senator Fulbright 
made a comment regarding the possible border closure in Berlin. Kennedy failed to 
clarify or comment on Fulbright’s assessment. A few weeks later, the GDR erected the 
Berlin Wall, partially because of Kennedy’s July 25 speech. However, Fulbright’s 
comments did help confirm their feelings about how Kennedy would react. Kennedy’s 
failure to condemn the Wall boosted Khrushchev’s bravado in other areas of the world. 
When Fulbright again made a comment about missiles being in Cuba and that the U.S. 
was in no worse position, Khrushchev was emboldened again believing that Fulbright 
spoke for Kennedy. Khrushchev placed missiles in Cuba believing Kennedy would not 
react considering he remained relatively quiet over the Wall, but this time Khrushchev 
misread Kennedy’s intent and the premier’s high stakes gambit would backfire. Kennedy 
was irate and the world was brought to the brink of nuclear war. By 1963, Kennedy’s 
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blustery rhetoric at Rudolph Wilde Platz was overlooked by Khrushchev because of 
Kennedy’s tough action in the past and his clear commitment to Berlin’s defense help 
establish acceptable boundaries on Soviet action in the city. To escalate Berlin once again 
made little sense because the two superpowers had come to a clearer understanding of 
each other. Kennedy was forthright with his rhetoric after Cuba, sending clear signals that 
Khrushchev could read. He stated his position on Berlin so that there would be no future 
misunderstanding between the two.  The approach this study has employed makes it clear 
that the Cuban Missile Crisis and the erection of the Berlin Wall were in large part direct 
outcomes of Kennedy’s wavering and failure to communicate clearly about major U.S. 
priorities. Once he committed publically and clearly through his speeches in Berlin and 
through back channels to Khrushchev, an era of détente was ushered in and tensions were 
quickly diffused. 
Kennedy’s rhetoric also shows the limitations placed on a president when he is 
part of an alliance. Kennedy could not publically criticize his ally’s views, even when the 
alliance was threatened, as when de Gaulle threatened to change the Western Alliance in 
1963. In 1961, Kennedy refrained from blatantly stating America would not interfere in 
East Berlin because of his alliance with West Germany. Instead, he insinuated the Soviets 
and GDR could act as they saw fit in East Berlin. In 1963, Kennedy went to Germany to 
support the Atlanticists and refute de Gaulle’s claims questioning American commitment 
to Europe. The trip symbolized American commitment and Kennedy refrained from 
attacking France for undercutting the U.S. commitment to West Germany. Kennedy 
referred to leading the alliance and to working with Congress, both were necessary, but it 
would be easier to act without taking into account their disparate interests.  
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 Future scholarly work in this area might profitably focus on the continued 
evolution of the American-German relationship after the erection of the Wall. The Berlin 
Wall created a new political atmosphere in Germany and West Berlin, and many political 
changes took place inside Germany with the rise of Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt. Brandt 
gained national notoriety for his public speech against Kennedy and the West’s lack of 
action when the Wall was erected. Future studies could focus on Western reaction and 
rhetoric concerning the Wall’s presence in Berlin. Continued research can be conducted 
to investigate how the speeches by Kennedy or German leaders during the Kennedy era 
or other presidential administrations shaped the geo-political situation in Central Europe, 
the Soviet-American relationship over Berlin, and the German-American relationship.  
 Another area of possible scholarly inquiry is Truman and Kennedy. The Truman 
Doctrine was originally intended to be a flexible policy, much like flexible response, but 
it soon became a blanket policy cited by Cold War politicians as a reason to intervene in 
a foreign country. A comparison between the two speeches and policies is needed. 
Truman and Kennedy also present two ideal candidates to compare and contrast 
rhetorically by analyzing their policies and relationship toward Germany. Both were 
democratic presidents in office during the Cold War and both had major German crises to 
handle. Their rhetoric concerning the U.S.-German relationship could prove fruitful to 
both rhetorical and historical scholars. 
 Kennedy took an accusatorial and strong stance toward communism, while at the 
same time promoting a strategy of détente and negotiations. Other scholarly work could 
focus on presidents using a similar strategy of promoting two contradictory paths or 
examine how presidents’ discussed an adversary. What terms were used to describe the 
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adversary and what policies were implemented to deal with these adversaries? Such 
rhetoric could include other Cold War presidents’ rhetoric on the Soviet Union including, 
but not limited to, Reagan’s rhetoric toward the crumbling Soviet empire. Reagan’s 
strong stance against the communist ideology and his proposed “Star Wars” defense 
system is contradictory to his proposals at Reykjavik and other summits where he wanted 
to limit or decrease nuclear arsenals. Another area of exploration could be rhetoric 
concerning different offshoots of communism including “Maoism” and “Titoism.” Areas 
of study here could include Nixon’s rhetoric concerning China and normalizing relations. 
What strategies did Nixon explore and use when he planned and announced his Chinese 
trip and how do they compare to his rhetoric toward the Soviet Union? In each of these 
cases, the historical influence is important to understand and examine. Could Reagan’s 
initiatives due to the weakness of the Soviet economy? Was Nixon’s trip and normalizing 
of relations influenced by China’s failed Cultural Revolution? Rhetorical analysis with 
historical support could lead to insights to such questions. 
Finally, Kennedy’s rhetoric on Germany in the 1960s provides some insight into 
how presidents lead an alliance or coalition. Future studies could examine other Cold 
War presidents’ handling of the Western Alliance. Other scholars might take up such 
topics as the coalition-building required for George H.W. Bush’s preparations for the 
Gulf War, or perhaps mount an examination of George W. Bush’s rhetorical leadership in 
his attempt to promote and build a coalition of the “willing” post-9/11. Regardless of the 
potential new research projects implicated by the work undertaken here, it is my hope 
that this study has demonstrated the importance of linking rhetoric to history and history 
to rhetoric.  Texts and contexts remain inseparable. I trust that future scholars will 
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continue to pursue the mystery of how the past becomes a prologue and how presidential 
words spoken today cannot help but shape our common tomorrows.  
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